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CULTURE, PHILOSOPHY AND FAITH[1]

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THOUGH I have been a member of this Institute, I think from its foundation, I have been a steadily inactive member, and have resisted with what grace I could the blandishments of our Secretary when he has suggested that I should address my fellow-members. For I am not a philosopher, either by training or, I fear, by instinct; and, now that I have allowed myself to be inveigled into this place, I feel that I am brawling in church. I am the most ill-informed of laymen, and, if you feel any interest at all in what I am about to say, it will, I fear, only be the rueful interest that the expert sometimes takes in an exhibition of ignorance.

Yet, after all, in a sense the philosopher, unlike the scientist, is fair game for the layman. For there is no such thing as pure philosophy. The philosopher has a purpose beyond the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake. He has, in fact, a social purpose, and his work can therefore be subjected, at least in some degree, to the test of success or failure. The pure scientist escapes that test, for he can claim that his experiments succeed even where they fail, that each hypothesis disproved is an advance in knowledge. With still more reason he can claim that a discovery which has to all appearance no practical utility is nevertheless a triumph. But the philosopher has staked his all, not only upon the truth of at least one central hypothesis, but upon, so to speak, its availability to mankind at large; and, where he fails to prove that hypothesis or, proving it, fails to demonstrate its practical utility, he must admit defeat.

[1] Address delivered to the British Institute of Philosophy at University College on December 15, 1936.

The philosopher's purpose is indicated in Bacon's epigram: "The knowledge of ourselves . . . as it is the end and term of natural philosophy in the intention of men, so notwithstanding it is but a portion of natural philosophy in the continent of nature." The philosopher represents this "intention of man." He has staked all on the hypothesis to which the whole human race has always felt itself committed: that the universe has a meaning for man which it has not for any other living creature, that man can only know himself by rightly judging his relation to the universe, that his manhood consists, not only in his growing knowledge of the "scheme of things," but in his appropriation of that knowledge to himself. To vary an old simile: every fact ascertained by science must be converted by man into life as the mulberry leaf is converted into silk. As knowledge grows this process of digestion becomes more difficult, but, on the other hand, its necessity is more insistently felt. Never, certainly, has it been more insistently felt than to-day; never has so severe a strain been placed upon the philosopher's powers of interpretation.

It is in that sense that the question may fairly be asked: Is the philosopher succeeding? And, as a guide to an answer, it is permissible to ask another question: How far has he succeeded in the past?

I suppose that, at the back of most men's minds in this age, there is a pretty picture of philosophy derived from nineteenth-century liberalism. According to this picture, man emerges in the dawn of time as a half-bestial being, moved partly by animal passions derived from the struggle for existence and partly by superstitious fears of the unknown. Those fears he has embodied in irrational rules of worship and propitiation, and he has then used these rules for the more rational purpose of controlling his animal passions in the interests of the community. From this rudimentary stage there thus emerges a human society where quite reasonable standards of duty and mutual obligation are based upon the irrational taboos of religion. These irrational taboos may contain an element of truth. Science has not yet abolished the unknown, nor is it probable that it ever will. There may be a God; there may be a life after death. Man may have duties towards that supreme power and with reference to that ultimate future which go beyond his duties to his neighbour. But his duties to his neighbour come first, and they do not need the support of any taboo. They can be shown to be necessary by a rational study of the laws of nature and the requirements of civilized society, and they are at least often distorted by the religious sanction which primitive man originally invented for them. So the function of the philosopher has been to wean men steadily from irrational to rational ethics; from the fervours of religion to

a single-minded respect for their neighbour's human wants and rights. In a word, he has been the apostle of "civilization," and the ideal man whom he is gradually forming will be that type of humane and cultured sceptic so often pictured to us in the Utopias of Mr. H. G. Wells.

This is indeed a pretty picture, but is it anything like what has actually happened in history? Of man's actual beliefs before the dawn of history we know, in fact, nothing. Nothing is more crassly unscientific than the calm assumption that they can be identified with the beliefs which may be observed to-day in the mind of the King of the Cannibal Islands. Personally, I can see no reason for supposing that the experience of primitive man was any different from any of those cycles of experience which are so clearly marked in man's subsequent history. In any case, we know that as soon as we come to historical societies the cycle of man's ethical and speculative thought does not run from the irrational to the rational. but rather from the rational to the irrational.

A society begins with a religious faith and a code of social conduct as rational as the state of its knowledge and the development of its reasoning powers permit. If, in the early stages of its development, its members have to struggle too hard for mere livelihood, either in protracted migrations or settled on poor soil and in an unfavourable climate, the faith may ossify into a cult so rigid that further progress becomes impossible. These are the so-called "primitive" societies. In more fortunate societies, the same ossification takes place, but at a later stage and consequently with no such final results. Such a society becomes gradually more highly organized as its prosperity increases. The State succeeds the village community. The sanctions of religion are increasingly invoked for the purposes of the State—no longer for the mere regulation of village morality but for the preservation of public order and the building up of the community's material wealth and power. It is under the influence of these expanding ambitions, not (as in less fortunate societies) under the pressures of poverty and insecurity, that the process of ossification begins. Wealth and power are found to be more congenial spheres for the use of human reason than worship or speculations about man's ultimate destiny. And, as the community's system of religion has become the framework within which wealth and power can be attained, men come to feel that they had better not meddle with that framework. But, before very long, the hardening cult begins to interfere with men's search for wealth and power. A priesthood, for instance, becomes economically powerful; or it tries to use its taboos to restrain men from the pursuit of necessary knowledge. Then the worldly ambition that had used faith as a convenient protection begins to revolt against

it. The revolt may be violent or gradual, but in either case the cult begins to decay and men begin to look round for a more elastic framework for their community life.

It is at that point that the philosopher comes in. The decay of a cult commonly coincides with a new growth of knowledge and opportunity which the old religious faith can no longer digest and make available. The task is taken up by the rationalist. But surely philosophy has always followed the same cycle as faith. As religious faith has hardened into a cult, so philosophy has softened into a culture. It begins by making the most exacting claims on man's intellectual responsibility; it ends by sinking him in a sort of feather bed of other men's opinions where he may rest in assured respectability, certain that he believes nothing which he has not read or heard on good authority. In its prime, philosophy can be sterner than faith, the philosopher king a greater tyrant than any priest; in its old age it achieves an emancipation which men find more intolerable than the chains of any religious cult. And when that stage is reached the religious cycle begins again. A faith emerges which once more calls upon men to make the effort, both of reason and of will, involved in its acceptance or rejection.

It is here that our nineteenth-century fathers went wrong. Cults they hated and feared; but culture was almost their ideal. They did not see, what we can surely see to-day, that both are degenerations. They did not realize, what history teaches and what our contemporary experience demonstrates only too clearly, that if men have often revolted violently against a cult, they have, as often and with even more violence, revolted against a culture. For a culture is worse than a cult in that, while it is equally unreasoning, it is even more unmeaning. It abandons even the pretence of interpreting the universe in terms of man. A culture is superior to a cult only in that, being even more unsatisfying, it spurs men more surely to the revolt which is the indispensable condition of further progress. "*Malheur au vague; mieux vaut le faux*"—that cry of Renan's may or may not please us as an expression of personal preferences, but it is historically true.

This tendency to degeneration of all human thought, philosophical as well as religious, has been obscured in the history of the Western world for the last thousand years or so by the close alliance between religion and philosophy. Christianity is the only religious faith which has been capable of such an alliance. (I will not pause to justify this generalization; I know it is risky.) For centuries, faith and philosophy have gone hand in hand; together they have emancipated and together they have tyrannized; cult and culture have merged into each other and, in the revolts they have provoked, it is difficult to disentangle the threads of free thought and new

faith, of Renaissance and Reformation. Opinions will always differ, for instance, as to how far the revolt of the sixteenth century was a philosophic revolt against a cult, an appeal from dogma to reason, and how far it was a religious revolt against a culture, an appeal from Aristotelian scholasticism to the principle of justification by a living faith. But however we may choose to separate the threads, it is mere colour-blindness to read the history of modern Europe and America as a progress from religion to philosophy. In the morphology of Calvinism, for instance, the sequence Calvin—Hume—Carlyle in Scotland or Calvin—Jonathan Edwards—Emerson in New England is at least as much a continuous process of philosophic degeneration as a struggle between dogma and free thought.

I dare not venture further into a history of philosophy. I must leave the bare mention of this sequence as my slender bridge across three centuries. But on the hither side of that bridge we come to a movement of thought of which we are the direct heirs and which we may, therefore, be able to judge with greater certainty. And in that movement we can perhaps discern the reason for those repeated failures of human thought which puzzle and disappoint us as we study the remoter past.

The nineteenth century was the age of scientific, as the sixteenth had been the age of geographical, discovery. As in the sixteenth century, discovery was accompanied by a revival of philosophy and was followed by a revival of religious faith. But the curious and significant fact is this: that discovery, while it gave philosophy its new impulse, did not give it its new material. The material on which the new schools of philosophy mainly worked was, not the scientific, but the social. True, this material was partly the indirect product of discovery—the changed economy resulting from the technologist's application of the scientist's new knowledge. But much of it was simply the old material of human relationships newly envisaged. It was no change in human relationships that stimulated, for instance, the philosophy of legal reform from Beccaria and Bentham onwards. And even in rationalizing social change the philosopher neither asked nor received much help from the scientist. The new humanitarian philosophy called on men to re-examine themselves as individuals and as members of society, rather than to reconsider their position in any cosmic scheme. It held out the prospect that such self-examination might be made as rigorously and objectively scientific as any analysis of inanimate matter. In that hope it sought to create a new category of social sciences, and to make that category almost independent of the physical sciences. The Utilitarians may not unfairly be said to have found a use for everything except the new facts of physical science.

The religious revival for the most part followed the same model,

from Lacordaire and the Christian Socialists to the social reform movements of our own day. Even the dogmatic and authoritarian revival in the Roman Catholic Church was intimately associated with the new humanitarianism; even revived mysticism focused itself at Lourdes in a faith directly related to the alleviation of human suffering.

Moreover, as science became self-conscious, the scientists themselves united in warning off the philosopher. Huxley's agnosticism was more hostile to philosophy than to faith. It could dismiss the mystic with Hobbes's smiling retort: If any man pretended to a private revelation, no other man could contradict him. But the rationalist must be positively and authoritatively assured that scientific knowledge was not far enough advanced to justify any sort of philosophic synthesis. This agnosticism perhaps reached its culmination in men like Ray Lankester, who anticipated by some years Mr. Henry Ford's discovery that history itself is "bunk." More recently there has, indeed, been a reaction among scientists against the agnostic attitude, but the reaction has taken a form hardly more helpful to philosophy. We are now assured that the universal flux into which the physicist is resolving the universe may be fitted into almost any scale of spiritual values; but a free pass to journey on every conceivable road is not much help to the traveller who is looking for a signpost.

Philosophy, thus driven back upon the study of society, could not, of course, remain untouched by science, but it has drawn from science analogies rather than material. And these drafts have been dangerous. In adopting analogies, the philosopher has tended to forget that he is using a different time-scale. No one seriously believes, for instance, that the theory of biological evolution, with a time-scale reckoned in tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of years, has any direct relevance to the history of organized human society during the last sixty centuries or so. Yet what began as nothing more than a suggestive analogy has tended to become a fundamental assumption. Biological evolution has been transmuted on the shorter time-scale into "social progress"—a process tacitly regarded as equally continuous and inevitable. On this foundation has been built up a sort of introspective, a sort of self-contemplative, social philosophy. Science has been assumed to have cut the connection between progressive humanity and the supernatural; and it has confessed itself unable to trace any alternative connection between humanity and the natural universe. Meanwhile the scientist has at least demonstrated that the universe contains many forces capable of being harnessed by man for his material enrichment. Let man, therefore, contemplate himself as the independent master of the universe. Let him observe that his mastery has been attained,

and can only be developed, by co-operative effort on a scale undreamed of at any earlier stage of human history. From this observation let him draw a new sense of social responsibility and evolve a new form of democratic society. Humanity, engaged on a pioneering adventure, is cut off from any outside influence or guidance; let it find in that thought a new self-reliance and a new comradeship.

Only the crassest prejudice could be blind to the nobility of this ideology, but it has an obvious danger—precisely the same danger as we know threatens the individual who indulges in excessive introspection. So long as such introspection takes the form of self-confidence confirmed by a career of constant success, the individual may be both happy and useful, however exasperating he may be as a companion. But, his course of success once interrupted, his superiority complex may turn rapidly into an inferiority one. Then his personality disintegrates; he becomes a nuisance to himself and to the world. Is not this what is happening to all civilized societies to-day? As a new science of psychology, on the border-line between the social and the physical sciences, has been intensifying the drive towards an introspective social philosophy, men have been rapidly losing faith in the prospect which had been the sole foundation of that social philosophy—the prospect of progress through the conquest of nature. The scientist's accumulating knowledge of the universe has not only remained indigestible by the philosopher; it has become unmanageable by society. War and economic chaos have made the conception of progress look like a bad joke. In the twilight of the inferiority complex thus created all the elements in our fashionable social philosophy, old and new, have faded into a discredited jumble; the ancient idea of freedom has joined more sophisticated ideas, such as "progress" and "social democracy," in a limbo of mere culture. And so revolt: the falsehoods of an iron regimentation are better than vague contentment with a traditional culture.

We seem, in short, to have reached that point in the cycle of thought when men are likely to turn from philosophy to a new religious faith. And when I say "new" I mean something more than a "revival," in the sense in which that word is often used. I mean something revolutionary, a profound change of mind. There are signs enough in the world to-day of such a change. Behind all the violence to which we are becoming accustomed in Europe lies an aspiration which may be defined, with equal accuracy, in language borrowed either from political philosophy or from theology. In the one language it is a desire for *status*; in the other, for *justification.* It is, in fact, a demand for some intelligible interpretation of man's position in the scheme of things. And since no contemporary system

of philosophic rationalism has been able to meet that demand, men are turning to those who at least profess to be able to meet it, to propagandists who hold out the prospect of justification by some kind of faith.

I suppose that none who have listened to me thus far will have failed to detect my own bias. My belief is that philosophy without faith is dead. You might suppose therefore that I should welcome this approaching revolution. But that is not my feeling. I have no doubt that the demand for faith will create its own supply; but I have equally no doubt that the resulting faith may be false in a sense to which we of the Western world have long been unaccustomed. It may be not merely superstitious or liable to the exaggerations of fanaticism; it may be inherently and positively evil. The Kakodaemon is a perfectly tenable philosophical hypothesis; devil-worship is a perfectly genuine religion; there is a worship of humanity which seems to awaken the primitive beast in man. If we have not learnt these facts from history, we have only to look round the Europe of to-day.

In face of this rising passion, born of intellectual and moral disappointment, my chief anxiety is that all those who have any responsibility for guiding human thought should remember and reassert the double foundation, intellectual and moral, on which all faith and all philosophy must rest. No system of thought can be true that does not build a bridge, both between every man and the physical universe, and between every man and all other men. Its intellectual synthesis must embrace all human knowledge, not merely the immediate environment which obviously determines the individual's life and livelihood; its moral synthesis must embrace all mankind, transcending the limits of race, geography, political allegiance or culture. And we shall not, I suggest, be able to reassert these truths, to convince men of their intellectual and moral responsibility, unless we realize the causes of our own failure in the past. It seems to me to be the supreme paradox of rationalism that it has never, in any age, been unsuccessful in moral synthesis, but has always, in every age, failed in intellectual synthesis. From that paradox proceeds another: that revivals of faith have usually resulted from a craving for intellectual integrity rather than for moral reform. That paradox has always puzzled the scholar; as embodied in Luther it drove Erasmus to despair. It is not without significance that so many cultured people to-day should feel drawn to Erasmus as one of the most sympathetic figures of history. He is that; his memory has all the lonely nobility that belongs to men who have failed to understand the times in which they lived; but we to-day have a sterner task before us than to win a like renown at the cost of a like failure.

Our task is to reassert the power of human reason—its power not only to know but to understand. Man is not committed to the closed cycle of faith and philosophy, cult and culture, round which he has so long revolved. His thought can strike out into a straight road which does not end in a blind alley. To assert this is, indeed, itself an act of faith, but it is an act that has been made, consciously or unconsciously, by every human being who has ever set out seriously to use his reason. Especially has that act been the starting-point of all thought in the last two thousand years, since Christianity, transferring man's golden age from the past to the future, created the conception of "hope." Few of us perhaps realize how that conception has saturated our mind. Only in a mind so saturated could the idea of "progress" have been born; only in a mind unconscious of its own postulates could that idea have ended in the blind alley of political or economic programmes.

My own belief is that reason, having once made this act of faith, can be satisfied only when it has made another; that any fearless use of reason must lead to the conclusion voiced by a recent French writer: "*Il faut faire renaître l'idée de Dieu.*" If man by searching cannot find out God, his search must at least lead to the conviction that only by finding God can he reach "the place of understanding." But, even if this be true, those who believe it must be on their guard against a religious self-satisfaction quite as deadly to a serious use of reason as any agnostic indifference. Even the finding of God can only be the beginning of wisdom; there can be no end to the effort to understand. If the modern world is revolting against both cult and culture, it is chiefly because Christians have forgotten that the God revealed in Christ is not only a God whose will must be obeyed, but a God whose purpose must be understood. The choice which is being presented to men to-day is perhaps the final choice which will determine the continuance or the downfall of our civilization; and it is presented alike to all who are at ease in Zion, whether they take their ease in the reading-rooms of culture, or in the lecture halls of philosophy or in the household of faith. It is the iron choice between reason and passion. On the one hand lies the endless adventure of universal understanding, which is also the adventure of love; on the other the trench warfare of tribal affections and doctrinaire prejudice. There is no middle road; scholarly indifference will find itself sooner or later dragged in one direction or the other. It is surely time that those whose choice is reason should realize the full meaning and the full responsibility of the choice that they have made.

THE STORY OF AMERICAN REALISM

Professor Wm. PEPPERELL MONTAGUE

I. The Pre-Realistic Background

In American philosophy at the end of the nineteenth century there was small interest in Empiricism and almost no interest in Realism.

The great Thomistic realism of the Catholics was unfortunately regarded by the non-Catholics as too closely bound up with theological dogmas to be of any significance for secular thought. The realistic doctrines of the Scottish school, at one time rather widely current in the country and expressed with vigour by McCosh at Princeton, had passed away. The agnostic realism of Spencer and Hamilton had not affected to any extent the teaching in the universities. The traces of realism, both Platonic and particularistic, in the philosophy of C. S. Peirce had not attracted attention, and the same may be said of the kind of realism which Hyslop, a reader of the valuable but little-known work of Thomas Case, combined with his spiritistic beliefs. Paul Carus, whose blend of Buddhism and psycho-physical monism contained realistic elements, exerted little influence on academic philosophy, and he himself never received from the universities the recognition which his valuable services to philosophic journalism should have elicited.

In contrast to these fragmentary realistic tendencies, Idealism, both epistemological and ontological, was everywhere rampant. Even before the Transcendentalism of Emerson and Alcott had quite died away in New England, Dr. W. T. Harris, the much respected United States Commissioner of Education, had organized a group in St. Louis for the study of Hegelianism and had founded the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*. The Idealism thus started in the Middle West was further continued by Wenley at Michigan and by many others. G. H. Howison at the University of California had developed a very original though not thoroughly worked out system of pluralistic idealism in which the monadism of Leibniz and the subjectivism of Fichte were combined in a new synthesis. And by the force of his personality and the ardour of his convictions he created on the Pacific coast an enthusiasm for philosophy that still endures. So much for the West. In the East, Thomas Davidson at his "Bread-Winners' College" in New York was preaching a form of pluralistic idealism similar to that of Howison but more voluntaristic, and strongly coloured by the thought of Rosmini. At the universities, there were Creighton at Cornell, Ormond at Princeton, Fullerton at

Pennsylvania, Miss Calkins at Wellesley, Butler at Columbia, Ladd and Duncan at Yale (more Lotzian than Hegelian), and Borden P. Bowne at Boston University whose "Personalism" is being vigorously continued to-day by Brightman and Flewelling. Finally at Harvard, there were Everett, Palmer, Muensterberg, and Royce. (I have listed merely the names that come to mind, and many others should doubtless be added.)

Most of these idealists were "Right Wing" rather than "Left." From the Orthodox Christian Theism of Bowne to the Personalistic Absolutism of Royce there was little of the Spinozistic or pantheistic tendency of Bradleyan idealism. Howison, Fullerton, and Davidson were, however, in successively increasing degree aloof from the position of traditional religion; and Muensterberg with considerable originality used Fichtean transcendentalism as a façade for the thoroughgoing mechanistic naturalism which he applied to the existential world of phenomena.

II. The Revolt of the Pragmatists

The first decade of the present century was a time of change and insurgency in American philosophy. The pragmatism of William James foreshadowed in his great *Psychology* and explicitly proclaimed in his California address in 1898 was systematically expounded in the books entitled *Pragmatism* and *The Meaning of Truth*. During these same years John Dewey, first at Chicago and later at Columbia, had developed independently of James but in close sympathy with him, the form of pragmatic philosophy known as Instrumentalism. Though the pragmatism of James and the instrumentalism of Dewey were alike in opposing the monism and intellectualism of the dominant forms of idealism, it is my impression that it was the metaphysical and psychological faults of those doctrines that aroused James to revolt, while for Dewey it was rather the sociological and methodological weaknesses of idealism that merited attack. As a result of this difference in emphasis, the philosophy of James developed into a metaphysical pluralism stressing the free will and independence of the individual as opposed to the idea of what he termed the "block universe" of the absolutists. This personalistic pluralism was later extended to the even more complete pluralism of *Radical Empiricism*. On the other hand, Dewey's instrumentalism, true to its name, developed from its first theoretical expression in his *Essays on Experimental Logic* into increasingly practicalistic treatises on education and social questions, in which the problems of traditional metaphysics were less and less stressed and finally abandoned as outmoded and artificial. In short, the instrumentalism of Dewey, both in its practicalistic motivation and in its anti-meta-

physical outcome, has proved itself to be for better or for worse more purely pragmatic than pragmatism itself.

III. The New Realists and their Programme

It was, I think, in the spring of 1910 that six teachers of philosophy formed a group for the purpose of expounding and defending a new kind of realistic philosophy. The group consisted of Perry and Holt from Harvard, Marvin and Spaulding from Princeton, Pitkin and myself from Columbia. After a few meetings we published in *The Journal of Philosophy* "A Program and First Platform of Six Realists." This co-operative article was followed in a year and a half by a co-operative book entitled *The New Realism*.

Although the impressions of American realism that are to be sketched in this paper are almost exclusively concerned with the organized groups calling themselves "New Realists" and "Critical Realists," it is appropriate to mention at least the names of six American philosophers who, though they were not officially members of either group, have during the past thirty years in various ways and in varying degree expounded a realistic philosophy. These "unofficial" realists are: first and most important of the series, Woodbridge of Columbia (who was invited but refused to join the New Realists), McGilvary of Wisconsin, Boodin (now) of the University of California at Los Angeles, Cohen of the College of the City of New York, Loewenberg of the University of California, and Macintosh of Yale.

We had all been realists prior to our forming the group, and each of us had written papers in which realism was implicitly or explicitly defended. I think that Perry and I wrote the first two of the explicitly realistic articles, and these were each inspired by the bitter attack on the realistic standpoint contained in the first volume of his Gifford Lectures by our teacher, Professor Royce. My article in *The Philosophical Review* for March 1901 was entitled "Professor Royce's Refutation of Realism"; and Perry's article entitled "Professor Royce's Refutation of Realism and Pluralism" was printed in *The Monist* for October of the same year. Though the members of our new group differed widely in their metaphysical views, there were certain methodological and epistemological postulates which we shared in common. I may summarize them as follows:

1. Philosophers should follow the example of scientists and co-operate rather than work alone. The co-operation which we were to practise consisted in each man showing his essay to the others, taking account of their suggestions and securing not unanimous agreement with every proposition, but general assent to the essay as a whole.

I am not sure that this precept was put into practice to any very significant extent. We read one another's papers and listened conscientiously to one another's criticisms, and we did for the most part make the revisions or at least the omissions that were requested, but I am afraid that especially on matters about which we felt strongly there tended to develop among us a tacit and I hope an unconscious understanding which if made explicit could have been expressed as "I'll pass your stuff if you'll pass mine."

2. Philosophers should follow the example of scientists in isolating their problems and tackling them one by one. We were to follow this precept by isolating the epistemological problem and studying the cognitive relation obtaining between any knower or apprehender and any object that he knows or apprehends without prejudging or even raising the question as to the ultimate nature of the apprehending subjects or of the apprehended objects.

I think that we stuck to this precept fairly consistently. If a certain amount of ontology and cosmology was included in each of the essays in our book it was by way of supplementation and clarification of the central issue which was the question of whether the cognitive relation was or was not a necessary condition for the reality of the objects cognized. The point was of especial importance to me because I had a metaphysics less naturalistic and more dualistic than that of the others—with the possible exception of Pitkin—and I wanted to be quite sure that our agreement on the realistic theory that *knowledge as such makes no difference to the objects known* was not going to commit us to any theory as to the nature of those objects or of man's place among them.

3. Some at least of the *particulars* of which we are conscious exist when we are not conscious of them.

This was the ordinary particularistic or *existential* realism of common sense.

4. Some at least of the *essences or universals* of which we are conscious subsist when we are not conscious of them.

This was Platonic or *subsistential* realism.

5. Some at least of the particulars as well as the universals that are real are apprehended directly rather than indirectly through copies or mental images.

This was the *presentative* realism of Reid as contrasted with the representative realism or epistemological dualism of Descartes and Locke.

It will be seen from the last three of our five postulates that we planned to revive and defend ordinary realism by adding to it Platonism and by subtracting from it the dualistic or copy theory of knowledge.

IV. The Argument for Existential Realism.

The general argument for our new realism as applied to particular things in space and time was itself not new but old. It consisted in the attempt to show by empirical examination and inference that the things that are believed to be real do not seem to depend on the fact that they can figure as objects of perceptual and conceptual experience. To prove this independence directly by Mill's Method of Difference is of course impossible; and to demand it of the realist is both unfair and absurd. We can bring a dog into the presence of a cat and observe that he growls, then take him away and note that the growling ceases and thereupon infer with high probability that the dog's growling depended upon his being in the presence of the cat. Or, substituting a chair and a book for the cat, we can introduce a dog to their presence and by the same Method of Difference infer that his behaviour is not affected by and hence not dependent upon his being in the presence of those objects. But we cannot look at a thing before we see it or after we have seen it and note whether our seeing it has changed its appearance. Yet, as Perry so conclusively showed in his classic paper on *The Egocentric Predicament*, it does not follow because an object's independence of our experiencing it cannot be proved by the Method of Difference that therefore it cannot be proved by some other method. Still less does it follow that the idealist's hypothesis of the dependence of objects upon consciousness is implied by the fact that when objects are observed, consciousness is always present.

The presence of consciousness together with the objects of which we are conscious is merely a tautology which leaves the dependence or independence of the objects an open question to be decided by inference from their behaviour *while under observation.*

The situation is analogous to the one in which we find the stars always present together with human affairs. If we wish to refute the astrologer's claim that human affairs depend upon the presence of the stars, we cannot do it by removing the stars and taking note of what then happens. So far as the Method of Difference is concerned we are to be sure in a "predicament." But despite our predicament we seek confidently to show that there are no constant or causally significant correlations between the behaviour (conjunctions) of the heavenly bodies and the episodes of men's lives. In the same way and with at least as much success, we as realists can seek to show that the behaviour of objects when co-present with consciousness reveals no constant or causally significant correlations with that consciousness. Even the astrologer, whatever his other fallacies, does not rest his case merely upon the irremediable co-presence of the course of the stars and the course of human affairs. But the

idealist, whatever his other virtues, does incline to rest *his* case on the mere co-presence of the two terms in the situation whose dependence or independence is at issue. *He entrenches himself behind a tautology in the belief that it is an axiom.* And as Dr. G. E. Moore has remarked, if only the idealist can once be made to entertain even as a bare possibility the hypothesis that the objects of which we are aware may nevertheless be independent of that awareness, half the battle for realism is won. For whether we consider the objects of ordinary perception or the more recondite objects of science, it is somewhat pathetically obvious that in neither case does their behaviour show any signs of being affected by their presence in consciousness. They come and go as they list, and while our experience and its changes depend largely upon them and upon their changes, the converse is not true. Of all the invariant relations or "laws" of physical nature, I know of no single one that depends for its reality upon the mere fact that it is or can be experienced.

V. The Argument for Subsistential Realism

The method of proving the independent reality of the universals or essences that *subsist* is the same as the method of proving the independent reality of the particular things or events that *exist.* That $7+5=12$ is entirely explained by the natures of seven, of five, and of twelve, and not in the least by the nature of consciousness. The "egocentric predicament" applies as much and means as little for our knowledge of forms as for our knowledge of particular facts. Whether the forms are numbers or non-quantitative qualities like blue and yellow, their relations and configurations exhibit a complete indifference to the fact that we are conscious of them. It is of course true that *which* of the forms or *which* of the events a man will experience at any moment will be determined by the condition of his organism and even by his memories and interests at that moment. But the function of these subjective factors is *selective* rather than *constitutive,* and the objects themselves are to be explained in terms of their relations to one another and not in terms of their relations to the process of selecting them.

VI. The Argument for a Presentative rather than a Representative or Copy-Theory of Knowledge

For an object to be perceived it is necessary either that it should stimulate the percipient organism as with waves of light or sound, or else that an effect similar to that of a stimulus should in some other way be produced in the organism. Thus we shall normally perceive a sphere in front of us if there actually is such a sphere and

if it sends to our eyes light waves and by that means ultimately produces a certain specific effect in our brain. But if that same specific effect is produced by two flat disks acting through the mechanism of a stereoscope, we shall perceive a sphere as clearly as in the other case. Everybody admits such facts as these; and there are many who have argued that because an effect in the organism must precede the perception of an object it must follow that the perceived object is itself identical with the effect produced in the organism. The truth of such a conclusion would mean that the whole perceptual world is inside the percipient and that it is at best no more than a copy of the external world of physical entities.

Now we New Realists believed that this epistemological dualism was not implied by the premises invoked in its support. We argued that Descartes, Locke, and their followers were guilty of a sheer *non sequitur* in concluding that the object perceived must be identical with the intra-organic means by which it was perceived, and that as the latter was internal the former would have to be equally internal.

The arguments for our position in this matter were not, I think, as clear and consistent as they should have been. We were perhaps all in agreement that the fact that perceived objects at least *appear* to be external created a presumption that they were really external and that the burden of proof rested upon those who would deny that presumption. I think we were also agreed that the space and time of perceptual experience, despite specific aberrations that might call for correction, took up so to speak "all the room there was," and that consequently there was no room left for a conceptual or inferred space and time that were to be real beyond and behind the realm of perceived and perceivable objects. These seemed to be as external as possible; and if *they* were not really outside us there was nothing else that could be.

To the extent that we attempted to supplement these rather vague feelings by explicit arguments, we fell into disagreement and of those disagreements I shall speak later.

VII. New Realism in Relation to Idealism

The fallacies of idealism as they appeared to us can be briefly stated and such a statement may help to clarify our own position.

The first and cardinal fallacy of idealists was their ascription of self-evidence to the proposition that the relation of the knower to the object known is an "internal relation," that is, a relation such that the terms related are dependent upon the existence of the relation.

This first dogma, asserting the axiomaticity of idealism, has been

held by idealists from Berkeley to Bradley. The realist of course denies that the relation of the knower to the object known is self-evidently revealed as "internal." He makes no counter claim for the self-evidence of the "externality" of the cognitive relation, but he does hold that the latter can be proved inductively.

Now when the idealist has once committed himself to the postulate that no object can exist apart from consciousness or experience, he finds himself in a predicament. The universe is obviously too large and long enduring for him to regard it as dependent upon the finite experience of himself and his neighbours, hence there must be postulated an infinite and absolute experience in which it is contained and on which it does depend. The second postulate of Absolutism is thus made necessary to repair the havoc wrought by the first postulate of Subjectivism. If, however, we refuse as realists to take the first step, we are under no compulsion to take the second. If events can exist in their own right without the need of depending on consciousness, the hypothesis of an absolute consciousness is no longer demanded by the situation. The Absolute may of course be inferrible on other grounds, but not on the grounds of epistemology.

VIII. New Realism in Relation to Pragmatism

From the standpoint of most realistic observers, the essential doctrine of pragmatism consists of two postulates which we may term respectively the Methodological postulate of *Practicalism* (which states a theory as to the *criterion* of truth), and the Epistemological postulate of *Relativism* (which states a theory as to the *meaning* of truth). The methodological postulate is very ambiguous and appears to be variously interpreted even by the pragmatists themselves. When one says that a proposition can be believed to be true if it works well in practice or if it leads to successful consequences, one may mean either (1) that accepting the proposition brings happiness or (2) that it brings a sensory experience of which the proposition in question was an anticipation. A religious creed, for example, may be held to be true on the ground that it enables its adherents to function efficiently and to meet the crises of life with serenity and courage. In this sense it works well and leads to successful results in practice. But I think that most realists would regard the correlation between the truth of a proposition and its "working well" in this sense as very imperfect and unreliable. There are many false beliefs that have worked well over long periods of time for many people, and again there are many true propositions that can bring despair and even paralysis of action to some of the persons who believe them. If on the other hand we take "working well" or "successful consequence in practice" to mean *sensory fulfilment of anticipation*, then indeed

we have a reliable criterion of truth—which is, however, nothing but old-fashioned empiricism under a new name.

But it was not the methodological postulate of pragmatism (even when interpreted "humanistically" rather than empirically) to which realists as such were mainly opposed, but rather the epistemological postulate which grew out of it. To regard the successful experiences that ensue from a belief as a criterion of its truth is one thing—and a thing that is sometimes bad and sometimes good—but to assume that *truth itself consists in the process by which it is verified* is a different thing and always bad. It makes truth a psychological affair, and as such an affair of individual experience and relative to each individual who has the experience. I may experience successful consequences from believing that the proposition "A is B" is true; you may experience consequences that are equally successful and successful in the same sense from believing that it is false. Shall we then say that the same proposition is at once both true and false? True for me and false for you? This relativistic epistemology of the pragmatists was rejected by the realists. The truth (or falsity) of a proposition *antedates* the process by which it is verified (or refuted). The proposition "Mars is inhabited by intelligent beings" is either true or false; but it may be a long time before we discover which. When and if we do discover whether the proposition is true it will occur to nobody except a philosophic pragmatist in the privacy of his study to imagine that the proposition waited until that moment to *become* true or to *become* false. The facts about Mars, like other facts in the world, will be regarded as having been what they were prior to the events of their discovery or verification.

To this realistic attitude the pragmatists replied by saying that we were making a fetish of "Truth in the abstract" or "Truth with a capital T" which could never be experienced and which consequently had no use or meaning. And they would add the comment that while it was all very well for us to say that truth was the relation of "agreement between judgments and realities," we ought at the same time to admit that such agreement could only be found in individual experiences to which therefore it was relative and on which it was dependent.

It seems to me that we have here a recurrence of the "*egocentric predicament*," but in an interestingly altered form. In the original form of the "predicament" we were challenged by the *idealists* to point to a case of *reality* apart from experience. In the new form of the "predicament" we are challenged by the *pragmatists* to point to a case of *truth* (i.e. the agreement relation of judgments with reality), apart from experience. We answered the idealist by pointing out that though quite obviously facts could never be observed in the absence of experiencing them, yet when they were observed in the

presence of experience they gave every sign of being independent of that experience with which they were co-present. And as it was with *facts* so also is it with *truth*, which is the special relation of agreement or correspondence obtaining between facts and the judgments about them. The agreements can never be discovered when absent from the experience that verifies them, but when discovered in that experience they give every sign of not depending upon it. When Columbus verifies his hypothesis that there is land to the westward of Europe; when Newton verifies his gravitational hypothesis; when Pythagoras verifies his geometrical hypothesis—in each and every case the truth that is verified reveals a structure that could not have depended upon or have had to "wait for" the verifying experience in order to be what it is. The whole nature and behaviour of things testifies to the realists' conclusion that the function of experience in general and of verification in particular is not to create in themselves the things and the agreements that are experienced and verified but rather to reveal or discover them to us. It is we the perceiving subjects and not they the perceived objects that profit and are changed by that strangest of all relations between an individual and his environment, the relation which we variously denominate "awareness of," "consciousness of," or "experiencing."

There was a final charge that was sometimes brought by the pragmatists which made us peculiarly and justifiably indignant. This was the charge that, because we held that facts and truths do not depend upon being experienced, we should also hold that experience is *otiose* and makes no difference to the world in which it occurs. In rejecting this imputation of epiphenomenalism (at least as a necessary consequence of his epistemological theory), the realist may point out that consciousness, though not affecting objects in the act of revealing them, can and does change them through the actions of the being to whom they are revealed. Seeing an object enables the seer to adapt himself to it and to its laws, or even to adapt it to himself and to his needs. The light of a lantern does not directly affect the obstacles in the path of the traveller, but it does affect them indirectly by enabling the traveller to remove them. Thus and thus only are objects affected by our experience of them.

From this Section (and the one preceding) it will be seen that the epistemological controversy was triangular: Idealism, Pragmatism, Realism—each one against the other two. From our realistic viewpoint the idealists were right in holding to the ordinary conception of truth as something absolute and not relative to finite minds, but wrong in their insistence that facts exist ultimately only as items of a single all-embracing experience; while on the other hand the pragmatists were right in holding to a pluralistic world of facts,

but wrong in supposing that truth about those facts was relative to and dependent upon the changing and conflicting experiences of verification. In matters of ethics, however, the pragmatists were usually on the side of the angels. And as we were all utilitarians we approved of their making *value* relative to the needs and satisfactions of individuals while regretting that they should fail to see the contrast in this respect between value and truth. When the same proposition seems true to one man and false to another, *one* of the men must be *wrong*; but when one and the same thing is felt as a good to one man and as an evil to another, *both* of the men can be *right*. One man's meat can be another man's poison.

IX. Disagreements of the New Realists

The six members of the organized group of New Realists had come to the movement for differing reasons and with differing interests. And our views on metaphysics and even on some aspects of epistemology were by no means always in agreement. Which of these differences were the most important and how they should be formulated would themselves, I am afraid, be questions about which we should differ. As I am the one who is at present telling the story I must of necessity formulate the points at issue between us in my own way and select as the most important those that seem most important to me. If in this matter or elsewhere in the article I inadvertently misrepresent the position of friends (or opponents), I here and now apologize.

From my standpoint the differences that were most important both in themselves and in their influence on the later development of the neo-realistic movement centred first on the question as to the *"Behaviouristic" nature of consciousness* and second on the question as to the *"relativistic" but existential status of the objects of illusion and error*. On these two questions Perry and Holt held views which I believed to be false. As to the positions of Pitkin, Marvin, and Spaulding on these points I was never quite clear.

X. The Fallacies of Neo-Realism: Behaviourism

As to the nature of consciousness: Perry and Holt believed that an individual's awareness of an object consisted in a "specific response" of that individual's organism to the object. Now an organism's response ("specific" or otherwise) to an object must be a *motion* simple or complex of some or all of the material particles composing the organism. Any motion must be up or down, east or west, north or south, or in some intermediate spatial direction. How can such a motion constitute what we experience as the "consciousness of"

an object? (1) It does not resemble it in any way, unless in the small proportion of cases in which the object is itself a motion of material particles. (2) It cannot be directed toward it except in those cases in which the object of our consciousness is a spatial event contemporary with the organism's motion. (3) It affords no clue to our ability to apprehend secondary qualities, abstract ideas, other minds, or events of the past and the future. (4) Worst of all, the organism's specific response or directed motion fails to provide for the *duration* or "specious present" that characterizes every experience and significantly differentiates it from all other events and relations. Each phase or momentary cross-section of a *motion* must be over and gone before a later one can come. But with *consciousness* it is just the reverse. Each phase or momentary cross-section is not over and gone when the successor appears but endures along with it.

These objections which applied with sufficient strength to the older forms of materialism are even stronger against this new materialism or Behaviourism which would identify the awareness of an object outside the body with a "specific response." i.e. a hypothetical motion of the body or its parts towards that object. The peculiar self-transcending thing called *awareness* puts an individual in relation to objects that are either in other places and times or not in space and time at all. If it is to be identified with something in the organism, that something should be anything rather than motion.

XI. The Fallacies of Neo-Realism: Objective Relativism

The second of my differences with my colleagues concerned the existential status of the objects of perceptual illusions and of other erroneous experiences. Unless I have grossly misunderstood them in this matter, they held the theory of "Relativistic Objectivism," or (as re-christened by Lovejoy) "Objective Relativism." This is the view that every object that *appears* to be in space *is* in space, and because different and mutually incompatible objects appear (though not to the same observer at the same time) to occupy the same space, it must follow that an object at each instant has no single position and shape by its own right, but many positions and shapes each one of which is relative to some observer.

To illustrate: The rails over which your train has travelled, when seen from the rear platform appear convergent, and when seen from directly above appear parallel. The convergent rails are apparently just as objectively existent in space as the rails that are parallel. But in each case the objective existence is not absolute but relative to an observer. Or again, that which normally appears as two flat disks will, when viewed through a stereopticon, appear as a single solid sphere; and the latter is to the objective relativist as truly

an occupant of space as is the former. Or finally, what to a healthy man appears as a bed-post may to a man suffering from delirium appear as a serpent. Each of these objects will (it is claimed) exist objectively in space—the bed-post relative to the healthy brain, the serpent relative to the fevered brain. In short, the things that exist objectively in space are to include along with the things ordinarily supposed to exist there the totality of actual and possible objects of perspective aberration and illusion and even of dreams and hallucinations.

The objective relativist is of course careful to point out that for an objective existent to be relative to and in that sense dependent upon an actual (or possible) observer or organism does not at all mean a relativity to or a dependence upon *consciousness*. And my neo-realist colleagues would feel outraged if they were accused of having surrendered in their theory of error to that very subjectivism against which we were all pledged to revolt. And yet despite the insistence that whatever appears can be relative to an observational context without thereby forfeiting its ontological status as a "physical" existent, it still seems to me that these relativistic objects do bear a suspicious resemblance to the sense-impressions of Hume, Mill, and Avenarius; and that the New Realism in adopting them has evolved (or degenerated) into the old phenomenalism.

There are three objections to this theory of illusory perception which I feel justified in stating as a part of my story of American realism, not only because I think that they constitute a decisive refutation of objective relativism itself, but because the failure of New Realism to meet them was the cause and the justification for the coming of Critical Realism.

The first difficulty with objective relativism is its neglect of the profound *asymmetry* of the relation between the veridical and the illusory objects of perception. The asymmetry referred to consists in the fact that *the illusory perceptions can be explained by the veridical, whereas the veridical cannot be explained by the illusory*. The rails over which my train has travelled appear convergent from some viewpoints and parallel from others. If we assume that the rails *are* parallel we can easily explain why and how and when an *appearance* of their being convergent will arise. But if we reverse this procedure and assume that they are in fact convergent we cannot explain why the appearance of their parallelism should occur under the circumstances in which it does occur. Or again, if the two flat disks in front of the stereoscope are in reality what they appear to be in what would usually be called veridical perception, we can then explain in terms of physical and physiological optics why these two disks when viewed stereoscopically should cause the appearance of a single sphere. But if we reverse the business and posit the solid sphere to be the

physical fact, we cannot explain why or how it should ever give rise to the appearance of two flat disks.

Between the hallucinations of dreams and the experiences of waking life the same asymmetry is found. Dream worlds can be explained in terms of the waking world but not the reverse. The dream hallucinations, like the perceptual illusions, can be as vivid and internally consistent as their veridical counterparts. Taken in themselves and by themselves one appearance is as good as another. But when we inter-relate them by that type of procedure which we call "explanation" their fatal differences in ontological status are easily discerned.

The second of the difficulties in the theory of objective relativism is a sort of generalization of the first. Real objects have two ways of producing effects, unreal or illusory objects have but one. An existent thing, be it material or mental, produces (1) direct effects, i.e. effects in its own right, upon all other things; and it produces (2) indirect effects through the agency of whoever believes or even apprehends it. The thing produces this second group of effects not *by right* as existing but *by grace* as being an object of some experience. Now while veridical or existent things produce both classes of effects, illusory or non-existent objects produce only those indirect effects that come through the agency of the minds whose objects they are. Consider flounders and mermaids. Flounders affect the hooks that catch them and the stomachs that digest them, and in addition as objects of contemplation they inspire fishermen and perhaps poets to do things that they would not do unless they figured in the experience of those agents. On the other hand, the mermaids, while they too as objects of contemplation have inspired poets and perhaps fishermen to undertake various actions, they have never in their own right affected a hook or a stomach or anything else. Or again, compare and contrast the real God that you believe in with the unreal god believed in by your theological opponents. You of course know that, while the effects of the latter are restricted to the fancies and resultant actions of the unfortunates who are deluded, the effects of your God are produced not only through the minds of His followers but upon the world as a whole.

This difference holds all along the line. Unreal objects, whether they be objects of hallucination and sensory illusion, such as stereoscopic spheres and converging railway tracks, or whether they be objects of intellectual delusion and mistaken belief, such as mermaids and false gods, are characterized by their utter inability to produce any effects except on and through the victimized minds in whose experience they appear.

It is because of his failure to realize this obvious but important truth that the objective relativist is guilty of a preposterously impudent *understatement* when he says that the objects of so-called

veridical perceptions are more "convenient" than the objects of so-called illusory perception. The former do not just happen to be more convenient. There is a reason; and the reason is that the veridical objects form a select aristocracy of appearances which owe their rank (1) to their ability to explain all the rest and (2) to their ability to constitute a self-consistent and self-contained system of causally related elements. This is just another way of saying that real objects are such objects and only such objects as can produce effects directly upon one another as well as indirectly by grace of the minds that perceive them.

The last of the three weaknesses in the theory of objective relativism is based upon its unmanageable complexity. It may be possible to find room in a single spatial system for the totality of such perspective aberrations as railway tracks of various degrees of convergence and of pennies of various degrees of ellipticity; but if we add to these comparatively simple erroneous perceptions not only the stereoscopic spheres but the objects of every dream and every delirium, then not even the genius of a Russell or a Whitehead could devise a space or a space-time that would be adequate to serve as a bed, no matter how procrustean, in which such so-called and miscalled "physical existents" could all be placed and duly ordered. Yet each and all of these objects would be *physical* if by "physical" one is to mean whatever appears as spatial. Indeed, "Pan-physicalism" should be the awkward but accurately descriptive term to designate this phase of objective relativism in which the phobia against a "bifurcation" or division of spatial phenomena into subjective and objective has been indulged to such an extent as to confer the same ontological status upon everything that appears to have shape, size, and position. But if, in order at any price to avoid "bifurcation," we must practice this metaphysical egalitarianism, I for one would prefer the idealistic form of it. It is less difficult, even if not less gratuitous, to think of the totality of actual and possible appearances as being somehow synthesized and harmonized in one absolute consciousness than in any millieu of a spatial or physical kind.

Of course the objective relativism which I have been attacking was not the only way out. Without lapsing into either dualism or idealism it would have been quite possible for the New Realists to have dealt with the problem of error by the simple expedient of *denying any locus of any kind to the non-existent things that figure in all erroneous experience*, as objects either of perceptual illusion or of conceptual delusion. For a thing not to exist is for it to exist nowhere. Any possible or subsistent object *can* appear in consciousness and a few of them *do* appear there; but only a minority of such objects enjoy membership in the great society of interacting existents

as well as in the little societies of objects for conscious minds. Just as one and the same point can be a member of two or more intersecting curves, so, as William James pointed out (for the first time I believe in a college class which I attended in 1898), can one and the same object be a member of the independent order of existence and at the same time and with no disruption of identity be also an object of experience. By accepting such a view of the matter, coupled with a refusal to accord any physical locus to the unreal objects of illusion and delusion, we can escape bifurcation or epistemological dualism without falling into either idealism or pan-physicalism.

I wish I could think of the theory just stated which was my own solution of the epistemological problem as the "Right Wing of New Realism"; but, alas, it takes more than one feather to make a wing, and as I was quite unable to stem the drift to the Left—i.e. to Behaviourism and Objective Relativism—I fear it is historically correct to regard those movements as constituting the essence of American New Realism, at least in its later stage of development.

XII. Critical Realism

In or about the year 1920 a second group of American philosophers decided to write a co-operative book in the interest of a realistic epistemology. The group was composed of George Santayana, formerly at Harvard, C. A. Strong, formerly at Columbia, A. K. Rogers, formerly at Yale, A. O. Lovejoy at Johns Hopkins, R. W. Sellars at Michigan, J. B. Pratt at Williams, and Durant Drake at Vassar. They called themselves Critical Realists and entitled their book *Essays in Critical Realism*. They regarded our New Realism with its attempt to interpret existent objects as directly presented to the mind (rather than as indirectly represented through images or copies), as a form of Naïve Realism—(which indeed it was) and they chose the word "Critical" as suitably antithetic to the "Naïveness" of which we their predecessors had been guilty.

As in the earlier group of six, so also in this later group of seven the members combined agreement in epistemology with disagreement in metaphysics. Rogers was a sceptic though with naturalistic tendencies. He had, however, been trained in idealism, and his realism was mellowed by a rich historical scholarship and an unusual tolerance of mind. Strong, Drake, and Sellars were all definitely naturalistic, though Strong supplemented his naturalism with a kind of pan-psychism in which Drake followed him, while Sellars supplemented his with an enthusiasm for Emergent Evolution. Lovejoy and Pratt were dualists in psycho-physics as well as in epistemology and constituted the Right Wing of the movement. Lovejoy put especial emphasis on the significance of *time* as affecting all aspects

of nature and mind, and christened his philosophy Temporalism. His pet aversions were Behaviourism and Objective Relativism, and against them he waged unremitting dialectical war, always urbane but devastatingly effective. Even further to the Right than Lovejoy and nearer than any of the others to a metaphysical spiritualism was Pratt, who combined a first-hand knowledge of the mystical idealisms of India with a strong sympathy for Christian theism. As for Santayana, his rich and many-sided philosophy is known to everybody. At least as naturalistic as Sellars, Strong, and Drake, he combined with his naturalism and materialistic epiphenomenalism a Platonic realism more completely and consistently worked out than in any previous philosophy. This blend of a materialistic conception of the realm of *existence* with a Platonic conception of the realm of *essence* from which all things derive their meanings and their values, but not their destiny, has always seemed to me (second only to Bergson's) the most challenging and instructive of modern visions. Even to one who, like the writer, is unable to share Santayana's pessimistic belief in the *causal impotence* of Platonic forms it is a great thing to have that vast encompassing realm of essence or subsistence depicted in its purity and completeness and freed from irrelevant entanglements with the subjectivistic theories of knowledge and the teleological theories of nature which have traditionally obscured both its meaning and its beauty.

When one turns from the original and richly varying metaphysical affiliations of the Critical Realists to the bare nucleus of epistemological doctrine on which they were all agreed and which constitutes the definition of Critical Realism itself, I am myself unable to see anything that is either rich or original. The theory may be true but it certainly is not new. It is indeed nothing but a restatement of the Epistemological Dualism which is explicit in Locke and Descartes and implicit in Hobbes, Spinoza, and the other modern philosophers prior to Berkeley.

This dualistic epistemology is very simple and clear. Its tenets are the following:

1. The world is composed of at least two sets of entities. (*a*) material things; and (*b*) mental states or ideas.

2. The ideas alone are given or presented as objects in consciousness and in that sense are *immediately* known, while the material things are only *mediately* known, being inferred as the direct or indirect causes of the ideas.

3. The inferred material objects are always numerically or existentially non-identical with the immediately presented objects or ideas from which they are inferred; and they are furthermore at least partially different in kind or nature from the latter.

From this point on, epistemological dualists differ from one

another. Some of them, for example Descartes and Locke, hold that the ideas inhere in a mental substance or spirit; others, for example, Hobbes and Spinoza, hold that the ideas do not inhere in a non-material substance, but that they are phantasms or inner aspects of the body or of the substance of which the body is the outer aspect. But it is important to realize that the question of whether the mind is numerically identical or numerically non-identical with the brain is a psycho-physical or metaphysical question that has no direct bearing upon the epistemological question of the relation of ideas to the material objects that are inferred as their causes. In other words, the alleged epistemological duality of internal ideas and external objects is not aggravated by supplementing it with the psycho-physical dualism of Descartes, nor is it mitigated by supplementing it with the psycho-physical monism of Hobbes or of Spinoza.

On the epistemological dualism which has just been summarily expounded, there are two preliminary comments which can be made without prejudgment of the question of its ultimate validity or invalidity. First, the theory seems to account simply and clearly for the illusions and aberrations of sensory experience and for what is generally assumed as to the physical and physiological processes that condition our awareness of events distant from us in space and time. Second, the theory seems to be as weak in accounting for truth as it is strong in accounting for error. If our experience affords direct access only to the internal realm of one's own mental states, by what magic can we jump out of our skins and infer or construct that external realm of material objects in which we undoubtedly do believe? If we emphasize the inaccessibility of an external world, we are led to scepticism, for we must doubt the extent to which that world which we can never experience can be proved to resemble the world that we can experience. In fact we must be doubtful not only as to the nature of the external world but even as to whether it can be shown to exist at all. On the other hand, if instead of concentrating on the numerical otherness of the external world, the epistemological dualist attends to the assumed qualitative likeness of that world to the world of his experience, then he is led not to scepticism but to idealism; for the world that he believes in and that he has alleged to be external now turns out to be an extension and elaboration of his world of ideas.

These two comments that I have just made briefly have been made at length and in detail by the whole history of philosophy subsequent to Locke.

Now what, if anything, have the Critical Realists done to mitigate the two sad dialectical sequels to epistemological dualism with which our philosophic tradition has made us familiar?

So far as I can see, their contributions to epistemology are mainly

confined to a refutation of the *monistic objectivism* of the New Realists and to a restatement in slightly different form of the dualistic or representative theory of perception. In the matter of refutation the most effective work, in my opinion, was done (1) by Drake in his arguments against any form of simple or absolute objectivism; and (2) by Lovejoy in his careful and extensive analysis of the fallacies of the relativistic objectivism of Whitehead, Russell, and the "Logical Positivists."

In the matter of restating the theory of dualistic realism, Santayana is the only member of the group whose thought makes any claim to an advance beyond the position of Locke and Descartes. Yet even in the case of Santayana, whose work in metaphysics is of such enduring value, I can find nothing of real novelty for the epistemological problem. To say that the object of awareness is always an "essence," and that one and the same essence can be exemplified both in subjective experience and in objective nature, does at first sight appear to bridge the traditional gulf between the internal realm of mental states and the external realm of material things. But this appearance of novelty in thought is, I fear, due entirely to a novelty in language—the language of Platonism being employed to describe a situation that is ordinarily described in the language of Nominalism.

To illustrate the way in which the two languages can be used with equal propriety to describe one and the same situation, let us take the classic example of Tweedledum and Tweedledee. Here are two numerically or existentially separate individuals who are, however, in quality, kind, or essence, exactly the same. If we are in a nominalistic mood and desire to emphasize their existential duality rather than their qualitative sameness, we shall characterize them as "two different individuals, Dum and Dee, who happen to be perfectly similar in respect to their *Tweedleness*." If, on the other hand, we are in a Platonic mood and desire to emphasize their qualitative sameness at the expense of their existential duality, we can characterize them as "a case in which one identical essence of *Tweedleness* happens to be exemplified or actualized twice, once in *Dum* and once in *Dee*." But it is easy to see that the two characterizations are merely different verbal formulae equally applicable to one and the same situation. For suppose that only one of the twins were given in experience; then the other could not be inferred with any more validity by calling him "a second exemplification of the very essence that is experienced" than by calling him "a second individual exactly similar to the one that is experienced." Now if for Tweedledum and Tweedledee we substitute respectively *ideas that are internal and given as mental states* and *physical objects that are external and inferred as being similar to the ideas in all or some of their properties*, we don't bridge

the gap between the given and the inferred by replacing the Lockian "*similarity of mental and physical things*" with the Santayanian "*mental and physical exemplifications of the same essence.*"

I should regard the analysis just given as too obvious to call for statement were it not for the fact that I believe that the Critical Realists labour under the delusion that quite apart from Santayana's Platonic *ontology* the description of the exclusively internal objects of consciousness as "essences" works in a mysterious way to bridge the epistemological gap between mental states and the material things inferred from them, and thus constitutes a real advance beyond the traditional dualistic epistemology of Locke and Descartes. That such is not the case is (ironically enough) nowhere more clearly brought out than by Santayana himself, who quite frankly deduces a conclusion of pure scepticism from his own epistemology. For he tells us that the hypothesis that external things as the causes and correspondents of our ideas do exist cannot at all be proved even with probability. We *believe* that they exist on the basis of "animal faith" which is the completely non-rational but biologically necessary instinct to regard our private mental states as symbolic of a public material nature. No actual sceptic, so far as I know, has claimed to disbelieve in an objective world. Scepticism is not a denial of belief, but rather a denial of rational grounds for belief. Santayana's picturesque name of "animal faith" does not in any way differentiate his position from that of Hume or other sceptics who have bowed to the inevitable fact that our basic practical attitudes toward the world are psychologically founded upon instinct rather than logically grounded on reason.

XIII. The Influence of American Realism on American Philosophy

My story of Realism in America, sketchy and inadequate though it be, is already far too long. I shall conclude it with two comments of a nature and temper more cheerful than my mainly destructive analyses of the arguments of both the New and the Critical Realists might seem to warrant.

First, then, for our comfort let us remember that *unproven is not disproven.* Grant that I have been right in arguing that New Realism in its eagerness to *bridge the gap* between the mind and its physical world has by its theory of Objective Relativism degraded the pure members of that world to an unseemly parity with the objects of error and fantasy, while at the same time, by its theory of Behaviourism, it has degraded the mind itself to a mass of "specific responses." Grant also that I have been right in arguing that Critical Realism has revived an old puzzle rather than contributed a new solution of

it and that in its eagerness to *preserve the gap* between the undisciplined hordes of mutually incompatible ideas and the single self-consistent system of univalent material entities it has made that gap as hopelessly unbridgeable as it was in the earlier dualistic realisms of Locke and Descartes. Grant me both of these negative appraisals of the two schools of American Realism and I can still say that the object of their joint devotion: viz. a physical world existing independently of the minds that inhabit it and use it, remains inviolate at least as an object of faith if not as an object of proof. And that "faith," which as Santayana has said is necessary to the life of animals, may be also necessary to the growth and health of philosophy.

Certain it is that both of the recent movements of realism, whatever the validity of their arguments, have brought a new and more invigorating atmosphere to American philosophy,—and this is the second and last of my concluding comments.

Prior to the advent of the New Realism, academic philosophy was curiously out of touch with common sense, with science and even with religion. The usual tenor of a course in "Introduction to Philosophy" was to convince the students in the first place that Berkeley's conception of the physical world was essential to philosophic truth, and in the second place that it was a kind of truth which, when accepted, made no essential difference to any particular belief. The net result of such teaching was the impression that philosophy was a combination of the paradoxical and the unimportant. As for science, its working categories and great discoveries were all too often belittled as "vicious abstractions from the organic unity of experience." Philosophers as such (with the notable exception of Josiah Royce) regarded themselves as under no obligation to acquaint themselves with what experts in various departments were finding out about the universe. Finally as to religion, the attitude of the professors alternated between a condescending neglect of it as a crude embryonic form of real philosophy and an idealistic defence of it that gave an all too easy assurance of God, Freedom, and Immortality based not on a study of the universe and its history but on a dialectical analysis of the problem of epistemology.

Thanks to Realism and also to Pragmatism, these thin manners of philosophy in the colleges have changed to something thicker and better. The teaching of metaphysics and ethics to-day is much more relevantly related to the natural and social sciences. And finally, the basic beliefs of religion are analysed more often in terms of their connection with what is known about physical nature and human history than in terms of idealistic platitudes, with the result that on the one hand the values and the dangers of the church as a social

institution are better understood, and on the other hand Theism itself is seen as an exciting and momentous hypothesis rather than as either a dialectical truism or a mere dogma of faith.

In short, to some extent at least there has come into our speculative thinking a revival of the ancient Ionian attitudes of curiosity as to the specific features of the universe and wonder as to its central mystery. And for this restoration of health to American philosophy the two movements of New and Critical Realism have, I believe, been largely responsible.

CONTEMPORARY BRITISH REALISM

Professor JOHN LAIRD

Anyone who thinks, for example, of "realism," "sur-realism," and the like in matters of art, or of the vulgar and journalistic vagueness in the use of the adjective "realistic," may be prepared for the discovery that in philosophy also the term "realist" is either uncomfortably fluid or else acquires technical senses that are rather easily blurred. Our lexicographers tell us that, in its most general sense, "realism" indicates fidelity to what is real, particularly in the representation of (usually sordid) matters of fact, and that in philosophy it is an antithetic term, asserting the contrary either of "nominalism" or of "idealism." In the main, we might probably say that "realism" in twentieth-century British philosophy is employed in the second of these philosophical senses, the mediaeval controversy regarding the status of universals (although perennial) being no part of its special business. But we should have to be wary in saying so.

Indeed, there would be nothing improper or archaic even to-day in Campbell Fraser's statement (say) that Berkeley was a "spiritual realist," and if it were true in fact that all contemporary British realists agreed in repudiating idealism, it may be doubted whether such a statement would help us very much. For "idealism" in philosophy is a very ambiguous term, and "its" opponents may well be opposing quite different things. Again, even if "idealism" were less ambiguous than in fact it is, there need not be much common ground among its opponents. One could hardly define blue as anti-buff; why then expect to define "realism" as anti-idealism? And what of the distinctions between philosophical realists? Some of them are "critical realists," not, indeed, of the American variety but as Mr. Dawes Hicks is; some, like the late Mr. Lloyd Morgan, are impenitent "natural" or "representative" realists; some come as near to being "naïve" or perhaps "direct" realists as they dare; and most of the members of the league of realists are prepared to castigate their dubious allies for being uncritical, unnatural, sophisticated, or oblique realists.

These observations are more than a piece of preliminary sparring, intended to stimulate the writer's circulation and possibly to catch the attention of an idle reader. As logic often is, they are devastatingly matter-of-fact. Thus a recent writer (Mr. S. Z. Hasan, in his *Realism*, 1928) gives a fairly full discussion of the views of Cook

Wilson, Prichard and Joseph, yet makes Moore the central figure in British philosophical realism. "There is hardly any position of fundamental importance which cannot be traced to him" (p. 229). But what in Cook Wilson could be traced to Moore? and how could it be maintained that Moore was greatly influenced by the "natural realism" that persisted in British philosophy from the time of Reid onwards, that did influence such writers as Pringle-Pattison and S. S. Laurie, and is not wholly extinct in these islands to-day? Again, how could anyone seriously maintain that all recent British anti-idealisms are pro-realistic? Is it not clear that most British pragmatists are anti-absolutists, but *not* realists? And did they not obtain the support of certain "personal idealists" some of whom, like Stout, might count themselves realists in a half-Reidian way, although with a host of qualifications, amendments, amplifications, and divagations?

Let us, then, begin all over again. All philosophical realists, we may allow, are opponents of some sort of idealism, but must be presumed to agree in a positive direction, even if they do not, strictly, occupy a common platform.

In attempting to give an account of this common tendency, I propose to take a course that may be unfair to several British philosophers now living. It is not true, I think, that all the contemporary British philosophies that might legitimately be called realism in terms of some quite intelligible definition or definitions of that word, owed much to Dr. Moore; but it is true, I submit, that what was commonly called "realism" in pre-War Britain during the present century was roused in the main by Moore's *Refutation of Idealism* and fostered by the immense activity of those who agreed very largely with him. Moreover, the War did not end this central fact. Consequently I propose to typify British realism in the present century by this sort of debate. We may not hear much about it now, but its influence lingers, just as the influence of realism in any of its senses lingers to-day, although we do not usually hear much about "realism" as such.

(I should warn my readers, however, that neither Moore nor Russell (who at one time followed him) called themselves realists. The name was thrust upon them. It will also appear that these writers, as well as many others, developed their philosophies in ways they did not originally contemplate, so that no one would call them "realists" now, although many would have called them so in Edwardian times.)

Why, then, did these authors, and others like them, attack "idealism," and what in the first fine *careful* rapture of their attack committed them to some form of "realism"?

As has been said, "idealism" has many varieties. It may not, for example, be much more than the doctrine that somehow the

nature of things satisfies as well as begets men's highest aspirations. Substantially, however, we may say that it has two major forms which, despite many individual differences, may be called respectively epistemological and ontological idealism.

By epistemological idealism I mean the view that knowing, perceiving, opining, believing, and all such processes (for short all cognitions) are such that anything cognized is by that mere circumstance mentalized in some way, so that the non-mental is incognoscible. Such cognition, so far as the argument goes, might be animal, human, superhuman, super-personal, or divine, but human cognitions and what they mentalize would, on any showing, play a prominent part in any such philosophy.

By ontological idealism I mean simply the view that the universe is either a spirit or a collection of spirits, so that nothing exists save spirit and its states. That is a view about the constitution of being, and it might be held quite independently of any epistemological premiss. For an idealist of the second type might hold that while there was no contradiction in the idea of non-mental things existing and being known, there were positive ontological grounds for denying that such things existed in fact. The alleged "things" might, for example (like the traditional devil), be too poor or too weak to exist; or they might be impossible participants in a universe as unified and as orderly as we know the actual universe to be. On the other hand, epistemological idealism would support ontological idealism if it could prove that the inevitable mentalization of any entity we can so much as conceive implied that that entity was either spirit or a "state" of spirit. In terms of this major division within idealism, British realism before the War was principally concerned with the denial of epistemological idealism, and presented an epistemological counter-analysis (or counter-analyses) realistic in some positive ways. This had an ontological bearing; but it was initially epistemological.

In his *Refutation of Idealism* (*Mind*, 1903) Mr. Moore argued that all idealisms required the premiss that *esse* necessarily implied *percipi* (assuming that *percipi* included thought as well as sensation), that this premiss was either an airy conceit or a confusion between "what is experienced" and "the experience of it," that in fact all cognitive events included a common part viz. "consciousness" or "awareness" together with a varying part, viz. the different "objects" cognized; that these parts were distinct and might exist separately; that consciousness, although "as it were diaphanous" was visible to introspection; that among other confusions the idealists treated the objects of mind as "contents" of mind (although they were "contents" of the object if they were "contents" in any intelligible sense at all) and that he personally

was "as directly aware of the existence of material things in space as of his own sensations."

This way of putting the case, despite its vigour and genuine acumen, may not seem to be wholly convincing. Thus it is true of any object experienced that it is experienced for a finite time; and it is also true that all experiencing lasts for a finite time. It could hardly be inferred, however, that pure diaphanous time, being common to both, may exist separately. On the other hand, the positive claim that we can see, by careful inspection, that acts of awareness are always existences distinct from the objects we are aware *of*, and that these objects could exist without being experienced is, in the slang phrase, something to bite upon. It is also "realistic" in a very obvious sense, for it asserts that there is no reason to doubt that the human mind can apprehend both itself and objects other than itself (including non-mental objects) as they are in themselves, thus denying epistemological relativism and agnosticism as well as idealism.

Accordingly there was much discussion of the grounds and tenability of this analysis, or of other analyses that were, broadly speaking, similar. Some of the critics, as Mr. Dawes Hicks, professed themselves to be realists (for it does not follow that epistemological realism stands or falls with the letter of Moore's *Refutation*); others were anti-realists; others did not care whether they were realists or not. The point is that the dominant idealism in Britain at the time had been badly shaken, and that much close if furious thinking ensued.

Let us select certain points for a brief consideration. (1) Do acts of pure awareness exist in the sense alleged? (2) Is it legitimate to treat the act-object analysis as an absolute prius in all epistemology? (3) Are all the "objects" of such "acts" existentially distinct from the acts, or some only, or none?

(1) In his later arguments Moore held that the nature of cognitive acts was "extraordinarily difficult" to be clear about although the characteristic of appearing must certainly be distinguished from and additional to the constitutive characteristics of any object.[1] In the *Refutation*, however, he held that "the awareness of blue" was existentially distinct from "blue" and itself directly introspectible. We could inspect the awareness, with some difficulty, and were not simply left with the puzzle that something must be blue, although a blue awareness was nonsense. Indeed, although this analysis of sensation might be incapable of being made more general (since we might not be able, e.g., to introspect an act of remembering, distinct from the remembered, although we could introspect an act of sensing distinct from the sensed), Moore in the *Refutation* took the analysis to extend to all cognition.

[1] See *Aristotelian Society Proceedings* (= *A.P.*), April 1921, pp. 134 *sqq.*

In this he had comparatively few followers. According to Russell (arguing against Meinong rather than against Moore), "empirically I cannot discover anything corresponding to the supposed act" (*The Analysis of Mind*, p. 17 *sq.*). According to Alexander, the distinction between experienc*ing* and the experienc*ed* is absolutely fundamental, and the *ings* are introspectible; but it is not true that introspection "contemplates" or could conceivably contemplate mental acts. It can only "enjoy" them (*Space, Time, and Deity*,[1] I, p. 12 *sq.*). According to Dawes Hicks "awareness" in Moore's proffered analysis was a mere universal, not an empirical fact. Hicks therefore maintained that Moore was asking quite wrong-headed questions about it (*A.P.*, 1916–17, p. 353).

(2) Hicks (among others) held that we should be "critical" realists, that is to say, realists who had learned a great deal from Kant, but had also unlearned some of him. Objectivity should be regarded as a gradual discriminative achievement, not something that could ever be visible to simple inspection, And subjectivity was a still more difficult achievement. Coleridge's growl about "ommjec" and "summjec" had a lesson for all this light-hearted, confident chatter about *-ings* and *-eds* (Applause from Scotland, and subdued applause from Oxford).

Again, if, as Russell later held, mind and physical nature (with certain reservations regarding passion and images) were to be regarded primarily as different series of sensory phenomenal stuff, and *not* as distinct existences, it is clear that Moore's analysis was roundly disputed, although it would be a question of definition whether "realism," in all its important epistemological senses, was also disputed. It is also clear that there might be considerable resemblance between Kantians and rabid anti-Kantians in this matter.

(3) Superficially, at least, the third problem is even more complicated than the others. I shall try, however, to give an account (brief and necessarily sketchy) of some of the more important points that were debated in this country.

(*a*) Even if it be assumed that there are definite acts of awareness occupying an assignable time in someone's life history, it cannot be inferred from this mere circumstance that (to retain a convenient piece of jargon) the *-eds* could exist apart from the *-ings*. Many, for example, would hold that there could not be an unexperienced pain, although, verbally at least, it is possible to distinguish between experienc*ing* a sharp pain and the sharp pain experienc*ed*, and although it is easy to distinguish an aching tooth from an aching toe, although an "aching feeling" may be said to be common to both.

Accordingly, if we attempted to analyse all cognition into cog-

[1] Cited hereafter as *S.T.D.*

nizing and cognized, holding that sensing and sensum, memory and the remembered, imagining and the imagined (and so forth) are, in each case, two distinct entities, we might find ourselves rather unhappy. The general position set forth in Moore's *Refutation* would need to be supported by particular arguments of detail if it were maintained that we do in fact sense colours (and the like) as they exist apart from sensing, that we remember past events as they were when not remembered, that we imagine imaginary objects as they would be unimagined, etc.

In lieu of debating such points in detail, I shall only remark that few professing realists would go so far as to defend such a thesis in full (at any rate without important reservations), although I personally think that anyone who persistently took such a view would have a much better case than is currently supposed.

(*b*) Awareness is always awareness of something. Therefore if, in the analysis of cognition, nothing is included except, on the one hand, awareness and on the other hand its "object," it may fairly be asked, "Where, then, is there room for error?" For, in error we do seem to be aware, in some sense, of "objects" that "really" are *not* objects, or, alternatively, of an "object" that is not what we are aware of it as being.

Something, no doubt, may be done in the way of classifying the causes and the types of possible error, and so of restricting the zone of hostilities. Certain persons, for example (not all of them realists), hold that there can be no mis-sensing (since sensation is below truth and error), no mis-imagining (since imagination cannot be false), no mis-knowing (since it would be self-contradictory to *know* what was false). But it would be impossible to deny that mis-judging, mis-conceiving and mis-remembering occur quite frequently.

Consequently, the objection was frequently raised that realists could not find a home for error, or that, if they did find a home for it, they were logically constrained to abandon their realistic domicile regarding truth. This realists deny; and Mr. Alexander, in particular, grappled with the problem very pertinaciously on realistic lines (*S.T.D.*, III, vii and viii). It seems fair to remark that a realist who is error-conscious is apt to be a chastened rather than a truculently "naïve" realist. He can scarcely maintain that error is the correct awareness of "false objects"[1]; for even if there were such objects, the correct awareness of them would not be erroneous. On the other hand, it seems pessimistic to conclude that nothing is apprehended as it is because some things are apprehended as they are not, or that any non-realistic theory of error is better able to deal with this problem, at the critical point, than a

[1] Or "objectives" in Meinong's terminology.

realistic theory. (Some such theories can push the problem a stage further back; but that is not a solution.)

(*c*) It is also pretty clear that not all "objects" of an "act" of cognition have the same status *vis-à-vis* the mind that a yellow patch (say) may plausibly be held to have *vis-à-vis* the sensing of it. A yellow patch (we may plausibly, if rashly, say) is "there" to be seen. But consider such apprehensions as "It will probably rain to-morrow," "Jones will either sink his putt or lose the match." Rain may be "there," but not "probable rain," and "reality" cannot be "either-or." In short, propositions are cognized and may in some sense be non-mental; but many or all of them seem to "express" or "correspond to" reality rather than to *be* it. Hence it is not surprising that most of those who busy themselves with symbols and "objectives" rather than with "objects" commonly suppose that they have thereby emancipated themselves from the sort of problem that appealed to the more enthusiastic British realists in the early years of the present century.

(*d*) Nevertheless, the problem of the status of physical objects remains; and the popular view, at least among semi-philosophical people, is that a realist in philosophy is a stout fellow who insists that there is a physical world which has existed, and probably will exist, independently of the observations of a human or, indeed, of any mind; and that human beings can apprehend portions or phases of this physical world as it would be if they were nowhere near it.

In this general sense there might be many divergent types of realism. Thus it might be held that our senses represented such a world correctly (a form of "natural" realism), that thought but not sense might grasp the real nature of physical things (noëtic realism), that we might be able to divine the essence of physical nature in some romantic or mystical sur-realistic way. For the most part, however, what the plain man understands by "realism" is the doctrine that if he opens his eyes or his ears he will (usually if not infallibly) become acquainted with physical nature as it truly is. If he sees white paper, and is not dreaming or drugged, then there is paper in his neighbourhood, and that paper is white. He believes that "realism" is a sophisticated philosophical defence of this naïve attitude. It is a *sensory* realism that interests him, and he is not inclined to brief a philosophical barrister who takes too many liberties with that fundamental position.

The philosophical problems concerning sense-perception have been exceptionally prominent in British philosophy for at least two centuries, but few would deny that Moore, Nunn, Russell, Stout, Alexander, Broad, and Price (to mention no others) have greatly increased our knowledge of the subtlety of these problems and of

the need for being circumspective in our inferences regarding this topic. And all these writers were either realists or considerably influenced by realistic views. They roused many philosophers from what had tended to be something very like an idealistic slumber, and made even an idealistic nap rather difficult, especially for the young. Moore may not have been justified in believing that he was "as directly aware of the existence of physical things in space as of his own sensations"; but it was much to have shown that the question "If not, why not?" had to be taken very seriously indeed.

In ordinary speech (and keeping to a stock example) we say that a penny is brown and round, and that our evidence for this belief is that we see the penny to be so. Yet we also say that "it" looks elliptical when viewed sideways, and black, not brown, in the dusk. Here again the evidence is that we see these shapes and hues.

"Its" colour, therefore, would seem to require a concealed premiss concerning the illumination, and (because of possible colour-blindness, etc.) a concealed premiss regarding psycho-physics. "Its" shape might also seem to involve a concealed premiss regarding the position from which the penny was seen.

Let it be granted that at any open-eyed moment we do see something, and that we should not confuse between glimpsing and glimpsed. Can it then be held that we really see "glimpseds" (or visual sensa) and that these are identical with some portion or phase of the physical penny?

The plain man talks about *a* penny that has only one shape, and, I suppose, only one colour; but there are many "glimpseds" that he would deny to be identical with this single shape or single colour (for example, all the oblique or crepuscular "glimpseds" of normal people, and all the "glimpseds" of persons drugged, or drunk, or standing on their heads).

Keeping to shape, we might argue (α) that *the* penny, visually considered, is a name for a set of shapes tending towards roundness, as a sort of paradigm, and defined by this tendency. It has not really *one* shape, except in a "Pickwickian" sense; but it is convenient to talk of *one* shape in order to designate a certain assemblage of shapes readily distinguishable from any other assemblage. And all the shapes might be non-mental and belong to the physical world.

We might also argue (β) that the penny has only one permanent shape, but that the elliptical glimpsed-shapes *are* its surface with certain omissions, while the omissions (if any) in its round glimpsed-shape do not affect the visible circularity of that in the surface which is *not* omitted. (The main difficulty in this line of argument would be that if a normal man presses his eye-ball, he perceives two glimpsed-pennies without actually creating a second penny.)

Or we might say (γ) that the physical penny (which is always round) should be distinguished from the glimpsed-shapes (which need not be round). If so, theories (α) and (β) would be very unplausible, since they imply, without adequate cause, that certain glimpsed-shapes are privileged. The plausible conclusion would be that the physical penny is not sensed at all, but it might be maintained, nevertheless, that the glimpsed-shapes justified the belief in the existence of a (round?) physical penny either by being the basis of an inference, or in some way even more fundamental than inference.

All these suggestions are, in various ways, realistic; and they illustrate, without exhausting, the realistic possibilities. None of them would quite satisfy the plain man; but I am afraid the plain man must for ever remain unsatisfied. He is Pickwickianized and de-Pickwickianized, and re-Pickwickianized by the most friendly philosophers.

Another possible view for realists would be that there are, properly speaking, *no* sensa. It cannot be inferred from "I see X" (such reasoners would say) that there is any entity a "seen-X" regarding which one can legitimately use the same sort of language as regarding X. Sensing, in short, is a "way" of apprehending X, and it is a matter for detailed argument whether X has sense qualities at all, or certain sense qualities (but not others), and generally what is meant by being sense-qualitied. Yet the need for such investigation should not prejudge the question whether X *was* sense-qualitied.

Here I must abandon this type of question and pass to others. I have tried to indicate, in a rough way, the variety and also the realistic trend of much British discussion of these questions.

While it seems to me to be correct to say that Moore's *Refutation* originated the greater and more characteristic part of what is commonly understood by twentieth-century British (epistemological) realism, it would be absurd to suggest that the *Refutation* exhausted his views, or exhausted those that had a direct bearing upon "realism." Indeed, Russell mentioned rather different matters when at an early stage in his career he avowed his allegiance to Moore. "On fundamental questions of philosophy," Russell said (*The Principles of Mathematics*, 1903, p. viii): "My position, in all its chief features, is derived from Mr. G. E. Moore. I have accepted from him the non-existential nature of propositions (except such as happen to assert existence) and their independence of any knowing mind; also the pluralism which regards the world, both that of existents and that of entities, as composed of an infinite number of mutually independent entities, with relations that are ultimate, and not reducible to adjectives of their terms, or of the whole which these compose. . . . The doctrines just mentioned are, in my opinion,

quite indispensable to any even tolerably satisfactory philosophy of mathematics."

Russell's work on logistics and on mathematics was a truly great philosophical achievement, bringing him (and this country) international and lasting renown. This was admitted by his British opponents. As the greatest of them said (F. H. Bradley in *Essays on Truth and Reality*, p. 309): "There is no living writer, with whom I am acquainted, whose work in philosophy seems to me more original and valuable." Again, the belief that philosophy could renew its ancient alliance with science, and even take the lead in the bolder sort of scientific explanation, seemed to give a solidity and importance to the whole enterprise that the rather condescending views of the absolutists regarding science had expressly abandoned. To-day we think of Russell, Alexander, and Whitehead as the pioneers and executants of a philosophico-scientific movement of great importance, and may not be disposed to inquire too nicely into the question whether they are "realists," and, if so, what kind of realists.

Nevertheless, Russell was a realist, without calling himself so, when he wrote *The Principles of Mathematics* and the "fundamental questions" (concerning which I have quoted his opinions at that time) were intimately connected with the argument of the *Refutation*. This is particularly obvious with respect to the philosophy of relations. To speak popularly, if, in being aware of X, I am aware of X as it is in itself, and as it would be if I were not aware of it, there must be an important sense in which certain relations (e.g. the relations involved in cognition) "make no difference" to some of the terms related. In short, certain relations, if not all, must be "external," yet true and quite fundamental. In certain presidential addresses to the Aristotelian Society, and at other times during a prolonged period, Russell reiterated this theme; and there is still room and need for discussing it.

In the main, however, Russell and a great many others argued such points with reference to analysis rather than to realism, and were not greatly interested in the question whether their analysis implied realism or didn't. Indeed, in 1914, Russell, in publishing his *Our Knowledge of the External World*, added the sub-title "As a Field for Scientific Method in Philosophy." The "logical-analytic method" was now the idol, and was to be followed wherever it led—to philosophical solipsism, perhaps, or to phenomenalism, or to nine and ninety other -isms.

Moore's philosophy headed in a similar direction. He also became the champion of analysis (although he may never have become a super-analyst like Wittgenstein and the logical positivists). In general, and speaking roughly, his position turned out to be that

we know with certainty "in the familiar sense" that there are pens, and hands, and pens in the hands, but that the correct analysis of such knowledge is of a higher order that can neither support nor refute common sense (*Contemporary British Philosophy*, Second Series). Since "realism" is frequently supposed to be a vindication of the common-sense order of statement, it is plain that philosophical analysts, in the exercise of their profession, are above all realisms.

Writers like Broad or Whitehead would not (I think) commit themselves to Moore's later views, but they sit loose to realism as currently understood, and I do not think that a nice discussion of the extent to which they are "realists" would serve any useful purpose. Even Mr. Alexander, who is still in earnest with his realism (see *Beauty and Other Forms of Value*, p. 10), preferred to take wider ground. "As to the terms idealism and realism," he said (*S.T.D.*, I, 7 *sq.*), "I should be heartily glad if we might get rid of them altogether; they have such shifting senses, and carry with them so much prejudice."

Indeed, in allowing myself to speak of affinities between realism and common sense (as I have occasionally done) I have myself come dangerously near to shifting the senses of the term "realism." Up to the present I have tried, pretty resolutely, to deal with "realism" as an epistemological doctrine; and "common sense," although it may heartily dislike certain epistemological *conclusions*, does not have much epistemology in its composition. In short, epistemological realism (to which department I should willingly confine all philosophical realism) is a *philosophical* theory.

It is clear, however, that many people, when they speak of "realism," think of it primarily as an ontological doctrine, which may be strenuously philosophical, but also has marked affinities with a non-philosophical commonsensical view of the world. This point of view has certainly not been absent from British philosophy in the present century, and Mr. Alexander, I think, was a "realist" principally because he wanted to offer, at a high philosophical level, a defence of ontological realism. "The temper of realism," he said in a famous preliminary sketch of his beliefs (*British Academy Proceedings*, 1914) "is to de-anthropomorphize; to order man and mind to their proper place among the world of finite things; on the one hand to divest physical things of the colouring which they have received from the vanity or arrogance of mind; and on the other hand to assign them, along with minds, their due measure of self-existence." And in his latest book (*Beauty and other Forms of Value*, p. 9) while "deliberately abstaining from metaphysics," he says (*ibid.*) "In every case the external object physically excites a physical response; but in creatures with minds the response is of such a character that at once the creature is aware, and the thing which

before was merely a physical object is revealed in its appropriate characters; as blue or green, or hard or soft, or sweet, or fragrant."

I shall, therefore, conclude this article (1) by saying a little more about the relation between epistemological and ontological realism (with special regard to this country and to the present century), and (2) by attempting to indicate the sort of theory that might be considered realistic, ontological, British, and relatively new-fangled.

(1) Even the negative proposition that there is no good reason for denying the existence of non-experiences opens up an important ontological vista; and if realism were the doctrine that we are acquainted with non-experiences, that would be an ontological doctrine. Suppose that, in Mr. Alexander's language, cognition, except, perhaps, in sheer error (if there is such a thing) always *reveals* something. If so (admitting epistemological realism), there is no objection to accepting such revelations as they come. If an object shows itself to be non-mental it *is* non-mental. If it shows itself to be mental it *is* mental. And so forth. There is no general presumption that things must be *very* different from what they seem to be; and if they are very different the proof would be one of "revealed" reasons and would not be a governing epistemological ordinance.

Nevertheless, the objects would have to declare their own "realism." According to the epistemological theory (and speaking metaphorically), they proclaim themselves such and such; but from the epistemological premiss that we should accept their declarations, we obviously cannot infer what these declarations are.

(2) What "declarations," then, should be called realistic in an ontological sense?

I do not see how this question could be answered to anyone's legitimate satisfaction. If "reality" reveals itself as it is, realism must accrue—and does so tautologically. If "reality" showed itself to be spiritual, coherent, a seamless garment, an irreducible plurality, a chaos, a plenum, a cycle, or a babble of change—any such revelation, being *ex hypothesi* authentic, would be a "realism." Ontological realism, therefore, if it is to have a special and distinctive meaning, must express the view that objects declare themselves to have a certain quite special type of constitution.

What this special constitution is I do not pretend to know, but I can make a guess at what most people would understand by it. They would hold in substance that a realistic theory of the universe is one in which spatio-temporal existence is the matrix, that everything in the universe, including mind itself, is consubstantial with its matrix. Such realism is itself a species of "naturalism," and "naturalism" is a vague and (I dare say) a pagan term; but doctrines

belonging to a type that might be vague, need not be vague themselves.

Suppose a philosophy claimed to be based upon physical matter-of-fact. Suppose it further maintained that the mind itself was physical matter-of-fact, and that mind, with all its genuine excellences and exalted functions was a natural growth, carrying to high perfection one of the potencies of physical matter-of-fact, and developing what sub-mentally is a pervasive property of all that there is. Suppose that a philosophy conceived in this spirit vindicated itself more successfully than any other—regard being had, in particular, to the modish panorama of the universe that the newer sciences have suggested or actually unfolded. In that case you would have a philosophy of a realistic temper. You would also have sympathy and much general agreement with Alexander and, I dare say, with Whitehead. But you might very well prefer to banish the term "realism" altogether.

HUME'S DIALOGUES CONCERNING NATURAL RELIGION

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Professor Kemp Smith in providing a new edition of Hume's *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion,* embodying all the author's additions and corrections, has given expression to the perennial interest and fascination which this work has possessed for many minds during the odd one hundred and fifty years since it was first published by Hume's nephew. The editor himself has performed a great service by contributing an Introduction and a clear and concise summary of the *Dialogues,* in both of which he expounds his own view as to how Hume's discussion is to be interpreted. Hume employs three characters—Demea, Philo, and Cleanthes; and the discussion is ostensibly reported by a youth Pamphilus, who claims to have been an onlooker at the time and who at the end sums up his impression to the following effect: "Upon a serious review of the whole, I cannot but think, that Philo's principles are more probable than Demea's; but that those of Cleanthes approach still nearer the truth." As Philo plays the rôle of the sceptical critic and Cleanthes that of defender of the teleological argument, the conclusion of the *Dialogues* suggests that Hume's sympathies are with Cleanthes, that he is to be identified with the latter, and that he thus is to be regarded as accepting the teleological view with its theistic implications. What has rendered it difficult for many students of Hume to accept this reading of the *Dialogues* is their apparently mainly negative character combined with the apparently sceptical nature of Hume's general philosophy. Professor Kemp Smith is one of those students and in his Introduction to, and in his summary of the argument in, the present edition he seeks to defend the interpretation that Hume and Philo are to be identified.

According to his presentation of the argument the *Dialogues* constitute a somewhat disjointed and even curiously inconsistent piece of work, infected by a supposedly mischievous humour on the part of Hume, even, it is to be suspected, by a certain degree of insincerity. Arguments of an important character are left unanswered by Cleanthes because he seems unable to deal with them. Philo is really made to have the best of the discussion: he dominates the argument and forces Cleanthes into positions which the latter cannot defend, being reduced to simple re-assertions of his view. He is able to state even Cleanthes' views more clearly and more

effectively than Cleanthes himself. Some of the arguments put into the mouth of Cleanthes, as in his reply to Demea in Part IX, "sound very strangely"; and in Part X "he is made to voice against Demea those very objections which Philo has been urging against his own modes of formulating the argument from design, and the cogency of which he refuses to recognize when they are again urged against him by Philo." On the other hand, Philo at times behaves with "mischievous intent." Hume's "usual procedure" is to have as much as possible of Philo's case expounded by one of the other protagonists. The close of the discussion contains merely "the conventionally prescribed avowal" about the disabilities of reason and the need of revelation. The latter part of the *Dialogues* takes "a very strange and indeed bewildering turn," for Philo comes forward as the champion of the case for design and claims to believe in final causes. And Philo, it has to be remembered, is to be identified with Hume. But the obvious absurdity of the sceptic, after an admitted victorious argument, confessing to a belief in what he had been opposing requires some explanation; and either it points to a playful insincerity in Philo and a mere debating success over Cleanthes, or else it requires resort to the "artfulness" and "mischievous intent" of Hume (that is, Philo) whose object is to whittle away any important theistic significance which Philo's confession may seem to have. It is the second alternative which Professor Kemp Smith emphasizes. Consequently in his opinion the outcome of the *Dialogues* is, firstly, more sheerly negative than is usually supposed, and, secondly, the conviction that Hume consciously and deliberately set out to undermine the religious hypothesis.

The resort to Hume's "artfulness" admittedly has support in a statement made by himself in a letter to Adam Smith (August 15, 1776) where he says that "nothing can be more artfully written." In what sense Hume's use of the word "artful" is to be understood is a debatable point. The context points to the effect which the fears and hesitations affecting his friends had upon him. Hume recognizes, as clearly appears from a letter to Strahan (June 8, 1776), that the topics advanced by Philo in the course of the argument are "out of the Common Road" and will give umbrage; and there too he definitely states that "he introduces a Sceptic, who is indeed refuted, and at last gives up the Argument, nay confesses that he was only amusing himself by all his Cavils." Either this statement must be regarded as another bit of egregious "artfulness," with the consequence that the *Dialogues* as well as Hume's other philosophical writings have to be considered as all a playful jest, or else it must be taken in all seriousness as expressing what Hume believed the *Dialogues* to be, with the consequence that he quite clearly identifies

himself with Cleanthes. That the statement of the case for scepticism, which is upheld by Philo, required careful handling in the supercharged religious atmosphere of the eighteenth century must be acknowledged. It was only too easy to formulate the sceptical position in an arrogant and offensive form. Hume's caution and "artfulness," if the latter is to be given a meaning other than skill shown in literary presentation and in developing the opposing views, requires no other interpretation than this—that he recognized, aided no doubt by the observed reactions of his friends, that he was treating a subject apt to provoke strong feeling and that it was incumbent upon him to write within the canons of good taste.

Somehow a sort of tradition, much like that about Voltaire, has arisen that Hume wrote with his tongue in his cheek and that any avowal of religious faith is but a cloak which merely serves his purpose of delivering surreptitious but deadly blows at religion. Professor Kemp Smith, for instance, considers that in the *Dialogues* Hume is deliberately and consciously undermining the religious hypothesis. Two points must be mentioned in reply to this contention. In the first place, the *Dialogues* are concerned purely with Natural Religion, and even for a very large section of orthodox divines in the eighteenth century the arguments of Natural Religion were a sort of heretical argument; and the deliberate exposure of their weakness, an exposure even ending in scepticism so far as that line of reasoning was concerned, would have caused no dismay, in fact would have met with approval, for it would have left their own position untouched, if not strengthened. In the second place, Professor Kemp Smith's assertion is made in face of Hume's express declaration in a letter to Sir Gilbert Elliot that "any Propensity you imagine I have to the other side (that is, in favour of the sceptical views of Philo) crept in upon me against my will," and in face of a definite request for assistance in strengthening the case of Cleanthes who, he says, is made the hero of the *Dialogues*. Unless this letter is to be regarded as another piece of artfulness, it is impossible to admit Professor Kemp Smith's assertion.

Those who take the view that the *Dialogues*, not merely in tendency but in intention, are sceptical lay stress upon at least two points. In the first place, one of the strongest supports in favour of such an interpretation is that Hume's general philosophy necessitates it. That philosophy is held to be essentially sceptical. Yet Hume himself in a footnote to Section XIV of Part III of the *Treatise*, where he is discussing the idea of necessary connection, writes: "The same imperfection attends our ideas of the Deity; but this can have no effect either on religion or morals. The order of the universe proves an omnipotent mind; that is, a mind whose will is *constantly attended* with the obedience of every creature and being. Nothing

more is requisite to give a foundation to all the articles of religion." This passage is clear evidence that Hume, whatever interpretation the philosophical public may put and may have put upon his theory, did not consider that that theory was inconsistent with an acceptance of the teleological argument; and it requires convincing evidence that he at any later time came to reject it. It rules out once more the suggestion that Hume was in temperament and in intention a sceptic. What alone could be legitimately maintained—what is quite a different thing—is that, whatever Hume himself may have thought, his views, including the discussion in the *Dialogues*, lead, when carefully examined, to sceptical results. In the second place, stress may be laid, as by Professor Kemp Smith, upon the weakness of Cleanthes' defence—a weakness which stands out prominently in spite of Hume's efforts to cover it up. This weakness must here be taken to be a matter of logically defective argument and not merely one of artful touches for or against Cleanthes, since Philo too is represented as being once at a loss in face of Cleanthes' argument and is also made to confess how great an effort was required of him to meet his opponent's view. Cleanthes, it is pointed out, seems, apart from the statement of his thesis, to be singularly lacking in argument and in ability to refute his opponent, he simply repeats his doctrine and is reduced in the end practically to silence. On the other hand, it is fair to point out that he is represented as treating Philo's objections as arbitrary and frivolous, in fact as simply irrelevant, as refusing to admit the conclusions which Philo puts forward as drawn from his hypothesis, as declaring that he sees in general the fallacy and error of Philo's arguments, although he does not state these fallacies and errors, as finding that the vulgar theology with its injudicious reasoning has given Philo too just a handle for his attitude of ridicule. Are all these features so much artfulness on the part of Hume and really designed to insinuate in the mind of the reader a belief in the weakness and untenability of the teleological argument?

Is the argument, then, of Cleanthes as weak as Professor Kemp Smith suggests and has Philo the best of it? Or is there some foundation for Cleanthes' contention that Philo's arguments are arbitrary and irrelevant and directed too much upon the "injudicious reasoning" of the ordinary theologians? The views expounded by Philo are stated in terms which are rejected by Hume in his general philosophy. They assume a clear and precise distinction between mind and matter which Hume's philosophy denies. Philo uses the notion of "actuating force" several times; he speaks in terms of productive power or energy which Hume has elsewhere ruled out—expressly in the footnote in Part III of the *Treatise* to which reference has already been made. The arguments at these points is non-

Humean because pre-Humean. It is true that Cleanthes in replying to Demea in Part IX seems to use an argument which involves a distinction between mind and matter. This is one of the arguments which Professor Kemp Smith thinks "sounds very strangely in the mouth of Cleanthes." But Cleanthes is here not maintaining any positive doctrine involving and requiring any such distinction; he is concerned purely with the refutation of Demea's theory, and, within the limits of that "pretended explication of necessity" asserted by Demea, he seeks to show that Demea has not proved that the "necessary existent" is the Deity, since matter may equally well be that necessary existent. But Cleanthes goes on in the same passage to point out that the same argument used to rule out matter as the necessary existent can be with equal justification used against the conclusion that the Deity is that existent; and his contention rests upon the inability of the human mind to make any clear distinction between mind and matter. The rejection of the term "necessary existence" by Cleanthes because it has no meaning is thoroughly Humean, the word "necessary" (if we may assume an interpretation of Hume's general philosophy here) having only an epistemological, not an ontological, significance. The views which Philo puts forward can have justification only on one ground, namely that they are serious alternatives to the thesis put forward by Cleanthes; and to be serious alternatives they must have a certain degree of intelligibility and of probability in themselves. To ensure the rejection of the teleological argument they must have a probability greater than that of the former. This must be the case with *each* alternative theory. Cleanthes protests against Philo's faculty of invention and declares its futility; in this he is justified, for Philo by piling up one possibility on top of another is relying for the refutation of Cleanthes upon the total effect of these various possibilities, when, as a matter of fact, each doctrine must be considered by itself and when the total effect is no greater than that of the one possessed of the greatest probability. The issue of the *Dialogues* is essentially reducible to the question whether the teleological argument is inherently intelligible and probable, and whether any other alternative with equal intelligibility and with equal or more probability can be formulated. The three characters in the *Dialogues* stand for three different, though at points over-lapping, standpoints. Demea represents the view that there is a Divine Being who is Creator of the universe but who is so far different from human nature and from anything in human experience that his nature is mysterious and incomprehensible; it is the view of those orthodox believers who stand by a supernatural revelation, and for whom a philosophical discussion about the Divine nature is absurd, indeed blasphemous. Philo's attitude is somewhat complex;

he cannot as a sceptic assert that there is no Divine Being; yet at times he argues that there is evidence in support of such a view; at times he agrees with Demea that the Divine nature is not knowable because of its incomprehensibility; at other times he argues that we cannot be certain whether there is or is not a Divine Being. Cleanthes holds that the Divine nature is to some extent knowable and knowable to an extent that is really requisite for human purposes; and, while Philo makes no attempt to assess the probabilities of the various ideas he puts forward and to consider whether there is a decisive probability in favour of one against his opponent's position, being content to insist upon the conflict of evidence and the need of suspense of judgment, Cleanthes contends that, according to the ordinary rules of evidence accepted even by the sceptic in other matters, the balance turns in his favour.

These considerations suggest that not only is it not beyond question that Philo has the best of the argument but also that the *Dialogues* can in a very fundamental way be regarded not as an expression of a personal attitude on the part of Hume, in which case his relation to Calvinism and to religion becomes a somewhat irrelevant matter, but as a discussion on *evidence*, just as the Essay on Miracles is essentially a discussion on evidence, religious issues being employed as a medium for a detached examination of logical issues. It is clear from Hume's correspondence relative to the *Dialogues* that he felt the weight of the evidence to be such as to create difficulties for the traditional religious views; and there arises an important question regarding the significance of the scepticism maintained by Philo and the teleological position maintained by Cleanthes. Hume in his correspondence is seen to be struggling honestly and seriously with a religious problem, which there is reason to believe arose for him through acquaintance with critical theories affecting religious beliefs. It is an analogous problem with which he deals in his general philosophy. What requires to be emphasized in regard to the *Dialogues* is that many, if not all, of the views put into the mouth of Philo are not original but borrowed. Professor Kemp Smith recognizes that one large portion is borrowed from Bayle on Strato's atheism. The presence of evil in the world, which is the subject of discussion in the latter part of the *Dialogues*, was a matter that received attention from many writers before and at the time of Hume, and the substance of that latter part is to be found in some of Voltaire's writings[1] published long before the *Dialogues* and while Hume, according to Professor Kemp Smith's

[1] The reference is to the *Éléments de la Philosophie de Newton* (1738), *Traité de Métaphysique* (1734), *Le Désastre de Lisbonne* (1756). There are many similarities of phrasing in the two writers, e.g. light is anatomized, (which I have been unable to trace in Newton).

view of the chronology of that work, was probably writing it. Voltaire even formulated the arguments for and against the teleological theory. The relevance of this fact is that, if Hume is to be identified with Philo, he and his *Dialogues* cease to have any importance as an original contribution to the problem of Natural Religion. All that he has done is to expound scepticism in the literary form of dialogue and thereby to give the discussion a certain dramatic interest. But otherwise he has simply collected and repeated arguments which had been often stated previously. If the *Dialogues* are to be or deserve to be rescued from this insignificance, it is necessary to look to the position maintained by Cleanthes, however imperfectly developed that position may be.

The discussion on evidence is concerned with the validity and value of the teleological argument based on analogy. Two main difficulties are brought forward: first, one connected with the use of the causal principle; second, one connected with the terms of the analogy, whether a machine of human contrivance is the most suitable term or one that need be used and whether *mind* is the only possible cause. Philo is made the spokesman of these objections. Causal inference rests upon a *species* of effect which in experience we have found to proceed from that *species* of cause. In order that a causal inference may be possible the universe must come under a *species* of effect which has always been found to proceed from a *species* of cause. But the universe is, or at any rate may be, so far as the evidence goes, something unique, and hence the requisite basis for an inference as to its cause is lacking. Because of this, room is left open for the admission of other possible causes and other possible effects to which the world may be compared. The world need not be compared to a work of art; it may with just as much justification be considered to be similar to an animal or a vegetable. Mind is not the only possible cause of order; matter itself may contain an internal principle of order; the cause may be rather of the nature of generation or organization than of the nature of mind.

The objection based on the nature of causal inference is discussed elsewhere in Hume's writings.[1] In Section IX of the *Enquiry* Hume lays down the principle that "all our reasonings concerning matter of fact are founded on a species of Analogy," and he draws attention to the part played by *sameness* and *similarity* of causes and effects. In Section XI he recognizes the importance of a *species* of cause and a *species* of effect, for if something were claimed to be an effect and were entirely singular, any inference as to its cause would be impossible—a view which is relevant, of course, to the question of miracles, for miracles are often singular or unique events. But

[1] *Enquiry*, Sect. xi.

at the end of this section Hume's words can be read to the effect that a denial of any other possibility is not intended but that some other avenue may be still open. Hume leaves it to the Epicurean "to pursue the consequences" of the principle enunciated, and observes that, since the opponents of Epicurus always assume the universe to be unique in its kind and the Deity, its cause, also to be unique, the Epicurean's reasonings upon that supposition "seem at least, to merit our attention." Cleanthes in the *Dialogues* rejects the view that the existence of any Being—for that is a matter of fact—can be *proved* and explicitly takes his stand upon the argument from analogy with the success or failure of which religion itself stands or falls. It might be noted that this issue has a topical interest in view of the contention of Logical Positivists that propositions about God have no meaning because they are not verifiable. How does Cleanthes fare under Philo's criticisms?

Emphasis is put upon the uniqueness of the universe and upon the consequent possibility of other causes than mind. Objection is taken not merely to the adequacy of a comparison of the universe to a human work of art but to the *need* of such a comparison. There are possible analogies, such as an animal or vegetable, besides a machine. Professor Kemp Smith, on the basis of a fundamental distinction between artificial products and organisms, argues in a long comment that the distinction invalidates Cleanthes' attempt to illustrate their self-evident similarity. Philo's criticism assumes this supposed contrast between a machine and an organism, and he is represented as making the utmost use of the idea of an organism to overthrow Cleanthes' position. Though it is he who elaborates the comparison of the universe to an animal and Cleanthes is represented as not having thought of this form of analogy, admitted to be a "pretty natural one," yet it is Cleanthes who first makes reference in Part III to animals, but in a respect different from Philo; and the difference serves to bring out an important feature of Cleanthes' theory. It is a feature that is inherent in Hume's general philosophy, the nature of which has been too much obscured by a preoccupation with the doctrine of causation as invariable sequence conjoined with custom, generating expectation and for the elucidation of which the *Dialogues* make an essential contribution.

Philo in his discussion of the analogy of an organism lays stress upon organization in the sense of activity, energy, power, as the source of order; and Professor Kemp Smith, in his use of such terms as "self-organizing," "self-maintaining," "self-regulating," and so on, seems to accept a similar view. Such terms are ruled out by Hume's general philosophy from any intelligible account of phenomena; and they are not used nor accepted by Cleanthes in the *Dialogues*. He is insisting upon the fact of order itself; organ-

ization is for him order. In the sense of power or activity it is simply an unknown x or occult quality, incapable of providing any basis for analogy. *Prima facie*, machines, animals, vegetables, are very different from each other, and are also very different from minds. Hence there are dissimilitudes which constitute a grave difficulty. But there is one feature in which all agree, namely order. When Cleanthes in stating his argument makes use of the term "machine," it is order of which he is thinking; when he refers to an animal, it is the "anatomy" that he mentions; when he speaks of light, it is the word "anatomy" that he uses, and in using it he intends to emphasize structure and order. The illustrations employed by Cleanthes in Part III and considered by Professor Kemp Smith to be bewildering, irrelevant, and misleading are a failure only if stress is laid upon the idea of propagation or upon the instances only as facts, but are significant when it is kept in mind that Cleanthes wishes to draw attention to order—exemplified in his special illustration by wisdom and coherence. Everywhere order is being discovered; the more science advances, the more does it come upon order. Philo argues in terms of causes of order or of organization, for instance in animals, and suggests that the cause may not and need not be mind. This form of argument is from Hume's point of view a traditional one because it employs traditional terms and concepts. It leads Philo to argue that a tree is the cause of a tree or an animal is the cause of an animal; and it leads him also to press Cleanthes as to the cause of mind and hence of the Divine Mind—a procedure against which the latter protests and which, it is pointed out, always presupposes order and does not explain it. On this interpretation of Cleanthes' argument the difficulty based on the requirement that causal inference rests upon a *species* of cause and a *species* of effect is removed, for Cleanthes accepts too the Humean doctrine that mind is to be understood and is *known* only as an order or system.

One important and significant feature of Hume's philosophy, often overlooked, is that it annuls so far as scientific investigation and knowledge are concerned the hard and fast distinction between machines and organisms and between mechanism and teleology, and forestalls the later controversy of mechanism versus vitalism or teleology by seeking a common and universal notion in that of order, system, or organization. When Hume himself spoke of the mind as a mechanism he did not consider it necessary to compare it to or to regard it as an engine or a pump. He was among the first, if not the first, of modern philosophers to draw attention to *relations* and to the problem of knowledge as a problem of relations. Whenever the human mind investigates nature, it always comes upon relations or upon structure.

"Light is in reality anatomized," says Cleanthes in the *Dialogues*. "Would not a man be ridiculous who pretended to reject Newton's explication of the wonderful phenomenon of the rainbow, because that explication gives a minute anatomy of the rays of light." In the *Treatise* where he deals with the question of personal identity he discusses this issue in a way which annuls any fundamental distinction between the productions of nature and the works of art as well as between these and minds. When a machine is investigated what are discovered are relations between the parts—"a reference of the parts to each other, and a combination to some common end or purpose." In the case of animals and vegetables the parts bear to each other reciprocal relations of cause and effect; they have a mutual dependence on, and a connection with each other, as well as having a reference to some general purpose. The intellect explains or understands a machine, just as it does an animal or vegetable, when it discovers its structure or system of relations. This applies equally to minds; the intellect never discovers a *self*—that is, a simple, unchanging entity or substance; it comes upon only a system of "perceptions," a system which Hume, in order to elucidate his view, compares to a republic. To try to get behind structure, system, or order, as Philo suggests in his argument is on such a Humean doctrine absurd; and Cleanthes in the *Dialogues* voices this absurdity when he is asked to account for the cause of the Whole itself. "Did I show you the particular causes of each individual in a collection of twenty particles of matter, I should think it very unreasonable, should you afterwards ask me what was the cause of the whole twenty. This is sufficiently explained in explaining the cause of the parts." It leads him also to point out that Philo's argument presupposes order or system and is not accounting for it; for though, as Philo maintains, there is a sense in which a tree is the cause of a tree and an animal the cause of an animal, this does not affect Cleanthes' contention since, in terms of Hume's philosophy, a tree or an animal is to be understood as an order or system, and this order is being all the time assumed.

The conclusion, therefore, to be drawn from a more detailed examination of the discussion is that there is no need to admit that Philo has the better of the argument, since on this interpretation of Hume and Cleanthes, his contentions are mainly irrelevant and have importance only when the whole matter is treated on traditional, that is non-Humean, lines. It is known from Hume's correspondence that he was aware of a difficulty due to the "dissimilitudes" or dissimilarities—a difficulty which Cleanthes recognizes; but he does not allow this to be a decisive factor in the argument. The various systems, including mind, have a fundamental similarity. How then on this basis does the principle of analogy apply?

A consideration of this question necessitates a reference to the nature of analogy as Hume understood it. In the *Treatise*[1] he gives a narrower interpretation of analogy which is a form of reasoning based upon a specific degree of resemblance between cases. In the *Enquiry*[2] he gives a wider meaning to it, for it is now regarded as equivalent to inductive inference or as covering the whole field of probability instead of being "one species of probability"; and in this respect he is in alignment with certain continental writers of the eighteenth century.[3] The difference between the two interpretations of analogy is that in the former case the inference is to a specific cause or effect and in the latter case to a general proposition or to a wider uniformity. There is no clear and fundamental distinction between the two, for by the analogical procedure in the narrower sense the known uniformity is having its range widened and the way is being opened for a more extensive generalization. On Hume's principles there is no guarantee that any such generalization will necessarily be true. Any generalization is experimental. The difference between scientific generalization and the generalizations[4] made by plain people in ordinary life lies in the fact that the scientist working under the guidance of rules elaborated in accordance with experience gained in the experimental investigation of nature exercises precautions and gauges the degree of probability according to the observed evidence and the character of the properties in respect of which bodies are similar. In this, too, Hume is in line with continental writers who otherwise differ regarding the foundations of their theory; but both agree in declaring that insight into nature, though not obtained by way of demonstration as exemplified in geometry, has none the less a kind of certainty of its own.

One objection urged by Philo against the argument by analogy is expressed in the question whether, supposing order to be admitted throughout the universe, such order is evidence of mind as the cause. Philo wants to argue back to a *cause* of order, and in doing so is thinking conformably to the traditional view and to Hume's more limited meaning of the nature of analogy. The characteristic order of a machine is due to mind; hence the order of the universe, which is similar to that of a machine, is due to mind. The existence and nature of a Divine Mind are thus *inferred from* similarity of effects and causes. It is *inferred from* the order observed in nature.

[1] Part III, Sect. xii (at end). [2] Sect. ix.

[3] e.g. S'Gravesende in his essay *Sur l'évidence.*

[4] Cleanthes in the *Dialogues* (Part I) says: In vain would the sceptic make a distinction between science and common life, or between one science and another. The arguments employed in all, if just, are of a similar nature, and contain the same force and evidence.

The tendency of this view is to regard the Divine Mind as something remote from the human mind; it is the attitude favoured by Deism and makes the Deity "an abstract, invisible object" as Hume elsewhere says. Cleanthes, however, in the *Dialogues* proceeds to maintain another position,[1] which Professor Kemp Smith holds to be inconsistent with the preceding argument which put emphasis on *inference*. It has to be admitted that there seems an inconsistency. This other position is that the belief in a Divine Mind immediately flows in upon one with a force like that of sensation; that is, the Divine Mind is not *inferred from* but is *immediately apprehended in* the order of nature. The view implies that the human mind is in direct contact with the Divine Nature, and it is the view accepted later even by Philo.

It is this second view which agrees most closely with Hume's other theories, especially his theory of mind as a system. The transition in the *Dialogues* is accompanied by a change in the way of looking at the various instances of order in the universe, for they are spoken of no longer as merely effects of mind but as "the image of mind reflected on us from innumerable objects." These are the words of Cleanthes. The first form of the argument involves a distinction between mind and order which is not consistent with Hume's point of view. For him, as for Cleanthes, mind is order of a certain kind, so far as mind is known at all, and that is the only way in which we can intelligently, and are entitled to, speak of mind. When emphasis is once put upon this idea, and a mind and a machine, as well as organisms, are considered as structures or systems, a machine is not merely an effect but is an effect that has a similarity to its cause. That such similarity exists between causes and effects is implied even on the ordinary view that trees are the causes of trees or animals of animals. Consequently, machines may be said to have a mental character, even that they have a mind—no doubt of a simple and rudimentary nature but none the less a mind—provided that Hume's theory of mind is remembered. For the purposes of the teleological argument, which is essentially an affair of reasoning, the relation of machines to mind has to be considered in order to justify the use of the *word* mind in respect of the type of order in question.[2] This makes the argument one by

[1] This form of the argument has a likeness to Voltaire's statement of the teleological view. The arrangements in nature "font une demonstration qui, à force d'être sensible, en est presque méprisée par quelques philosophes" (*Élements de la Philosophie de Newton*, I, Ch. i). Cf. other passages, "Je ne sais . . . . si jamais il y a eu un plus bel argument que cet verset: *Coeli enarrant gloriam Dei.*"

[2] In the eighteenth century it is probable that order and design were not two distinct ideas. In a footnote to *Le Désastre de Lisbonne* (vers. 75) Voltaire expresses a view concerning the order of the universe, which, according to

analogy in the narrower sense; and the argument is easily transformed into analogy in the wider sense in the form of a generalization expressing a world-wide uniformity. But any argument of this kind is only an attempt to elucidate and justify by means of reason what is a prior experience of a direct kind with an all-pervasive order of the nature of mind.

Philo admits later that, in dealing with Cleanthes' theory, he has needed all his metaphysical and sceptical subtlety to elude his grasp, but he adopts a triumphant note when he comes to discuss how the teleological view, based on experience and observation, can establish the moral attributes of the Divine Being. This issue, introduced by Demea, is recognized by Cleanthes as a crucial one, for the answer will determine whether there is to be "an end at once of all religion," and that answer is made to turn again upon whether mankind can be proved unhappy or corrupted. The issue is not discussed really very fully. It is one, however, which confronts not merely teleologists but all religious views; it troubled philosophers and theologians in the eighteenth century particularly because the difficulties seemed so favourable to scepticism. Cleanthes is giving expression to this fact in admitting that Philo has now fallen upon a subject worthy of his "noble spirit of opposition and controversy." He openly admits that the only way in which the moral attributes of the Deity—and he is prepared to adopt this way—can be defended is "to deny absolutely the misery and wickedness of man"; but even discounting much of the exaggerated account of Philo regarding human suffering he is still constrained to recognize that there is evil. In face of this fact the view which he ventures to suggest—a new theory he calls it—is that of a "finitely perfect Deity," "benevolence, regulated by wisdom, and limited by necessity." The conclusion which Philo on the other hand would draw is that the ultimate principle of the universe is morally neutral or indifferent.

The theory of a finite Deity is in accordance with the whole of Cleanthes' preceding argument; and the rejection of the idea of infinity is in line with Hume's general philosophical principles. That danger lies in the obscurity and the vagueness of the terminology used in reference to the Deity is suggested at more than one point of the *Dialogues*, and Cleanthes prefaces his theory of a finite Deity with remarks to this effect. The difficulty, however, confronting the teleological view in respect of the moral issue is a serious one, and there is evidence in Hume's correspondence with Hutcheson

the *Avertissement*, was interpreted to signify that "this word order applied to nature is void of sense, unless it signifies an arrangement of which we apprehend the regularity and design." Cf. Cleanthes' declaration concerning what is to be taken as a *whole*.

that he was fully aware of it at an early stage. The difficulty, which is noted also by Voltaire, is one concerning the ontological status of moral principles. If the latter are interpreted, as Hume interpreted them, in such a way as to make them relative to human nature or needs and subject to the varying circumstances in which human life has to be organized; if, for instance, *justice* is to be considered mainly in reference to the human institution of *property* and moral qualities generally in terms of *utility*, then there is no evidence that moral designations are applicable to the Deity or to any beings superior to, or even other than, man. Consequently, the basis of any analogical argument is lacking. Nevertheless it is possible to find in the idea of utility a means of transition from human life to the universe and a means of giving significance to Cleanthes' theory of a finitely perfect Deity. The question at issue at this stage is not that of the existence of a Divine Mind but of his moral nature. The theory of a finitely perfect Deity only requires that the Divine Being tend on the whole to promote the happiness of mankind. This does not rule out suffering, but it does assume a particular meaning of morality and goodness and it does require the admission, made by Cleanthes, that happiness predominates over the misery of mankind. The assumption may be wrong and Cleanthes' admission may be unverifiable; but within these limits the foundations for analogy exist.

The conclusion is obviously not, so far as words at least are concerned, what orthodoxy requires. But no claim can be made that Cleanthes is arguing on behalf of orthodoxy,[1] the representative of which, if any one is, is Demea. The whole issue is one regarding the extent to which reason, dealing with the evidence obtainable by means of experience and observation, will give support to the beliefs characteristic of the religious attitude; and of course the meaning to be given to the terms of such beliefs must be fixed also in accordance with that evidence. Apart, however, from this question about the lack of clearness and precision in the terms occurring in religious discussion, it is obvious that Cleanthes is far from orthodox and has given a new turn to the teleological theory. He is well aware of this; his concluding doctrine about a finitely perfect Deity is put forward with the statement that "if it deserve our attention, we may afterwards, at more leisure, reduce it into form." The final estimate of the *Dialogues* must of course depend in part on the interpretation of Hume's attitude to scepticism, in favour of which, according to Professor Kemp Smith, he deliber-

[1] Cleanthes' anthropomorphism can hardly be objectionable to an orthodoxy which holds that God created man in His own image, for, if so, man has a likeness to the Divine Nature. His theory is labelled *experimental theism* (Part V) and contrasted with the true system of theism.

ately and often with concealed and malicious intent argues. In order that such an interpretation in respect of the *Dialogues* may be successfully maintained, the representation of Philo the sceptic expressing his belief in the value of the teleological argument at the end of the discussion has to be understood as a subtle or "artful" manner of depriving the view of any serious significance. But the change-over on the part of Philo is not merely peculiar; it is a very inartistic device on the part of Hume, too glaring in its inconsistency to be considered even subtle or artful; and although Philo's attitude becomes nominally that of Cleanthes, there remain considerable differences between them regarding such matters as the foundation of religion, the part played by religion in life, and the relation between religion as a practical attitude in life and the intellectual interpretation of this attitude. The references to light and its anatomization suggest the view that, just as the scientist may analyse the seeing eye and light into structures and does not thereby annul the fact that the eye sees white light, which is an experience connected with a synthetic power characteristic of the eye, so analysis does not destroy the fact that human nature may be so constituted as to be religious or to view the world in a religious way. Herein there may be found an overlooked significance of Hume's *Natural History of Religion* which seeks to show that the religious attitude is universal, and herein too is found a reason for Cleanthes' insistence upon the universal influence of religion. Hume's references to religion elsewhere in his writings give no hint of any rejection of religion, though he gives many hints about his questioning theories of religion. The final representation of Philo is quite consistent with much that Hume says concerning the inability of the sceptic to adhere *à l'outrance* to his own doctrine, and it can be regarded as an artistic portrayal of such an attitude on Hume's part towards scepticism.

The critical and destructive side of Hume has been so much emphasized historically that the constructive pioneer, possibly because the construction is not of great magnitude, has been ignored. In the *Dialogues* the arguments of Philo are somewhat stale and hackneyed so far as the eighteenth century is concerned. It is the views put forward by Cleanthes, no doubt in very undeveloped form, that are of real interest and of philosophical value, however dangerous and heretical they may be from the point of view of the orthodox. Cleanthes' denial of the simplicity of the Divine Being, his acceptance of that mind as a system, in the sense in which Hume considers the human mind to be a system, his assertion of the finitude of the Deity carry with them the temporalizing of the Deity. These are the consequences of the application of Hume's philosophical ideas to religion. The precise historical significance of this re-inter-

pretation of teleology, as distinct from the philosophical validity of such a re-interpretation, would require an acquaintance with, and an examination of, the conflict of certain ideas in the eighteenth century. For the present it must suffice to mention a recent work by Professor A. O. Lovejoy on *The Great Chain of Being*, in which he points out, though Hume is not mentioned at all, that such ideas as have just been stated in connection with Cleanthes came to be put forward in the eighteenth century.

NATURE, EDUCATION AND FREEDOM ACCORDING TO JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU

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Do the most celebrated works of Rousseau—more particularly his *Discourse on Inequality*, *Émile*, and *Contrat Social*—present on the whole a coherent answer to the problems of Education and Society? My impression is that Rousseau has here been very much calumniated, owing to the incredible haste and superficiality with which his writings have generally been studied. Even sympathetic inquirers, like M. Schinz in his thorough and attractive work *La Pensée de J.-J. Rousseau*, seem to be too easily discouraged in the quest for unity.

My thesis, which will be further summarized at the end of the essay, is that, allowing for that movement and variety which are the signs of life, we must include Rousseau on the strength of the writings named, among the great *constructive* thinkers. For example, he speaks of Nature, not in an indefinite number of ways, but always in one of two very precise senses which can be recognized by the context in which the word is used. Primitive society is natural in the one sense, Émile's education in the other. Again, Rousseau may be confused in answering the question whether "civil religion" and "natural religion" are the same, or are diametrically opposed; he may, it is true, stress the Spartan ideal of Society more in the *Contrat Social* than elsewhere; but his main intentions are clear and their development logical.

Above all, he makes visible a close parallel between the evolution of the State and the growth of the child. This is, I hold, the key to the unity of Rousseau's system, as well as the origin of its difficulties. Rousseau, as we know, interested himself from the first both in education and in the organization of society, and published his chief works, in each case the result of long research, in the same year; so that politics and education play a similar part in his mental history. But he also finds many analogies between the two spheres; it was no accident that he returned so often to this parallel.

In the *Discourse on Inequality* he distinguishes a "childhood," and a "youth" of the human race, following one another in succession, and bringing men, as yet under the guidance of sentiment, to the threshold of Law. The *Contrat Social* extends this quasi-historical account, offering a comparison of the age of self-government to that of manhood. The legislator and the tutor alike are represented

as allowing the *form* of self-government to their charges at a time when they are able to withhold the substance of it. Premature self-government is compared by Rousseau to precocious education. He sees the parallel from the reverse side in *Émile*, Book II, where the child is compared to a man in the state of nature, and allowed a freedom of a comparable kind and degree; all this in spite of the fact that . . . Rousseau's pupil is intended . . . to remain all his life a *man of nature* as opposed to a citizen.

His reason for this parallel? The State is an individual, though moral and collective, body, with Sovereignty for its heart and Government for its brain; which must decline by an inevitable natural law to old age and death.

I wish to begin with a rapid review, which will raise few points of controversy, of all that Rousseau regards as *natural*.

(1) Education

We see from the first book of the *Émile* that in all education there is an element which belongs exclusively to nature. "Our education comes partly from nature, partly from men, and partly from things. The inner development of our faculties and organs is the education of nature; the use which we are taught to make of this development is the education of men; and anything that we acquire by our own experience of the objects which affect us is the education of things." We are educated by three sorts of masters, and we are well educated if their lessons are in harmony.

However, when Rousseau describes the ideal to which his book is devoted as a "natural education"; when he speaks of Émile as a man or child of nature, in contrast to *l'homme de l'homme* or *l'homme civil*; he of course does not mean to debar him from education by things or by men, as he would do if nature were still used in the same narrow sense. The ideal is not one of *laissez-faire*; though, in the earliest stages, where education "should be purely negative," it may almost seem to be so. We should be able to infer this from the fact that Émile is kept constantly dependent on things and on the guidance of his master; moreover, we have a clear statement on "natural education" from Rousseau himself a little later in Book I.

He opposes it there to the *civil* education, treating the alternatives as quite exclusive. "Forced to combat Nature or social institutions, we must decide whether to educate a man or a citizen; no one can be both at once." In order to inspire loyalty, the civil education must destroy the natural emotion of universal sympathy; in order to secure unity, it must suppress private emotions and judgments. Thus "les bonnes institutions sociales sont celles qui savent le mieux dénaturer l'homme." "He who would preserve in the civil order the

primacy of the sentiments of nature does not know what he asks." Moreover, civil education is associated in Rousseau's mind with education in colleges or any other form of education *en masse* (it is obvious that this is a mere mistake, since experience shows that such education may prevail in individualistic societies); he therefore jumps to the conclusion that natural education means *domestic* or *family* education. Its purpose cannot, indeed, be to train a man to live entirely by himself; "if (he says) we could combine with it the advantages of civil education, then by removing the contradictions of man we should remove a great obstacle to his happiness." He hopes to pave the way for this union. Man, he says in Book IV, is *sociable* by nature, or at least designed to become so; our man of nature is not a savage, only fit to retire to the depths of the forest; but in society he will not be the slave of fashion, as other men are. It will be remembered that Rousseau's pupil does indeed receive this mixed education; his training is international, but it is not anti-social. On growing up he is introduced to the world, is married, and, having chosen a community, subjects himself to its laws.

At this point Rousseau coolly ignores the dilemma which had been stated with such force in Book I. He has dwelt so long on Émile's originality and independence that we find ourselves wondering what form of State will commend itself to him; and it is not enlightening to be given a mere extract from the *Contrat Social*. On the one hand it is scarcely credible that Émile will prefer a totalitarian State (it is difficult to imagine him as even a moderate patriot); on the other hand, if he is an untamable individualist, the dilemma of Book I is retained, but it is not answered; and the view that freedom and morality are only possible to the citizen, vital as it is to the *Contrat Social*, seems to have vanished into thin air.

Suppose the child of nature to be unlucky in his search for a hospitable republic, in which to earn his living as a carpenter and peacefully follow the natural religion; Rousseau assumes that he might then retire into seclusion without grave loss of happiness, as Plato's philosopher shelters under a wall. But if full freedom must come from the State, this assumption is impossible and optimistic. Indeed, if we are to put faith in *Contrat Social*, I. 8, no one but a citizen can begin to make a deliberate choice. But it is always assumed that Émile possesses responsibility, and that, citizen or no citizen, he enters upon a life of self-discipline when he has grown up into a man. At this moment he passes beyond the guidance of mere sentiments, i.e. beyond what I believe M. Schinz would call a "romantic" happiness, into the rational or moral order. From this it is fair to infer that the *Émile* is at one with the *Contrat Social* in its definition of freedom, "l'impulsion du seul appétit est esclavage, et l'obéissance à la loi qu'on s'est prescrite est liberté." But the

question whether the State is the *sine qua non* of such freedom is no longer answered in the same spirit. (The obscurity of the view that "man is naturally good"—Rousseau's essential doctrine, by his own account—lies in this, that it *may* refer to the limited goodness of enlightened *sentiment*, or else to the crowning goodness of the rational morality for which we have the natural endowments.)

Since we have raised the question of happiness, and its possibility without the State, let us hear what is said of it in *Émile* (Book II). We do not know absolute happiness (or misery); we only know a relative freedom from evil. But we are affected by sentiments of pleasure and pain, and by a consequent desire to secure the one and be free of the other. Misery consists in a disproportion between our desires and our faculties, and "un être sensible dont les facultés égaleraient les désirs serait un être *absolument heureux*." This being the ideal, attainable happiness is reached "by diminishing the excess of our desires over our faculties, and placing power and will in perfect equality." (It is the ratio that matters; thus neither an extension of our faculties nor a diminution of our desires alone can assure us of happiness.)

Rousseau might be expected to continue that the desirable ratio can be established by self-discipline, in or out of society; but instead, he refers us to Nature. "It is only *in the primitive state* that the equilibrium of power and desire is found, and that man is not unhappy." In civilized man the imagination disturbs that equilibrim by exciting in advance desires which can never be satisfied. "Au contraire, plus l'homme est resté près de sa condition naturelle, plus la différence de ses facultés à ses désirs est petite; et moins par conséquent il est éloigné d'être heureux. Il n'est jamais moins misérable que quand il paraît dépourvu de tout; car la misère ne consiste pas dans la privation des choses, mais dans le besoin qui s'en fait sentir." Hence we must curb imagination, and resolve to pursue reality. But the real goods are health, strength, and self-respect; the real evils, bodily pain and the remorse of conscience. Physical evils "destroy themselves or destroy us." The wise man will remain in the place assigned to him by nature, not revolt against physical necessity, and never enlarge his unhappiness by imagination.

The inclusion of morality and immorality among the real goods and evils shows that Rousseau is not here giving directions for primitive or savage men, or exhorting us to imitate them. (A later passage, in Book III, says: "Le bonheur de l'homme naturel est aussi simple que sa vie; il consiste à ne pas souffrir: la santé, la liberté, le nécessaire, le constituent: Le bonheur de l'homme moral est autre chose.") Neither are his directions applicable to the civil man. They apply therefore (like the rest of *Émile*) to a man, who is conceived for present purposes to have reached morality and freedom

apart from society. Rousseau does not emphasize that self-restraint is necessary to the happiness he depicts; but how else are his directions to be obeyed? It is notable that nothing could be further from "Romanticism" than the command to curb the imagination; perhaps still more notable that no sermon was ever less taken to heart by its author.

(2) Stages of Growth, Racial and Individual

To return now to the enumeration of things ordained by nature: there are, Rousseau informs us, four stages in human growth. First, infancy in the literal sense of speechlessness, when the child is completely helpless, and the only educator is the mother or nurse. Secondly, childhood, in which the young are unable to generalize, being guided entirely by their particular impulses or sense-impressions. Rousseau argues that they cannot profit by reading or any of the usual forms of instruction; nor, in what concerns conduct, can they listen to reason or obey moral motives. Positive instruction should be avoided; we should attempt to lose time rather than to gain it. If lessons in behaviour become necessary, we should make use of the child's fondness for imitation, inducing him to ape the virtues which he will one day understand; no attempt at explanation is advisable. In conduct children should not be allowed to have their own way, but the restraint used should be a restraint of things; for as yet they live only in the physical world. Thirdly, there is a short stage between the first dawning of reason at the age of 12 or 13, and adolescence. It is the subject of Book III of *Émile*, and is summarily described as "l'age paisible d'intelligence." Reading and other education of the mind can be begun. On the practical side, the child's impulses are no longer casual; he can advance to the notion of *utility*, and must now always be permitted to ask "A quoi celà est-il bon?" This advance is not a mark of dawning *conscience*, but is due to the beneficial working of the natural urge to self-preservation, in alliance with sympathy or pity. Fourthly, there is the period of adolescence. Rousseau conceives intellectual training as coming practically to a standstill. History, however, serves to impart some acquaintance with human nature from a safe distance. Physical exercise is intensified to counteract the violent onset of emotion; apart from this, the "natural education" consists of a training, in the proper emotional setting, in "natural religion," and in the introduction of Émile to the world of men. Any *philosophical* reasonings about conduct Rousseau rightly postpones to a still later stage; the moral law, like the political (*Contrat Social*, II, 7), is at first grounded in Religion.

A careful reading of the *Discourse on Inequality* shows, I think, that Rousseau's account of the growth of the human race depends largely, and perhaps entirely, on his view of childhood. In the child we can observe the natural man, far better than in the pages of travellers and historians. The first part of the *Discourse* is accordingly devoted to an attempt to reconstruct the *childlike*[1] man (there is, of course, no parallel to literal infancy). In the latter part men are supposed to have settled down in families, and to have reached, merely by natural sentiment, their first ideas of promises and alliances; at the same time, the pursuit of utility has led them to discover agriculture and a few industries. A just mean between "l'indolence de l'état primitif" and "la pétulante activité de notre amour-propre," this age must have been the happiest and most lasting; men can only have left it by some disastrous chance. "The example of savages, who have nearly all been discovered at this point, seems to assure us that the human race was designed to remain in it for ever, that this state is the veritable youth of the world, and that all further advances, in appearance so many steps towards the perfection of the individual, have really led to the decrepitude of the race." The "disastrous chance" is less fortuitous than Rousseau here admits; for the social life is bound to engender rivalry and self-consciousness, and with these the tyranny of wealth and class is at hand.

(Both in its virtues and in its dangers if uncontrolled, this age is an exact counterpart to the "age paisible d'intelligence" in individual growth.)

Henceforth if men allow their affairs to drift, or if usurpation forestalls the social contract, they are carried down the path to inequality and injustice, which now descends steeply; and miseries more intolerable than those of the state of nature await them. From the gulf in which they are lost there can be no return to "primitive innocence," and no easy or immediate change to the freedom of citizenship. But if by chance a legislator appeared in time, he would control the adolescent people by the voice of Religion, until with the progress of generations they arrived at intelligence and freedom. Rousseau thinks that the few free peoples of history have always, by the grace of God, found a legislator before it was too late. In their case the Contract which was designed only as a defence against wrong, soon turns to an instrument of positive good.

(The *practical effect* of this is too complex to be mentioned here. It must be remembered that Rousseau in any case regards many inhabitants of the globe as for ever debarred from self-government, owing to climate or heredity.)

[1] "La race étoit dejà vieille; et l'homme restoit toujours enfant."

(3) Emotions and Sentiments

There are in human nature "deux principes, dont l'un nous intéresse ardemment à notre bien-être et à la conservation de nous-mêmes; et l'autre nous inspire une répugnance naturelle à voir périr ou souffrir tout être sensible, et principalement nos semblables" (*Discourse on Inequality*). Concerning self-love, Rousseau makes three important points: first, that it is the basis and origin of all other passions: secondly, that it is different from *amour-propre* ("self-esteem"), an artificial and relative sentiment, born in society, which inspires rivalry among men, and may thus be the source either of honour or of cruelty: thirdly, that self-love and pity together give rise to "natural right." By this Rousseau means that they can produce an imitation of morality and justice.

(i) That self-love is the original passion is stated in *Émile*, Book IV. "La source de nos passions, . . . la seule qui naît avec l'homme et ne le quitte jamais tant qu'il vit, est l'amour de soi: passion primitive, innée, antérieure à toute autre, et dont les autres ne sont, en un sens, que des modifications. En ce sens toutes, si l'on veut, sont naturelles. . . . L'amour de soi est toujours bon, et toujours conforme à l'ordre."

When self-love finds itself assisted or hindered by another *will*, it turns into love or hatred. Towards *insensible* things, however much they assist or hinder us, we are not moved in the same way. "Ce qui nous sert, on le cherche; mais ce qui nous veut servir, on l'aime. Ce qui nous nuit, on le fuit; mais ce qui nous veut nuire, on le hait." In the *Émile*, from which the quotation comes, Rousseau passes over the emotion of pity, which, according to the *Discourse*, was a second basic emotion "whose function is to moderate in each individual the activity of self-love, and conduce to the mutual preservation of the species."

(ii) The contrast between self-love and self-esteem occurs both in the *Discourse* (especially Note 2) and the *Émile*. Self-esteem is later, both logically and in fact, than self-love; it does not appear until social intercourse has made men self-conscious and reputation has become a valuable asset. Thus in the history of the race it is the origin of social (as distinct from physical) inequality; and it causes "une multitude de mauvaises choses sur un petit nombre de bonnes."

In individual history, self-esteem is associated by Rousseau with the awakening of sexual feelings, which, according to him, first make us self-conscious and provoke jealous comparison with others. He seems now to allow it no good effects at all (cf. "voila comment les passions douces et affectueuses naissent de l'amour de soi, et comment les passions haineuses et irascibles naissent de l'amour-propre"). He sternly rejects competition as an instrument of education; it

is better that a child should never learn, than that he should learn through vanity and jealousy. (What Rousseau says here may not be acceptable, but he is making a valid criticism of earlier views of the state of nature, which, from the truism that men are naturally self-seeking, infer that they are naturally enemies.)

(iii) In the Preface to the *Discourse on Inequality* we read that the two natural emotions in proper alliance can produce results as beneficial, though not as lasting and secure, as those of conscience. "It is from the agreement and combination which the understanding is in a position to establish between these two principles, without its being necessary to introduce that of sociability, that all the rules of natural right appear to me to be derived—rules which reason is afterwards obliged to reaffirm on other foundations, when by its successive developments it has completely stifled nature." Later in the *Discourse* he returns to this idea and sings the praises of "natural sympathy." It fills, in the natural state, the place of law and morality, with the advantage that none are tempted to disobey its gentle voice; it cannot, indeed, inspire "the sublime maxim of rational justice: Do to others as you would have them do to you;" but it can inspire "that other maxim of natural goodness, much less perfect indeed, but perhaps more useful: Do good to yourself with as little evil as possible to others." If virtue could only be acquired by reason, he adds, the human race would long have ceased to exist.

There is an important observation to make here. Just as Rousseau always treats earlier forms of Society as more natural than the State founded on contract, and just as he treats sensation as more natural than intellect; so he treats the life governed by passions, however "sublime" and "gentle" these are, as more natural than the life governed by conscience. And although he refers to conscience as a "sentiment," he certainly does not regard it as merely an intensified degree of the natural sentiments he has discovered; but as something fresh and unique, which really stands in contrast to all "sentiment." But is it equally opposed to "Nature"? The example of Émile, who is the natural man, shows that it is not.

We have already seen that "nature," in the narrowest sense, contributes only a small part of the "natural education." We can now add to this a new point: That when the State and the conscience are sharply opposed to *nature* and the *natural*, nature is again confined to the narrower of its two senses. It must also be true that a life without discipline is *unnatural*. And to prove this we have only to look at Rousseau's picture of a "natural education."

He deceives himself to some extent here, arguing that reason and society are only "natural" to men *as at present constituted*—as though they might have remained, but for some unfortunate

accident, in the golden age where everything is ruled by sentiment. That is to say that sentiment is more "original" than reason, not only in a logical sense, but in an actual sense as well. Rousseau does not see that this assertion is unfounded; and that, in order to give it foundation, he must undertake that inquiry into the evidence of *facts* which he has rejected at the opening of the *Discourse*.

(4) Religion

The "natural man" of the *Discourse on Inequality* is without religion: when he begins to have a religion, it is crude and polytheistic. But in another sense there is a natural religion, and one of its few dogmas is the existence of a single supreme Deity. We have already learnt that the recipient of a natural education cannot be intended to live in the state of nature, and I think we can once more see through an apparent ambiguity to the truth which Rousseau wants to express.

"Natural religion," on the whole, means for Rousseau the tenets of Gospel Christianity; not upheld on the strength of literary tradition, or of a revelation communicated to a few gifted individuals, but regarded as obvious by the light of nature to every sincere man. Just as he has argued that "natural education" unfits a man to live under laws which call upon him to sacrifice his individuality, so he argues that the good Christian is a bad citizen, and the worse the nearer he is to the "natural" Christianity of the Gospels. He is unable to tell us how we are to patch up our divided loyalties, which he attributes to ineradicable contradictions in human nature.[1]

I must pass lightly here over the textual evidence for these conclusions, as the skein is more than usually difficult to unravel. The chapter entitled "Civil Religion" (*C.S.*, IV, 8), was evidently written by Rousseau in much the same mood as the contrast between the man and the citizen in Book I of *Émile*, with which it should be compared. He seems to delight in excavating as deep a cleft as possible between natural happiness and life in society. The religion of *man*, he states, requires no temples or altars; it is "un culte purement intérieur du dieu suprême . . . la pure et simple religion de l'Évangile." From it follows *le droit divin naturel*. On the other hand, the religion of the *citizen* is of a narrowly patriotic kind. It extends no rights to the citizens of other communities; it marks itself off from them by outward formalities and local rites. It leads to *le droit divin civil ou positif*. A third and more bizarre kind of

[1] However, the "civil religion" which he outlines in *contrast* to Christianity (*C.S.*, IV., 8), has, to judge from his dogmas, more resemblances to it (i.e. ideal Christianity), than one would expect. Rousseau seems simply to forget the point he is urging, viz. that some of the old polytheisms are much stronger *civil* religions than Christianity is.

religion has arisen, an attempted combination of both, which gives a man two rival masters, the Church and the State, with the result that its adherents fail both in piety and in patriotism. He names as examples the religion of the Llamas, the Japanese religion, and Roman Catholicism.

He now argues that, though a society of Christians under "le droit divin naturel" is in some respects the most perfect imaginable, the very idea of it conflicts with the limited State. Christianity inspires us with indifference to the present life, urges submission, and teaches that men of all nations are brothers in a society which is not even dissolved at death. Now it is in the interest of the Sovereign that every citizen should have a religion which makes him loyal. It is also in the *power* of the Sovereign to fix certain articles of belief, and to punish the citizen if he will not subscribe to them and behave as if they were true. There should be a few such dogmas of civil religion, and they should be announced in simple, precise terms without commentary: the existence of a Deity, powerful, wise, and good; the future life, the happiness of the just; the sacred character of the social contract.[1] Whether this ideal civil religion requires priests and ceremonies, Rousseau does not seem to say.

In his *Profession de Foi* he shows us what would be the philosophical commentary, which has been neglected for civil purposes. It now appears, not only that the doctrines which the State needs to enforce are few and simple, but also that human nature is essentially incapable of grasping any but these few and simple truths. And Rousseau's attitude to established religions is therefore more searching and critical in the *Contrat Social* than it had been in the *Profession de Foi*; from the civil point of view, the various creeds with their ceremonies and superstitions had at least been tolerated as long as they were compatible with the few doctrines of State religion; but now Rousseau argues, with intent to destroy, against miracles, the literal truth of the Bible, the necessity of faith to salvation, and other articles of Christian belief. In this attack both Catholicism and Protestantism seem to suffer; for Rousseau is no less hostile to the idea that every man is a competent judge of the Bible, a book written long ago in a foreign tongue, than he is to the spiritual authority of the priest. As records of historical fact, the Gospels require trained criticism, though the truth of their morality is obvious to everybody. (Rousseau's defence in the *Lettres de la Montagne* shows that he is above all anxious to appear a true Protestant; for he argues that he, and not the Council of Geneva, stands in the true line of descent from the Reformers.)

The "natural religion," then, consists of the morality and theology

[1] I must repeat that I am compelled to leave aside the question why these are, after all, so similar to the dogmas of natural religion.

of the Gospels, from which the support of miracle and revelation has been withdrawn, and a philosophical foundation, borrowed from Plato and Samuel Clarke, substituted in their place. This religion would not seem (*pace* M. Masson) necessarily to vilify the lower elements of human nature in a spirit contradictory to that of the remainder of *Émile*; but it would seem, from the more emphatic of Rousseau's statements, to conflict with the ideal of a good citizen. Even on this point some doubt must remain, since at the very moment of making it Rousseau draws up the creed of civil religion, and gives as its dogmas the existence of a mighty, intelligent, provident, beneficent Deity; *the future life*; the happiness of the just, the punishment of the wicked, the sanctity of the social contract and the laws; and these seem after all to be identical with the dogmas of natural religion, with (*a*) the addition of an article about the Contract; (*b*) the omission of arguments for free will and for a unitary self, and of the rest of the metaphysical foundation.

Thus Rousseau intends to convey by the terms "natural education" and "natural religion," the education and the religion which man, as at present constituted, ought to adopt. These terms have no allusion to the hypothetical "state of nature"; but Rousseau does so far misrepresent his own true purpose as to suggest that only some fall or decline on the part of man, some change in his "original" nature, have made them possible. Nor does the term natural imply that men will turn spontaneously to this education and religion, for Rousseau explicitly distinguishes a part within the whole "natural education" which is to be left to the unaided forces of nature.

With the term "natural" as applied to society, the case is otherwise. Rousseau is bound to follow the lead of his predecessors in identifying natural with primitive society. The corollary to this is that civilized society is artificial, and Rousseau accepts this gladly, arguing against Locke, Diderot, and others that only if the State *is* deliberately constructed can we hope to reconcile Law and Freedom. As before, he is untrue to his real purpose when he depicts this construction of the State as an unfortunate necessity, by which men stave off greater evils. In spirit he seems quite positive that the State, too, is "natural" in the Aristotelian sense, being a proper outcome of human endeavour and a condition of the good life. In what sense the return to nature is a part of Rousseau's teaching will perhaps be obvious from this summary. It is also sometimes disputed whether he taught the natural goodness or the natural depravity of human nature, or neither; but into this question we cannot enter.

Law and Freedom

After the survey of "Nature," we have to consider Rousseau's treatment of freedom. How do men become and remain politically

free? As is known, his answers are (i) that they superimpose on the natural order a new order, imitated from that of nature and yet superseding it; (ii) that every individual must share in the construction of this order, since he has also to share in its maintenance. But these answers only receive their full significance when illustrated by what Rousseau says of the liberty of children, as compared with that of men.

On becoming a citizen, each man forsakes natural liberty, i.e. an unlimited right to everything he succeeds in obtaining—a right bounded only by his strength—and he receives in exchange a civil liberty limited by the general will, by which his possessions become property. Now the purpose of this change is not to spurn the natural order in favour of something different, but rather to flatter it by imitation. This is made most evident in the second book of *Émile*. The child, says Rousseau, enjoys a liberty similar to that of man under the reign of Nature; but children are feeble, their needs far surpass their strength, whereas men in the natural state are robust and self-sufficient; and so the man is happy, the child is not. "Les enfants ne jouissent, même dans l'état de Nature, que d'une liberté imparfaite, semblable à celle dont jouissent les hommes dans l'état civil (*the degenerate society, we must assume*); . . . nous étions faits pour être hommes; les lois et la société nous ont replongé dans l'enfance." But the faults of society can be remedied. There are two sorts of dependence—dependence on *things*, the effect of nature, and dependence on *men*, the effect of society. The former, having no moral significance, does no injury to liberty, and engenders no vices; the latter, because it is incalculable, engenders every vice. "If there is a means of remedying this evil in society, it is by substituting Law for a man, and arming general wills with a real force superior to the action of any particular will. *If the laws of nations could be given the inflexibility of natural laws, so that no human force on earth could prevail over them, dependence on men would return once more to a dependence on things*—the Republic would combine the benefits of the reign of nature with those of society; to the liberty which keeps men free from vice, we should join the morality which elevates them to virtue."

How is this to be achieved? At no point is it more vital to remember that Rousseau's purpose is to discover true principles of general application, and not to enter into practical details and difficulties, as a reformer must do. However, the problem of "substituting Law for a man" is faced in the *Contrat Social*, and its solution shown to be conditional on gradual enlightenment under the guidance of a legislator. At present, in Book II of the *Émile*, we return to individual education, and learn how the child of nature is fitted for moral freedom by his tutor. What is never solved is the problem

of uniting these achievements, and adapting the man of nature to citizenship; and until this is done, the careful parallel between the race and the man is wasted. *One* of the desiderata expressed in the last quotation may be taken to be answered by the doctrine of the general will; dependence on men is made inflexible; but there is no union of the blessings of nature with those of citizenship, and it seems to remain true that "les bonnes institutions sociales sont celles qui savent le mieux dénaturer l'homme."

If children are kept exclusively dependent on *things*, says Rousseau, then firstly they receive the kind of freedom to which, as creatures of nature, they are entitled; and secondly they are prepared—negatively, no doubt, but effectively—for the life of reason and virtue. "Maintenez l'enfant dans la seule dépendance des choses, vous aurez suivi l'ordre de la nature dans le progrès de son éducation." This means, in practice, a middle course between indulgence and severity. The spoilt child is artificially and unnaturally shielded by his parents from the world of things ("if you are too careful to spare them every variety of discomfort, you withdraw them from their position as human beings, to which they will, nevertheless, be one day forced to return"); on the other hand, the repressed child is deprived of happiness now, and can only be timid and sensitive afterwards. Further, the dependence on things carries with it the consequence that we should never appeal to reason, or to anything save force and sensible example. It is not only useless, in restraining children, to harp on authority, obedience, or other moral and religious notions; it is also extremely dangerous, since that which should be welcomed as a privilege will have established itself prematurely in their minds in a fantastic guise. Rousseau foresees the objection that even young children will meet such notions accidentally, and so we shall be forced either to satisfy their curiosity, or to run the risks of reticence. He replies that positive teaching, where necessary, can be conveyed by force of example, children being natural imitators; supporting this in the manner of Aristotle, with the point that their behaviour will not be moral, "but at an age when the heart has as yet no feeling, we must cause children to imitate the actions in which they are to be habituated, in order that they may some day do them from discernment and love of the good" (*Émile*, Book II).

When childhood passes into the age of awakening intellect, and this into adolescence, these directions are no longer applicable. Enough has been said, and enough is generally known of Rousseau's educational methods, to allow me to be brief here. The notions of utility and happiness suggest themselves to children in the age of first intelligence, and provide a plank on which to cross over to those of duty and morality. Therefore at this age there is still no reason for

discipline by command. Adolescence, which follows, is the beginning of self-government, if the preceding rules have been observed. "Moi, comparant mon élève aux vôtres, je trouve à peine ce qu'ils peuvent avoir de commun. . . . Comme il a passé son enfance dans toute la liberté qu'ils prennent dans leur jeunesse ("which they assume in their early manhood"), il commence à prendre dans sa jeunesse la règle à laquelle on les a soumis enfants: cette règle devient leur fléau . . . ils se dédominagent alors de la longue contrainte où on les a tenus; . . . Émile, au contraire, s'honore de se faire homme, et de s'assujettir au joug de la raison naissante." He is no longer the pupil, he is now the friend of his master. "Quand, par les signes dont j'ai parlé, vous pressentirez le moment critique, à l'instant quittez avec lui pour jamais votre ancien ton." The master does not, by this step, abandon his *authority*; on the contrary, he now comes to secure it for the first time, having never yet obtained anything from his pupil except by force or ruse.

We see, then, that growth is divided into three periods, and that the child of nature is always free; in the first he possesses the liberty of the physical realm, to which he entirely belongs; in the second his life is a free pursuit of utility, which is the highest end he then recognizes; in the third, he "is proud to become a man, and to subject himself to the yoke of nascent reason." He has never had to listen to a command.

Rousseau in his *Discourse* had given a history of the human race in the two earlier periods, and had also drawn the darker side of the third; his theme was the eclipse of natural freedom. But in the *Contrat Social* he tells how a nation can be guided through adolescence into maturity, and "remain as free as before." "Par le pacte social, nous avons donné l'existence et la vie au corps politique; il s'agit maintenant de lui donner le mouvement et la volonté par la legislation." This later contract, unlike the first, is to be regarded as historical; but in its perfect form it requires a legislator whose unselfishness and wisdom transcend anything that we can imagine to be possible. He must also, by a miraculous chance, appear at the right moment. "Most nations, like most men, are teachable only in youth. Once customs are established and prejudices have taken root, it is a vain and dangerous enterprise to try to correct them. . . . There is for nations, as for men, a period of youth, or, shall we say, maturity, before which they should not be made subject to laws." The legislator must further be able to impose his will only by persuasion and an appeal to the fear of God, for he possesses no authority or magistracy, and even at this early time the people are to fasten the yoke on their own necks. In this consists the almost insuperable difficulty. For a young people to be able to discern sound principles, the effect would have to

become the cause; the spirit which is to be created by law would have to preside over the institution of law itself.

The crisis, which we are supposed to be watching, corresponds to adolescence in the individual. Rousseau asks us to assume that, as the end of all education is fitness for freedom in the sense of self-control, so the end of all legislation is fitness for self-government. In self-control Reason harnesses the force drawn from the whole body. In self-government, judgment and selection belong to a few, but all share in willing the Law. There is, indeed, one serious flaw in comparison; for whereas the tutor has been at hand throughout the the earlier stages, constantly intervening "by force or dupery," the legislator does not appear on the scene any sooner than he is needed, and may delay till irreparable mistakes have already marred the young nation for self-government; unless we can rescue consistency by a belief in watchful Providence. But Rousseau, by his hypothesis of a legislator, has in any case withdrawn from real life; and he is now entitled to conclude that, if fortune is moderately, or perhaps rather unusually, kind, there is no reason why either a nation or an individual should at any period (whether before or after the age of intelligence), have to listen to an arbitrary command.

Thus the doctrine of the sovereignty of the people under ideal circumstances is an absolutely rigid deduction from Rousseau's premisses; he is, I think, compelled to propose an assembly as the mouthpiece of the General Will. But among these premisses must be counted the doubtful analogy between a nation and an individual man.

Under real circumstances, Rousseau must clearly withdraw the hypotheses he assumed—especially the existence of the legislator and tutor—and attempt to salvage what he can. He generally declines this, as belonging to the province of practice; the analogy of education helps us to this extent, that we can compare the task of a statesman in modern Europe to that of the tutor of a backward boy. Modern peoples are like children who have in some cases been made timid by tyrannical parents, in others spoilt by excessive indulgence, whilst their positive education has been neglected. It is clear (i) that the ideal could, in these conditions, never be attained, (ii) that instant emancipation would be disastrous, (iii) that the child's mental growth, however distorted, will prevent some of the methods which prove so salutary under ideal circumstances, e.g. the dupery. The cause of this is that the time is hopelessly out of joint: mental quickness and maturity have become joined to an infancy of the character.

Remembering this, we need not despair of bringing even the despised *Discourse on the Sciences and Arts* within the framework of Rousseau's system; for it is there that he gives his version of European history. It goes deeper than an impassioned exhortation

to set fire to our libraries and academies; Rousseau, as Professor Cassirer has explained, does not grudge men intellectual and artistic culture as such, but argues vehemently that they are luxuries to be provided only when justice and equality have been found. And is not this, too, a cardinal point in the *Émile*? Mental education is ruthlessly subordinated by Rousseau to education of character, in accordance with what he believes to be the destiny of man and the natural order of his growth. (His psychology, however, seems to be unusually wide of the mark here. It is preposterous to suppose that children *cannot* learn languages and the sciences, or take pleasure in reading.) It is sometimes said that in discussing religious truth, Rousseau shows himself a pragmatist. That is not the case, unless Kant also is one; his principle is not "that which works, or proves its utility, is true"; but that the competence of our reason is limited to those subjects which concern our welfare, and secondly that within this sphere, that which works morally, and is immediately obvious to the heart, is true. Rousseau's principle is the subordination of theoretical to practical reason, not the subordination of indifferent truths to important ones.

Conclusion

"In this," it may be said, "have you not elucidated Rousseau to his own discredit? does not this merely show his view of sovereignty to be untenable, because bound up more closely than had been thought with dubious analogies and fairy-tales?" To discuss the objection here would take me on to an entirely different plane. I prefer therefore to reserve it for a future discussion, which will, I believe, involve a fuller account of Rousseau's religious views and of other questions which have been skirted by this essay. Meanwhile, I am convinced that it is quite unprofitable to expound, and hypocritical to hold, the doctrine of the General Will without the background which I have tried to depict.

These are the conclusions which I hope I may not unfairly claim to have established:

(1) The use of the word Nature in Rousseau is twofold. It may be applied to all that is not human, including those features of human conduct which are shared with animals and inert bodies, i.e. instincts and impulses. But the natural education and religion are natural precisely because they *include* what is distinctively human. Rousseau preaches a return to nature, *first*, because he would have us embrace the natural education and religion, and *secondly*, because civilized society, though artificial, is according to him an imitation of nature. It models itself on the inflexibility of natural law. The "natural" education is neither (*a*) an education among natural

objects, though this may be one of its requirements, nor (*b*) an education in which nature alone works.

(2) Between the *Émile* and *Contrat Social* there is much unresolved contradiction. Both agree that discipline is essential to freedom, but the political work diverges in maintaining that only the State can impart such discipline; whereas the *Émile*, and Rousseau's writings as a whole, maintain that the State is a harsh instrument of uniformity, and that the independent natural man could, and would, reach self-discipline without it.

(3) Rousseau's view of freedom is entirely dependent on his view of the growth of society, and this in turn on the analogy ever present to his eyes, between individual and racial development. What this analogy gives him is a sharp contrast between physical and moral freedom (to one or other of which men and nations have an inalienable right); a view that sentiment and utility provide a bridge between the natural and the moral; and a conviction that the claim to justice and happiness is more vital to human nature than the claim to truth.

We might, in extension of this, show that the significance of Rousseau as a precursor of Kant is possibly far greater than anyone except Kant himself has realized.

KNOWLEDGE, ACTION AND RELIGION

CANON OLIVER QUICK

THE relation of knowledge to action and of theory to practice constitutes one of the most vital problems for human thought to-day. The classical philosophy, which the Catholic Church has inherited from the master-minds of ancient Greece, tends on the whole to rank theory above practice, and to maintain that ultimately we act for the sake of knowing. Characteristically modern thought, on the other hand, in most of its multifarious forms, inverts this order of precedence. We are commonly taught to-day that knowledge exists for the sake of action, and that theories are to be judged true or false according to their tendency to promote or hinder those severely practical aims, the attainment of which must constitute the main business of living. It is with the causes of this change of mind, and the judgment which we ought to pass upon its general value, that I propose to deal in this article.

I will begin with a dogmatic assertion, which I hope subsequently to elucidate. There are two relations which fundamentally determine the whole structure of human experience and of reality as it appears therein; these two are causal efficacy and significance.

Causal efficacy is that by which one event produces or brings to pass another. Everything that happens is produced or brought to pass by something else. But the succession of events manifests a certain order and repetition of sequence. Hence the laws of causal efficacy state the uniformities according to which events necessarily follow upon one another in occurrence. In this aspect reality is apprehended as changing and being changed in temporal process. And it is our acquaintance with causal laws which enables us to act within the process so as to modify and control what happens.

Significance is that by which events are presented to the mind together and associated in the mind with one another. By significance events are held together so as to become in the mind symbols which indicate or express the things which are signified objects of thought. The laws of significance are the uniformities according to which one meaning (i.e. thing signified) necessarily implies another rationally and in logic. In this aspect reality is apprehended as, at least relatively, static and enduring, and as having an order which transcends the temporal process and change of happening events. It is through significance that we know things as they are.

Consider first how intimately these two relations are connected,

and yet how obstinately they remain distinct, even in the most rudimentary elements of our experience. What is involved in the simple fact that I see a tree? When we think of the matter in terms of causation, my seeing of the tree is an event which comes at the end of a series of other events which cause it. It is produced by the action of light vibrating through some atmospheric medium, both upon the object and upon the retina and optic nerve in my body. Vibrations travel from the object to the retina and along the optic nerve into my brain, and then I see the tree. But the series of events takes time to happen. Accordingly, I seem obliged to say, not that I can see the tree as it is at the moment when the causal process is completed, but that then I have a visual image of the tree possibly as it was when the process began, the visual image being the effect in my mind of a physical process of causation which terminates in the brain. What, therefore, I directly "sense" is the mental image. But then, what can I mean by asserting that it is an image *of the tree*? Clearly I cannot mean either that it is an image *like the tree*, or that it is an image *caused by the tree*. For "an image like the tree" need not necessarily be an image *of* the tree at all.[1] and "an image caused by the tree" might be something altogether different.

This difficulty, of course, is a very old story in the theory of sense-perception. Mere common sense may wish to cut the knot by saying that I see the tree as it appears, and not its visual image at all. But common sense is refuted by scientific examination, which is verified by the indisputable fact that we sometimes see trees which are not there. There is only one way out of the impasse; and that is to suppose that when I have the experience which I call "seeing the tree," my mind entertains, indeed, a visual image caused by the tree, but treats it, not merely as caused by the tree, but as *signifying* its existence there and now. In other words, the moment the visual image comes into my mind, I perform an act of interpretation (not infallible) which ages of practice have rendered unconscious. Thus it takes both causal efficacy and significance, in their union and in their distinctness, to enable me to see anything at all.

It is in their connection with *time* that the difference between causal efficacy and significance is most plainly revealed. There is causal efficacy just as soon and just as long as events depend on one another in temporal succession. But it is the essential function of significance to transcend the causal and temporal order of events; and it does so in a double manner:

[1] Doubtless it is a more important consideration that I can never compare the image with the tree itself, but only with other images or sense-impressions. All "sense-data" are originally apprehended as significant of something; and it is their essential significance which escapes us when we try to analyse or classify them in terms of causation.

(1) A sign itself (at least so far as it consists in anything seen, heard, or felt through the bodily mechanism) is brought into being by an analysable series of physical events which, entering the mind, are held together by it in a single and simultaneous whole. A temporal series of physical stimuli goes to make up the visual image of a tree, which, as an image in the mind, is complete at a single instant. But the same truth is more clearly perceived, when we consider the case of a verbal sentence. The words as understood have a fixed order of before and after, and, if I am hearing or reading the sentence, they are even apprehended as coming successively into the mind. Nevertheless, the sentence constitutes a single and simultaneous sign. The meaning is carried by the sentence as a whole, and not by the succession of its parts; and, if there be any causal relation between the parts, it is irrelevant to the meaning.

(2) Again, since anything signified comes into the mind together with its sign, it must be possible for any past or future thing, which can be signified, to be made really *present* to the mind. Past events, of course, cannot be made now to *happen* in my mind. For happening, which embodies causal efficacy, is altogether fixed in time. A past event can only be properly signified as having happened, not as happening—for otherwise it would cease to be past.[1] And yet, if a past event can be really presented to my mind at all, it must be so because all events have in reality an aspect other than their actual happening which passes, viz. their capacity for being signified, which endures. Because they happened, they are "dated" by their happening; and therefore they can be *thought* of at any time in their abiding character as past. All temporal connections presented through significance fall within a whole which is before the mind at the time of its thinking. The temporal connections as signified still constitute a certain order in events; but this order has ceased to be temporal, i.e. successive, since, far from preventing, it actually enables events which occurred *at different times* to be thought of *simultaneously*. Events thought of as temporal cease to be merely temporal just in so far as they are thought of. It is on this fundamental paradox that the possibility of true history depends.

All knowledge of objects is mediated by significance. Yet there is an element in our knowledge which is not so mediated, namely, the mind's awareness of the life of its own organism in interaction

[1] If a past event were really presented as actually happening, the event would be repeated now. In the dramatic representation of a historical event there is some show of repeating it; but it is only a show, precisely because, however vivid the representation, the original causes and effects of the event are absent. In so far as any representation of a historical event gives me a true idea of the event itself, the representation is precisely not a *repetition* of the original (still less, as Macmurray suggests in *Interpreting the Universe*, a *substitute* for it), but an image significant of it.

with what is beyond it. It is in this awareness, unmediated by signs, that we have direct experience of causal efficacy. We have it, when we are aware that something in us moves our limbs, and that the movement of the limb follows upon the decision of the mind to move it. But our immediate awareness is not simply of our own action upon an environment, but also of its action upon us. The use of the very word action seems to imply the presence in the environment of a causality similar to that which we experience in ourselves. And primitive man, no doubt, tends to attribute all the movements of nature to the direct action of some will, because he is aware that it is by a will that his own body is moved. This animistic tendency is soon corrected by the increasing knowledge of his environment which man acquires through the interpretation of the signs which enter his mind in sense-impressions. This interpretation we commonly call "observation of fact." Now causal efficacy itself can never be observed; for it belongs entirely to that actual momentary happening which can only be *felt* and never *perceived.*[1] Nevertheless, systematic observation does establish the recurrence of fixed sequences and uniformities in events, according to which certain consequents follow upon certain antecedents. And we call these uniformities, as they are expressed in our knowledge, "laws of causal efficacy," because they are the forms under which the interpreting mind represents to itself that order of interaction and production of change which is one aspect of reality.

But this knowledge of fixed order and invariability in the sequence of events has a further connection with causal efficacy. It is the invariability of certain sequences which enables man to extend control over his environment by his own causal and efficacious action. It is because the continued friction of two bits of wood invariably produces sparks that he finds himself able to command fire at will. And with every fresh discovery of a further uniformity of this kind man's potential control over nature is increased. Even if the events exemplifying the uniformity are such that he cannot produce or prevent their occurrence, at least he is enabled to direct his action in the light of new knowledge of what will occur.

The more we reflect upon the matter, the more surely I think we shall conclude that the pragmatists are right in maintaining that all this study of events as they succeed and pass into one another in the constant flux of occurrence, issues from and has its end in the practical interests of mankind. It gives us one whole branch of human knowledge, that, namely, by which we adapt means to ends and attain our purposes in practice. And yet there is one kind of knowledge it can never give, the knowledge of rational understand-

[1] We never literally "see a thing happen." What we *see* is the change in phenomena (perceived objects) which the happening produces.

ing. For that is a knowledge of things as they are in their abiding nature as signified and signifying. And it is impossible that the mere study of things as they change and produce changes (that is, as instruments or organs of *action*) should ever give us the knowledge of things as they are enduringly, that is, as objects of thought or intuition united by their mutual implication of one another in significance. This is the proper knowledge of *truth*.

Thus, there is a dual character in the reality with which we live and think. On the one hand, reality *happens* in a constant flux and succession of temporal events, which in all their changes observe certain uniformities of sequence. By an ever-extending acquaintance with these uniformities man both predicts what will happen, and, through the appropriate interposition of his own causal action, makes what happens serve his will. On the other hand, reality is presented to the mind through signs which indicate or express abiding entities beyond themselves. And by reflecting on this significance of things the mind aspires to know reality, not as a passing series which is to be modified by action, but as an ordered whole which can be understood.

The dual character of reality generates two kinds of knowledge, or ways of knowing. There is the knowledge which seeks to acquaint itself with the causal order and uniformities in the flux of happening events, so that human action may be more efficacious as a cause; and there is the knowledge which seeks to understand the abiding truth of things, which is signified, not by the momentary happening of events, but by the relatively static appearances of things in the mind. We may, if we will, call the former knowledge practical, and the latter theoretic. But we must beware of supposing that distinction implies complete separability. On the one hand, the very facts of causal change and interaction are known, at least in part, through appearances which also signify the abiding nature of the truth. On the other hand, the most theoretic quest of the truth through the study of significance is itself an action which constitutes an efficacious cause in the flux of events. And yet one question remains, of fundamental importance both for theory and practice. What is our ultimate aim both in acting and knowing? Does the understanding of permanent truth, gained through the study of the significance of appearances, ultimately subserve the action which directs change and controls events? Or does the experimental acquaintance with events, which enables us to control them, subserve the knowledge which understands and contemplates what is?

There is no doubt what answer the modern world would give to this question. Marx's great saying, that the business of our philosophy is not to understand the world but to change it, might well stand as the motto of what is most characteristic in the intellectual life of

our time. Modern thought subordinates knowledge to action. What are the historical causes for its judgment? There are two:

(1) The first is the dominion which experimental science has established over the modern mind. Experimental science views the world as a causal process. As experimental science, it does not trouble itself about the theoretical meaning or intelligibility of anything, either of causation or even of its own theories. Such matters it leaves, sometimes half contemptuously, to the metaphysicians. Its business is to apply its theories, to test them experimentally, and to show that they work. A scientific theory works, when it enables us to predict, and therefore to control, results. And in many branches of science it has seemed that theories, even in proportion as they have been found to work more perfectly and with more startling effects in human life, have been more and more deprived of any definite or intelligible meaning which even their own exponents can understand.

This result has certainly been paradoxical to the men of science themselves. The founders of modern science took over from the scholastic philosophy the notion of a causal order immanent in all things. Their method was different from that of the philosophers, in that they were interested in observation and experiment upon facts, rather than in the logic of ideas. But their dominant aim was *discovery*, the searching out of the realities behind phenomena. The *invention* of mechanical appliances was only a by-product of their main work. They sought to understand nature rather than to control her. And yet it is beginning to look as though increased control, rather than increased understanding, were the main fruit which we are to reap from the long labour of scientific investigation. This is especially the case in physics. In the Newtonian physics terms such as space, time, matter, mass, velocity, gravitation, and the like, still seemed to have a meaning intelligible to the ordinary man who understood the use of language; since he could refer these terms to objects of his own perception. But now that Einstein has supplanted Newton, the case is very different. The further analysis of causal process has immeasurably enlarged the gulf between everything that human senses can directly perceive, and the entities which the expert uncertainly supposes to exist as the causal ground of effects which are registered by instruments of precision. The Newtonian terms have become just popular and misleading words, for what can be accurately represented only by mathematical symbols. And it belongs to the essential function of such symbols, that they mean nothing in particular, but stand only for certain general relations which must hold between any entities fulfilling certain postulated conditions. Hence some modern physicists suggest that we can know no more of the material world outside

us than a deaf man might learn of music from a diligent study of musical literature and notation. Others maintain that if we would really know the nature of anything we must use other faculties and other methods than those which physical science calls into play. Others again are inclined to blame the structure of language for the mental darkness into which the study of physical light has plunged our thought. We must begin with the help of mathematics to build up a quite new philosophy which dispenses with the use of language altogether.

At first sight this is a somewhat tragic issue of the inquiries which were begun with such high hope in the seventeenth century. Yet what has so far been said represents, after all, only one side of the picture Our attention is called to the other, every time we listen to the wireless or travel by aeroplane, or read of the minute accuracy which astronomical predictions have displayed under the test of observation. The real marvel and mystery of modern physical science becomes apparent when we contrast the astonishing exactness of its observations and predictions and the extent of the new powers which it has bestowed upon mankind, with the hardly less surprising absence of any certain or agreed information as to the real constitution of the physical universe.

No doubt in the biological sciences the contrast is less glaring. Yet even here there is a marked discrepancy between the biologist's success in analysing and manipulating the processes of vital and organic activity, and his failure to furnish us with any clear notion of what life is. Distinguished experts look forward to a time when the physical and mental characteristics of our offspring will be artificially controlled in a way altogether shocking to old-fashioned believers either in nature or in God. But as to any fresh understanding of life itself as an abiding reality signified and significant, they tell us nothing. And we may add that the case is hardly different with the psychologists, who help us so wonderfully to control the mind.

Small wonder, then, if most men are impressed with the changes which science has brought and will bring, rather than with the obscure and uncertain explanations which scientific experts may suggest as to the nature of things as they really are.

(2) Another potent influence tending in the same direction is the social unrest which science itself has done much to produce. Perhaps the most profound difference between the character of civilized man as it is to-day and as it was in the ancient and mediaeval worlds, concerns the emotional attitude towards the future. In the Hellenic philosophy time was usually conceived of as an endless series of recurring cycles, and the Jewish-Christian eschatology, which modified the pagan doctrine, certainly did not encourage belief in any general progress or evolution towards the good. Conse-

quently, if a man found the present course of events utterly unsatisfying to his reason and conscience, he naturally sought for some ground of hope, not in the future of this world, but in another world to which his soul might attain after bodily death, or, even before death, in spiritual knowledge or mystical experience. Apart from such hope, he had no resource but the cultivation of a stoical apathy. This whole outlook tended to encourage a doctrine of salvation through knowledge of eternal realities dimly discerned beyond the flux of time. Nowadays, men's thoughts have a very different bent. They may find the actual and present conditions of life no less unsatisfactory than did their forefathers; but they believe implicitly that there are forces at work in natural and human evolution which tend towards the realization of better things in the future. They cry out for the changes which man himself can and might and surely will produce in this spatio-temporal world. Salvation for them is by scientifically directed action. Our reformers and revolutionaries feel that they have the powers of the natural universe on their side; and time to them is the bringer of all good things, even though its slow steps have occasionally to be hastened by the judicious application of a little dynamite. The ancient notion of time summed up in the lines of Sophocles:

ἅπανθ' ὁ μακρὸς κἀνηριθμητὸς χρόνος
φύει τ' ἄδηλα καὶ φανέντα κρύπτεται

is quite foreign to their minds. In vain Spengler harks back to older methods of reading history. He has hardly more audience than the scholastic logicians. Thus it is that the whole attempt to pursue knowledge for its own sake, or to put forward the contemplation of things in their ultimate significance as an end for the mental activity of man, is regarded by Marxists as simply the by-product of a bourgeois society where thinkers theorize at leisure, because they live on wealth filched from the working man. The life of reason is at once accounted for and invalidated by being attributed to an economic *cause*.

No doubt it is the Marxist who pushes this type of pragmatism to extremes. But the general principle of subordinating reasons to causes is characteristic of the age. It is the intellectual root both of the relativism of the tolerant agnostic, who supposes that all theories of the truth are just the product of particular conditions, and of the zeal of the fanatic, who seeks to make his own doctrines prevail by the efficacy with which opposition to them is suppressed. Thus the infinitely various opinions of the modern world seem on the whole to be converging towards this amount of consensus, that the business of thought is not so much to understand the world as to change it, that knowledge exists for the sake of action, that causes

are more important than reasons, and efficacy than significance, and that time, in which things happen and are successively produced, is more real than the fancied eternity in which they may be contemplated and understood together in the order of their rational coherence.

But, after all, modern thought can hardly be allowed to be judge in its own case. It may be condemned by the thought of to-morrow. And even if it is not, it is by no means self-evident that the thought of to-morrow must be truer than the thought of yesterday, unless we assume, to start with, the truth of a particular philosophy of evolution, which itself is on trial in the dispute. Speaking generally, if it be legitimate at all to acknowledge a supreme end for human life, there seems to be no more intrinsic absurdity in making the goal the understanding of things in their ultimate significance, than in making it the continuance of action accompanied by a greater range of satisfaction than we now enjoy. If it be urged that knowledge arises out of action, that is no reason why it should end in it. And if it be urged that knowledge in fact furthers action, it may be replied that the converse is also true.

Our answer to the ultimate question will, in fact, depend largely on the importance which we attach to our ideals. Ideals of beauty, truth, and goodness are evidently derived, in some sense, from our experience of the actual world; and, equally evidently, they move us to condemn it. Is their function then solely to stimulate us to improve it by action? So pragmatism maintains. But it is evident that the word improvement has no meaning, unless it implies some movement in a fixed direction determined by the abiding nature of the ideal. If ideals themselves change utterly with the passing generations, what is improvement to one generation may be deterioration to another, and any doctrine of general or universal progress becomes nonsense. If, on the other hand, there is any genuinely abiding and absolute character in the ideal, it is hard to resist the conclusion that we have in it some hint of a genuinely eternal being which is the source and goal of temporal change, and with which human spirits have some degree of community, just because they are able to survey and contemplate and judge, and are not tied to mere interaction with environment like the creatures of time. And in that case the goal of right action, which produces change, must in some sense be the contemplation and enjoyment of an unchanging truth and good.

We can now see more clearly why it is that the typically modern point of view, which is dominated by experimental science, is peculiarly inimical both to metaphysics and to religion. We have seen reason for thinking that the function of experimental science is to give us that kind of acquaintance with the causal sequences

of events which enables us to predict what will happen, and also by our own causative action to control it. Such study moves in the realm of efficient causes, and metaphysical speculation is outside its range. Metaphysics, on the other hand, is essentially the attempt to discover something which lies beyond, and is signified by, the seemingly unending sequences of causation. It tries not to change, but to understand the world, and to understand it as a whole. If phenomena are really meaningless except in relation to human action, if the very notion of the universe as a whole is just a human fancy, then metaphysics is simply a mistake. Neither pragmatism nor dialectical materialism, nor any doctrine which simply subordinates knowledge to action can be a metaphysic—except in so far as it is a metaphysical judgment to deny the value of metaphysics.

The ground of the opposition of modern thought to *religion* is more difficult to state, because the specific aim of religion is less easy to define than that of metaphysics. Schleiermacher, though of late he has fallen into disfavour among theologians, was surely on the right track when he emphasized the feeling of dependence as belonging to the essence of religion. Yet clearly the aim of religion is precisely not to leave men dependent upon the sequences of natural events, but to free them from such bondage by making them dependent upon a less changeful order of reality. Like metaphysics, therefore, religion seeks communion with an enduring reality beyond and behind the change and chance of temporal events. But its search has a different purpose. It would make us realize our vital and personal dependence upon the higher reality, while metaphysics would present it only as a principle of order to illuminate our understanding. And thus the function of religion is seen to be in direct contrast with that of experimental science. Science acquaints us with the causation of events in such a way that we may learn to control them. Religion teaches us the significance of events so that we may learn to be controlled by the reality which is beyond and above them.

It is true that religion, like science, has sometimes been a revolutionary force in human affairs, and, much more often than science, a cause of violence. Nevertheless, when the religious man girds on his armour and goes "to the help of the Lord against the mighty," he does so, in so far as he is genuinely religious, not because he thinks the Lord cannot overcome the mighty without him, but rather because it is the Lord's will to use him for that end, and his own very life depends upon the divine control. In the highest religion the ultimate end is conceived as *worship*. And worship differs both from the practical activity, which is the fruit of experimental science, and from the theoretical cognition, which is the aim of metaphysics, precisely in its fusion of the element of knowledge

with the feeling of service and self-abasement. In proportion as either the metaphysician or the man of science feels himself utterly abased before that which the world reveals to him, he is already a religious man, or at least he is experiencing a specifically religious emotion.

Our present attempt to grasp or define the problems set by the dual character of reality as given in experience will best be concluded by some further illustration of the essential contrast between experimental science and religion as ways of knowledge—the one the most modern, the other the most ancient, which the human mind has followed.

Religion in its beginnings is often difficult to distinguish from magic. In order to gain success in war, agriculture, or hunting, the savage may either pray and sacrifice to his god, or else he may perform spells and incantations over weapons or fields, or seek to charm the game into his power. The one method is religious, and the other magical; but often they merge into one another. The difference, which gradually becomes defined, lies essentially in the element of interpretation and rational explanation which religion requires and magic does not. Religion seeks to win the favour of a deity who will then help his worshippers to gain their ends. It gives some more or less intelligible explanation why the deity is pleased by the sacrifice, and why success follows. Magical ceremonies, on the other hand, appear to be incomprehensibly effective; and this is hardly less the case if they are supposed to bind or compel mysterious forces to produce the desired result. If the effect is thought to depend on the will of a god, we are dealing with religion. The essential character of magical proceedings is—and their mysterious efficacy is partly derived from the fact—that they appear to be almost wholly meaningless.

Experimental science gives success by a different method. It discards both magical mystery and religious explanation. But it has an explanatory principle of its own rooted in a law of causation, the precise meaning of which it can never successfully explain. By applying it with the help of minute observation and experiment it discerns ever more accurately the uniform sequences in which events actually happen. The characteristic of the scientific method is analysis. *Divide et impera* is its motto. First, each particular science, for convenience of handling, separates off its own subject-matter from that of others. Then, every obstacle presented is met by further analysis, so that when no uniformity of sequence can be found to hold in the relations of larger or more complex entities, uniformities may still be established in the relations of their smaller or simpler components. Some sciences now deal with entities so minute that they are not perceptible at all, and are only inferred from the changes which they cause in observable phenomena. Modern

physicists apparently regard even electrons as altogether too gross and palpable to be the primary elements of matter. Biology makes much of genes, and psychologists divide and subdivide the human mind. And yet it is not unfair to say that the greatest experts are becoming more and more aware that science is somehow missing the main significance of things, in spite of all the information which it acquires and the new power which it bestows. For science by its analysis necessarily breaks up the wholeness of the sign which means, and of the reality which is meant, in order to reduce all things to a causal succession of events.

Meanwhile, religion also still pursues its own characteristic and opposite method. Like science, it often finds the facts recalcitrant. They do not fit the explanations which it offers, or fulfil the expectations which it evokes. They seem to mean something different from the doctrine which it has hitherto maintained. Religion no more abandons its belief in God than science abandons its belief in causal law. But, instead of analysing the difficult facts further, religion seeks rather to synthesize them with others, to put them in a wider context, so that the Godward-pointing significance which seems after all to be excluded from the narrower sphere, may nevertheless be made manifest in the larger. The general answer of religious faith to doubts and difficulties is that, if we could but see all, if we could only enlarge the range of our experience, or attain some Pisgah-height from which we could view the whole country, then somehow we should find God's ways to man justified after all, in spite of present appearances. It is the limitation of our minds and our experience which prevents us from seeing how all things really point to the infinite goodness and wisdom of God. We are not "straitened in" Him, but in our own thoughts and affections.

The words of an ancient and of a modern poet may serve to illustrate how constantly religious faith seeks to reduce the ugliness or chaos of the present by viewing it together with a remembered past or a hoped-for future, so as to see the whole significance of things in the wider range:

> Hath God forgotten to be gracious? And will He shut up His loving-kindness in displeasure? And I said, It is mine own infirmity: but I will remember the years of the right hand of the Most Highest. I will remember the works of the Lord, and call to mind Thy wonders of old time."[1]

And again:

> Grow old along with me!
> The best is yet to be,
> The last of life, for which the first was made:
> Our times are in His hand
> Who saith: "A whole I planned;
> Youth shows but half: trust God: see all, nor be afraid."[2]

[1] Psalm lxxvii, verses 7–11.

[2] Browning: *Rabbi ben Ezra.*

Or let us go back once more to the mystery of sense-perception from which our discussion started. A man sees a flower. Physics gets to work on the fact, and forthwith both flower and light are dissolved into complex systems of "waves" which ultimately cause an image in what we call the mind. Physiology and psychology take up the tale and give their account of causal happenings within the organism of the seer. From these sciences, when their studies are perfected, I may learn everything about perception, except one thing, viz. the reason, nature, and meaning of its truth. But then listen to the religious poets dealing with the same simple fact:

> Flower in the crannied wall,
> I pluck you out of the crannies,
> I hold you here, root and all, in my hand,
> Little flower—but *if* I could understand
> What you are, root and all, and all in all,
> I should know what God and man is.[1]

And again:

> A primrose by a river's brim
> A yellow primrose was to him,
> And it was nothing more.[2]

It is the failure to see the universal significance of the particular which is the mark of spiritual blindness.

So religion, as it develops, constantly strives to discern God's presence and operation, no longer just in this or that series of events, but rather in the whole or in all, so that through final knowledge worship may be complete. And yet the continuing process of temporal change and causation for ever defeats its effort. The whole is never presented. What shall be does not yet appear; and what has been recedes into the darkness of the irrecoverable past. The religious soul is left to guess by faith at the vision which it seeks through the signs afforded by the fragments of its experience. Yet it remains sure—to the naturalistic mind absurdly sure—that there must be a "world" or plane of experience in which even the temporal process of continually changing events can be seen as itself significant, because in the whole and in the end it works out a pattern, which to the eternal mind is good. Others may suggest that religion should confine itself to propagating ideas which are serviceable for action within the environment of temporal events. But the religious man will obstinately reply that he cannot consider temporal events apart from the unchanging reality which they signify as the source and goal of their process and the ground of their coherence. In face of all doubts and difficulties his characteristic prayer will be that the power of his faith may be increased, so that "holding fast the word of God

[1] Tennyson: *Flower in the Crannied Wall.* [2] Wordsworth: *Peter Bell.*

he may come to the sight of what he now believes." He may agree that in this world knowledge ought on the whole to be subordinated to action. For, as Newman said, "here below to live is to change," and, no doubt, to live well is to make changes for the better. But "in a higher world it is otherwise." And it is the reality of the higher world, discerned through signs, which alone gives purpose and meaning to that causal process of change which is our present life.

DISCUSSION

BOTH GOD AND MAN—A Reply

THE ARCHBISHOP OF YORK

An adequate reply to Mr. Graham's article would take more time than I can at present give, and more space than could (probably) be allowed. But I ask leave to make a few comments. Mr. Graham opens with a quotation from Whitehead: "All verbal forms of statement that have been long before the world disclose ambiguities, and sometimes the ambiguities strike at the very heart of the meaning." The two crucial statements on which Mr. Graham's argument appears to hang—whether or not they have in this form been long before the world—disclose ambiguities which strike at the very heart of his meaning.

1. He states the Principles of Identity and Contradiction ambiguously and adopts an interpretation which is a *Petitio Principii.*

"Everything is what it is and not some other thing." This is true only if "other" means "incompatible." The old form is preferable: "A is A and not not-A."

"A thing cannot be both what it is and something else." Again, this is true only if "else" means "incompatible." It is true that a horse cannot be both a horse and an apple; but that is because "horse" and "apple" are terms representing incompatible modes of being. Again the old form is preferable: A cannot be B and not-B at the same time and in the same relation. A father cannot also be a mother; but it is quite possible to be both a father and a violinist. There is no necessary connection between "father" and "violinist," but also there is no incompatibility.

The question whether "God" and "Man" are terms representing compatible or incompatible modes of being is the first question raised by the Christian dogma of the Incarnation. If they are certainly incompatible, the dogma is untrue; if the dogma is true, it involves conceptions of God and of Man such as are not incompatible. This is part of what is meant by the familiar saying that the doctrine of the Incarnation is primarily a doctrine about God. If God once lived a human life (to put it crudely) then God must be such that it is possible that He should live a human life.

2. Having, by the fallacy of *Petitio Principii,* persuaded himself that the doctrine of the Incarnation is self-contradictory, Mr. Graham offers what he supposes to be the defence of Christians who have been driven to accept this result; and he apparently attributes this line of defence to myself. He imagines the Christian to maintain "the credibility of the unintelligible." (Does he remember the climax of Kant's argument about the moral law as a law of freedom?—"Thus, while we do not comprehend the practical unconditional necessity of the moral imperative, we yet comprehend its incomprehensibility"—i.e. we see why our power to comprehend stops short.) But Mr. Graham does not define his terms.

"Can we believe what we do not understand?" Here again is the fatal ambiguity. Of course we cannot believe that to which we attach no meaning —such as the "sibbling of rollochites" put forward by Mr. Graham as an illustration of "what we do not understand." But we all believe much which

we understand in very small measure, and know that we understand in very small measure. There are modes of human experience which are utterly beyond my reach. I have no notion what it would feel like to be mentally pregnant with *King Lear* or the *Ninth Symphony*. But I can attach meanings to propositions concerning Shakespeare and Beethoven in their throes of composition, and can believe these, while knowing that the reality exceeds my grasp, and that what remains unknown might (if I could come to know it) profoundly modify the apprehension I have reached; in such a case, however, I should still believe that this partial apprehension must be included in the fuller grasp. Still more must I recognize that I cannot, being man only, reach any full comprehension of what it would be to be both God and Man; I cannot, in the usual sense of the word, "understand" such an experience. But if, having "beheld his glory," I confess belief in Jesus Christ as the Word made flesh, I attach a real meaning to that expression, and may try to understand it more and more adequately, while yet knowing that the reality so far exceeds my grasp as to make my best endeavours so inadequate as to be almost futile. Yet I shall still believe that a full understanding, if it could be reached, or as it exists in the divine mind, contains and does justice to the reality grasped in the initial confession.

3. It is, no doubt, true that my own reference to this topic in *Nature, Man and God* is a *petitio* if that description may be applied to what is mentioned without argument. The argument I should develop on that theme could not be brought within the scope of the Gifford Trust, and the paragraph to which Mr. Graham refers is not an exposition of Christian doctrine but an outline of the way in which I should set out to defend that doctrine against the particular attack upon it contained in the last Gifford Lectures of Professor Pringle Pattison. So far as I have attempted a reasoned exposition of the doctrine of the Incarnation, it is not in *Nature, Man and God*, but in *Christus Veritas*.

4. There seems to be no room for doubt that the spiritual form of religious faith springs from that in it which is intellectually least easy to assimilate. I do not believe that a "vision of God as the personification of goodness" or any "ideal of love and selfless service" has much power to re-shape the human heart or the world of men. The power of Christianity, whenever it exhibits power, comes from the conviction—not that we ought to act in some way, nor even that God is such and such, but that God has acted—that He "hath visited and redeemed His people."

PHILOSOPHICAL SURVEY

PHILOSOPHY IN ITALY

(STUDIES IN LEIBNIZ)

Of recent years there has been seen in Italy a revival of the study of Leibniz, such as had already taken place elsewhere. At the beginning of the century the work of Russell, Couturat, and Cassirer shed fresh light, though with differing perspectives, on the problems of Leibniz's logic and metaphysics; since then the conviction has been gradually forming among students that the classical expositions of the system, such as those of Fischer and Boutroux, have had their day, and that new approaches needed to be made. Even without accepting Couturat's radical thesis, which tended to reduce the complexity of Leibniz's thought to the logical schemes of the propositions of predication, it has yet been generally apprehended that this thesis was of great importance for the understanding of some more formalistic aspects of monadology that stultify and devitalize the dynamism of the new conceptions of force, activity, and development. Thus the old "harmonistic" view of Leibniz's thought has been replaced by an "antinomistic" view, which represents the philosopher as tormented by an inner discord between a static logic and a dynamic metaphysics. On the other hand, the emphasis laid on the logical "point of view" or "perspective" in the historical reconstruction of the system has given rise to a countervailing stressing of other perspectives centred on some salient aspect of Leibniz's mentality. Such a view was suggested about ten years ago by Carlotti[1] in a book in which, following Baruzi, he considered interest in religion to be the point from which the whole system was orientated. The thesis was weak in itself because too generic—to particularize, it would be found that, not religion as such, but the philosophy of religion or philosophy pure and simple, is what lies closest to Leibniz's heart—and Carlotti conducted his argument in a particularly unfortunate manner, or rather he superimposed it like a hood on a treatment that took no account of it. Carlotti showed ignorance of the fact that much work had already been done in this field in Germany, where Schmalenbach and Heimsoeth, while exaggerating, the one the protestantism of Leibniz, and the other his "mysticism," had yet succeeded in laying bare some important religious aspects in the genesis of monadology: for example, the sense of impenetrability of the individual conscience, the feeling of solitude that each soul experiences in face of God, etc. When Carlotti, after an interval of many years, took up his argument once more in order to write the article on Leibniz for the *Enciclopedia Italiana*, he dropped the hood but did not in any wise improve his exposition, which is flat and colourless because it does not reveal the least sense of the problems of Leibnizian hermeneutics.

To Carlotti's "religious" Leibniz, Olgiati[1] has opposed a Leibniz who "on the religious side is superficial," "who had an intensely active external life, but knew nothing whatever of the interior life." This antithesis smacks of paradox: the philosopher who strove all his life to reduce the external

[1] G. Carlotti: *Il sistema di Leibniz*, Messina. 1923.
G. Olgiati: *Il significato storico di Leibniz*, Milano. 1929.

to the internal to be devoid of all inner life! But Olgiati, at bottom, only meant to say that Leibniz is not a mystic, and he mistook for religious superficiality what was instead a scrutiny of religion from a different point of view—speculative, not practical or sentimental. On the other hand, for Olgiati the true Leibniz is the founder or precursor of the modern science of history. After this affirmation one might legitimately expect an investigation of Leibniz's historiography, similar to that of Dalvillé. Instead Olgiati altogether omits any such inquiry, and goes on to find Leibniz's historical theory in the conception of the monad as the principle of activity and of development, without even asking himself whether that conception (the monad being without windows on the world) is compatible with such a function. Certainly it may be averred that the conception of the monad foreshadows that of spirit, as the latter foreshadows the conception of historicity, but there is a long road in between, and to try to shorten the distances is to risk taking pre-established harmony as the fount of historicity!

The three essays of Bariè, Colorni, and Del Boca on Leibniz follow his thought more closely, and are consequently more useful to the student. The first[1] considers Leibniz as the founder of modern spiritualism, and points out the road by which this spiritualism, freeing itself from ontological residues, has gone on increasing in strength and evolving. Bariè's book is of imposing mass, and makes difficult reading through the continual clashing between the author's strictly historical and doctrinal interests. But the section dedicated to the historical reconstruction of Leibniz's thought contains important material for evaluation that ought not to be neglected if his thought is to be understood in its complexity. While Bariè insists on the conception of the spirituality of being in Leibniz, he would be far from subscribing to Carlotti's statement that the German philosopher has reduced everything to *res cogitantes*. He demonstrates rather that there is a primary ontological-realistic phase of Leibniz's metaphysics, on which a second, gnoseological-spiritualistic, phase has been superimposed. Leibniz endeavoured to reabsorb all the realism of the first phase into the spiritualism of the second, and succeeded in making considerable progress along this road, but there remains a residue that has not and cannot be assimilated of the old realism whose presence gives rise to a discord in the thought of Leibniz that has never been harmonized. One of the most vexed points of the doctrine (but not the only one) in which this disharmony is revealed is in the conception of the material world, in which phenomenalism and realism collide with one another, and if the former is more in evidence (for which reason it seems to the majority of historians to dominate the field), the latter moves in the background, never completely subdued.

Colorni's[2] little volume is an exposition of Leibniz's philosophy in the form of an anthology. Hence the author's thought can be better deduced indirectly by means of the criterion of selection and the connection of the excerpts than through direct statement. Colorni adheres to the idea of logical-formal genesis of the conception of substance, which has left marked traces in the *Discours de Metaphysique* and in the correspondence with Arnauld. He admits, however, other concurrent mental interests (physical, psychological, metaphysical), which have assisted to determine that substance as the monad. He therefore tends to harmonize too easily the diverse sources of Leibniz's inspiration, and to conceal their contrasts. In only one point, but that a fundamental one, does he reveal a perception of a grave

[1] G. E. Bariè: *La spiritualità dell'essere e Leibniz*, Padova. 1933.
[2] E. Colorni: *La monadologia, preceduta da una esposizione antologica del sistema leibniziana*, Firenze. 1934.

discordance, and that is where he states that "the monad is immaterial, yet it retains a material aspect; thus it is not soul without body. Having made this statement, Leibniz goes on as if forgetting his premises which make matter out to be only some function of the soul, and he seeks for autonomous laws of the material world, distinct from those of the spiritual world. He returns to the Cartesian conception that he had always combated, that soul and body are two separate substances" (p. 116). For the rest, an exposition of Leibniz that saddles itself with the task of accounting for the knotty points of the system is an extremely difficult undertaking, and Colorni's, in spite of its omissions, is the best that has been attempted up till now. The most serious hiatus is that which concerns the concept of pre-established harmony, which, to quote Colorni, "does not add much that is essential to the doctrine of the monad" (p. 124). On this point he is completely astray: pre-established harmony is the very soul of the system. He has allowed himself to be misled by some esoteric appearances of the doctrine—the comparison of the clocks, Foucher's objections, etc. But, as there are two phases in the formulation of the terms of the relation (soul and body in a primary time; general communication of substances in a secondary time), so there are two conceptions and functions of pre-established harmony; and the second is the deepening, not the mere extension, of the first.

Susanna del Boca's work[1] was suggested by a page in Piat's *Leibniz*, where it is shown that Leibniz, in spite of all his efforts, ends by falling into Spinozism, and some of Leibniz's conclusions are summarily listed in confirmation of this lapse. But this only remains a suggestion because, while Piat is satisfied with a fleeting verification and huddles it among other disconnected items in his inchoate volume, del Boca has submitted those problems to a minute and closely reasoned examination. Revealing the other aspect of Leibniz's thought—that which is opposed to Spinoza—she has specified a series of antinomies which throw a vivid light on the whole system. For reasons of space we shall confine ourselves to the consideration of the first only of these, which concerns the principle of sufficient reason. "On the one hand, religious and moral exigencies incline Leibniz to a metaphysics of contingency, which should place the sufficient reason of the fact beyond the fact, in a being which is at the same time cause and end of that reality which is its creature. On the other hand, his dream of logical arrangement draws him inevitably in the direction of a metaphysics of necessity, synthesized in the principle of identity. Whatever efforts he may make, he never succeeds in extricating himself from these straits" (p. 36). However, in opposition to the thesis of Couturat who reduces the principle of reason *sic et simpliciter* to that of identity, del Boca justly maintains that "Leibniz thought out the principle of sufficient reason from the earliest period of his speculation free from any logical preconception in order to resolve a problem of purely metaphysical character. He thought it out in opposition to the principle of identity, which can be applied in its strict form only to the relations of geometric necessity, and made it the basis of a metaphysics of liberty and contingency." But she adds "when the logical scheme which was to provide him with the framework for the completion of the *scientia generalis* and the *characteristica* of which he dreamed appeared to him synthesized in the formula *praedicatum inest subjecto*, he tried, naturally, to include in it also the principle of sufficient reason, but without ever losing sight of the fact that this principle had been affirmed in order to justify a reality which was and had to remain contingent, not to be confounded with truths of mathematical order. Thereupon he

[1] S. DEL BOCA: *Finalismo e necessità in Leibniz*, Firenze. 1936.

began a series of tentatives which had inevitably to be expressed in ambiguous and contradictory assertions."

Del Boca observes the same contrast in the problem of creation, where the affirmation that the world originated through free, intelligent, divine choice is in danger of being cancelled out in the *mechanismus metaphysicus* of the struggle of possibles for existence. Similarly, after an acute and brilliant confutation of the Spinozan thesis that the real is that which is, and there is no other term of comparison beyond it, the principle of perfection which Leibniz affirms to be the directing criterion in the choice of the real finally changes its own nature to such an extent as to acquire the Spinozan significance which it was intended to controvert. Through the examination of this and other problems, del Boca arrives at the conclusion that "those principles which, by a powerful effort of thought, Leibniz formulated and opposed to Spinozism, little by little are defaced by his attempt to frame them in a logic which was not their own. While they were thought out as a decisive and radical confutation of Spinozism, these principles are altered to the point where they end by serving the cause which Leibniz had combated with energy and sincerity, not because Leibniz set out from a position analogous to Spinoza's, but because he was impelled in the direction of Spinoza by his own attempt at logical systematization, a logic objectively understood, of which the fragments of the *Characteristica* remain as the most infelicitous and evident witness" (p. 221). It is a just conclusion, which the authoress reaches by means of a painstaking and acute analysis.

GUIDO DE RUGGIERO.

(Translated from the Italian by Constance M. Allen.)

NEW BOOKS

An Examination of Logical Positivism. By JULIUS RUDOLPH WEINBERG, Ph.D., Cornell University. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner and Co., Ltd. 1936. Pp. vii + 311. Price 12s. 6d.)

The main doctrines of Logical Positivism (Logistical Positivism would be a better name) are already familiar, at least in outline, to students of Philosophy in this country. We all realize now—some of us with pain, some with relief—that a new brand of Empiricism has arisen, a brand far more formidable than its predecessors, because it has absorbed the super-subtle technique of modern symbolic Logic. By comparison with it, the old Empiricism of Mill looks amateurish, and even Hume himself is seen to have some residues of Dogmatism in him. This new Empiricism has two main aims, a negative aim and a positive one. The negative aim is the elimination of all metaphysical doctrines, which it asserts to be not false, as some of its predecessors said, nor indemonstrable, as others of them said, but meaningless—and so not even false. Hence the answer to any metaphysical questions is simply that there *is* no such question. Its positive aim is to exhibit as clearly as possible the structure of the Natural Sciences, for in these alone (it holds) the answers to all questions can be found. Pure Mathematics and Pure Logic, consisting as they do of nothing but analytic propositions (as both Hume and Leibniz held), tell us nothing one way or the other about the world; their function, roughly speaking, is to provide a mechanism for transforming one empirical, i.e. question-answering, proposition into another. That indeed is why they are valid, as Leibniz said, for all possible worlds. Such is the startling programme of Logical Positivism; but in the working out of it perplexing problems have been encountered, splits have developed between Right Wing and Left Wing, and a number of alternative theories, as queer as they are ingenious, have been put forward. Logical Positivism is a movement, not a set of dogmas. It has been developed by continuous discussion, much of it conducted in the pages of the periodical *Erkenntnis*, and it is still being developed. For some time past we have been badly in need of a guide to its main currents and cross-currents. This is what Dr. Weinberg has now provided. It was a difficult task, and on the whole he has performed it admirably. He has the necessary logical and mathematical equipment, and he is in sympathy with the main aims of the School without being an adherent of any one party within it, though perhaps he inclines slightly to the Right Wing (led by the late Professor Moritz Schlick).

The book begins with a good historical introduction, where it is shown how the movement arose through a fusion of traditional Empiricism, culminating in the work of Ernst Mach, and Mathematical Logic culminating in the *Principia Mathematica* of Russell and Whitehead. The rest of the book is divided into five parts. Part I, "Logical Foundations," is chiefly devoted to an exposition of Dr. Wittgenstein's Logic, the basic doctrine of which is that all synthetic propositions are "truth-functions" of elementary propositions, which in turn either accord or discord with the atomic facts of which the world consists. Part II, "Theory of Scientific Method," expounds the Logical Positivist theories of Probability, Induction, and Natural Law.

Here the most characteristic Positivist doctrine (known to English readers from Mr. F. P. Ramsey's essay on "General Propositions and Causality" in his posthumous book *The Foundations of Mathematics*) is that the laws of Nature are not propositions but prescriptions. They are not themselves true or false, but are recipes or rules for constructing singular propositions—especially predictions—which *are* true or false. If the laws are not themselves propositions, the classical problem of Induction—viz. how laws are to be made probable by the examination of a limited number of instances—of course no longer arises.

Here Dr. Weinberg has several objections to make. I will mention three of them. First, he complains that on such a view the sentences which formulate laws of Nature are *meaningless*, since they do not state anything which is either true or false. This objection does not seem to be very serious, and could be met by a change of terminology. Surely there is a good sense of the word "meaning" in which prescriptions or commands can be said to have meaning, and in which moreover those commands which have meaning can be distinguished from others which have not. Thus "Shut the door" has meaning, while "shut the square on the hypotenuse" has none. The second criticism is that some laws are *deducible from* other laws, which seems to show that they are propositions after all. This could perhaps be met by the consideration that laws, even though not themselves propositions, would have to include propositional functions, such as "x is heated" or "x expands" (where x is a variable). Thirdly, Dr. Weinberg objects that it is not explained why a law which has led to many true predictions is trusted—and reasonably trusted—more than a law which has led to few. This seems the most serious objection, and Dr. Weinberg plausibly contends that the Problem of Induction, which was alleged to have been got rid of, here returns upon us in another form.

In Part III, "The Elimination of Metaphysics," the most interesting topic is the so-called Solipsism which seems to be the necessary consequence of Dr. Wittgenstein's Verification Principle: since on the face of it there is no conceivable way in which I could verify the sentences which purport to describe the experiences of other people. It appears to follow that either these sentences are meaningless, or if they do mean something they must be descriptions of processes in other human *bodies* (which I *could* conceivably verify). This extremely paradoxical consequence has vexed the School a good deal, and no wonder. Various more or less heroic remedies have been suggested, notably the somewhat homoeopathic one called "Physicalism," developed by Prof. Rudolf Carnap, one of the leaders of the School. To this Dr. Weinberg turns in the next part.

Part IV, "Radical Physicalism," is accordingly devoted chiefly to Prof. Carnap's theory. The main aim of the Physicalist is to show by a detailed examination of the structure of language that all statements whatever—including those purporting to describe the experiences of other people—can theoretically be translated into the "inter-subjective" language of Physics.

In order to do this, Prof. Carnap has to give up, or at least greatly modify the old Verification Principle, which said that sentences were to be verified or falsified by direct reference to the empirical data of sensation or introspection. He seems to hold that sentences can only be verified by reference to other sentences, and even then never conclusively. For the other sentences in turn will need verification too. Thus we seem to have a closed world of sentences, much like the closed world of "judgments" in the Coherence Theory of Truth, and the indispensable empirical element which distinguishes Science from mere games like chess is in danger of being thrown out altogether. (It is

noteworthy that another Physicalist, Prof. Otto Neurath, explicitly defends an extreme form of the Coherence Theory of Truth.)

I am not sure that Dr. Weinberg really succeeds in making clear the complicated details of Prof. Carnap's theory of language, which involves a good deal of difficult and (to one reader at least) unfamiliar symbolism. But I think he is right in saying that the proposed remedy is worse than the disease, and moreover in contending that it isn't really a remedy at all. For there still remains an irreducible difference between my statements and other people's: e.g. between "I am tired" and "*Smith says*, 'I feel tired.'"

Part V, "Conclusion," consists of two chapters. The first, "An estimate of the Viennese Circle," is in effect a summary of the preceding parts of the book. The other, "The Possibility of an Alternative Theory of Language," is only a brief sketch, and I am not sure that I fully understand it. Dr. Weinberg seems to hold (1) that the doctrine that general propositions are *finite* conjunctions must be abandoned; (2) that, *pace* Prof. Carnap and others, there are ostensive propositions which refer directly to empirical data; (3) that Solipsism can be avoided if refutability (as opposed to verifiability) be taken as the criterion of the meaningfulness of sentences. It seems desirable that these suggestions should be more fully developed. On the face of it, the relations between (2) and (3) seem likely to cause trouble.

I will conclude with a few criticisms.

1. It must be admitted that some parts of the book are very difficult. Dr. Weinberg, like other experts, sometimes assumes that his readers are as completely at home in the handling of the Russell-Whitehead-Shaeffer symbolism as he is himself. And I doubt whether his exposition of Wittgenstein and Carnap could be followed by anyone who was entirely unfamiliar with the doctrines of those writers; though a reader who (like many of us) has a half-familiarity with them will certainly learn a good deal.

2. The book contains a number of typographical singularities. Some are outright misprints: e.g. "it is clear that $\sim(\exists x) \sim \phi x$ and $\sim(\exists x) \sim \phi x$ can both be true on this theory" (p. 131.) Some are unfortunate conventions. Thus not-p is frequently written not—P, where the unguarded reader might suppose that the long dash was a technical symbol, and might be tempted to read "not not p." (This is all the more likely to happen where the "not" occurs at the end of one line and the long dash at the beginning of the next.) And what are we to say of the statement that "P implies $\Phi = df\ \overline{P|\overline{P|\Phi}}$" (p. 180)? (I suppose we should substitute $\overline{P|\Phi|\Phi}$.)

3. Dr. Weinberg's English is sometimes difficult. The German abbreviation "resp." (respektive) occurs more than once; e.g. "objective (resp. intersubjective)" (p. 278), and one is occasionally puzzled by curious turns of expression, e.g. "if Wittgenstein's theory of number is contrasted with Russell's in order to see significance" (p. 96).

H. H. Price.

Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce. Edited by Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss. Volume VI, *Scientific Metaphysics.* (U.S.A. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. 1935. Pp. x + 462. Price 5 dollars; 21s.)

With the publication of this volume the presentation of Peirce's views on metaphysics is completed. Some metaphysical papers were included in Volume I, whilst Volume V (*Pragmatism and Pragmaticism*[1]) contains what is virtually Peirce's prolegomena to metaphysics. It must be admitted that

[1] This was reviewed in the *Journal* for January 1936.

the present volume is, for the most part, dull, not to say, boring. It may well be the case that only the conscientious reviewer will attempt to read the whole of it, or to look up the constant references to the preceding volumes. There can be no doubt that Peirce held the view that methodology must terminate in metaphysics. His Pragmaticism is a propaedeutic to a curious form of objective idealism. Readers of the earlier volumes will not expect to find any fully developed metaphysical theory. Peirce was extraordinarily scrappy, not only in his mode of writing but also in his mode of thinking. The papers in this volume present the usual curious mixture of vague, obscure, grandiose speculation and penetrating analyses of various special topics.

The title of "Scientific Metaphysics"—chosen for this volume by the editors—must not be taken to suggest any fundamental agreement with what it is now fashionable to call "scientific philosophy." Kant, Hegel, and Schelling are Peirce's masters, but there is more of Hegel in him than of Kant, and of Schelling than of either of the others. But Peirce's metaphysical theory is also peculiarly his own; it is, on the whole, a surprising theory for so great a symbolic logician to have held. Peirce took very seriously the traditional inquiries into ontology and cosmology. Metaphysics, in his opinion, "has to account for the whole universe of being. It has, therefore, to do something like supposing a state of things in which that universe did not exist, and consider how it could have arisen" (vi, 214[1]). He hastens to add that "when we speak of the universe as 'arising' we do not mean that literally," since "time itself is a part of that universe whose origin is to be considered." All that "arising" can be taken to indicate is an objective logical sequence. Unfortunately Peirce's discussion of this distinction is too scrappy to be at all enlightening.

He begins (or, rather, this volume begins) by sketching an extremely comprehensive programme for the metaphysician. His business is "to study the most general features of reality and real objects." Among the questions that Peirce regards as falling within the scope of metaphysics are the following: "Whether or no there be any real indefiniteness, or real possibility and impossibility?" "Whether or not there is any definite indeterminacy?" "What general explanation or account can be given of the different qualities of feeling and their apparent connection with determinations of mass, space, and time?" "Is Time a real thing, and if not, what is the nature of the reality that it represents?" "What is consciousness or mind like; meaning, is it a single continuum like Time and Space, which is for different purposes variously broken up by that which it contains; or is it composed of solid atoms, or is it more like a fluid?" Such questions as these have been commonly considered by metaphysicians. It is not surprising to find that Peirce gave much thought to them. But it is surprising to find that he regarded metaphysics, thus understood, as "an observational science." He insists that "the data of metaphysics are not less open to observation, but immeasurably more so, than the data, say, of the very highly developed science of astronomy, to make any important addition to whose observations requires an expenditure of tens of thousands of dollars" (6, 3). It is difficult to see how an observational science, using "the universal methods of such science," should be able to deal with questions such as those enumerated above. Yet Peirce believed that the backwardness of metaphysics was due to the fact that it had been left "to the caste of theologians." The editors of the present volume seem to suppose that Peirce's animus against theologians and his assertion that metaphysics is an "observational science" suffice to yield a "scientific metaphysic."

[1] References are throughout to the numbered paragraphs; the number of the volume is prefixed.

What this metaphysic amounts to is already fairly well known. The main points of his doctrine are contained in the papers published in the *Monist* at the beginning of this century, some of which appeared in the volume edited by Professor Morris Cohen under the title, *Chance, Love, and Logic*. The curious juxtaposition of these three words in the title indicate the extremely original theory of the universe to which Peirce gave the name "tychistic-agapastic-synechism." He believed that it is regularity that requires explanation, and contended that the universe originated in chance, whereas love is the generating power of systems. Regularity is to be explained as being the product of evolution from the chance elements in the universe. By "chance" Peirce seems to mean "general indetermination." From chance as a matrix regularity is born. From his many disconnected statements on this topic it is difficult to derive any clear, still less consistent, view. But there can be no doubt that the assertion of absolute chance is essential to his metaphysics. His discussion of Necessitarianism throws light upon this point. "Necessitarianism," he urges, "cannot logically stop short of making the whole action of the mind a part of the physical universe. . . . On the other hand, by supposing the rigid exactitude of causation to yield, I care not how little—be it but by a strictly infinitesimal amount—we gain room to insert mind into our scheme, and to put it into the place where it is needed, into the position which, as the sole self-intelligible thing, it is entitled to occupy, that of the fountain of existence" (6, 61). In this way he is led, by devious reasonings, to the conclusion that a form of objective idealism provides the only satisfactory, because the only intelligible, theory of nature. Matter is effete mind; physical laws are the habits of this effete mind. The creative force in the universe is Love.

Peirce's exposition of this doctrine is, for the most part, extremely obscure. It is encumbered by his passion for Triads, by his elaboration of a decidedly unenlightening architectonic, and by his unfortunate love of coining an unnecessary terminology. So far as I have been able to understand what he says about Time and Space, his views seem to me to be unduly simple-minded. There are, scattered about the volume, many illuminating *obiter dicta*, and some suggestive views are indicated, but far too briefly to be of much service. In my opinion this is the least interesting of the six volumes of Peirce's *Collected Works*. It is to be hoped that when his able and indefatigable editors have finished their laborious task, they will give us their estimate of Peirce's significance for philosophy. It is well known that he had a considerable influence upon William James and Royce; this volume suggests that there are interesting affinities between Peirce and Santayana. That this should be so is some evidence of the many-sidedness of Peirce's interest and of his importance in the development of philosophical thought in the United States.

L. Susan Stebbing.

The World's Unborn Soul. An Inaugural Lecture delivered before the University of Oxford by Sir S. Radhakrishnan, Spalding Professor of Eastern Religions and Ethics. (London: Clarendon Press, Humphrey Milford. 1936. Pp. 31. Price 2s. net.)

Sir Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan was elected last summer as the first occupant of the new chair of Eastern Religions and Ethics founded in Oxford by Mr. and Mrs. Spalding. His appointment comes at an interesting moment of Indian history, when people in this country are interested as never before

in the ideas on the fundamental questions of religion and ethics that have moulded the life of the East in the past, and under the new constitution will have freer scope to direct its destinies in the future. His inaugural lecture is a notable utterance upon the wider influence which these ideas may have as a contribution to what he conceives of as the world's greatest problem at the present moment: the salvation of its soul. It falls into two parts. The first is a masterly sketch of the influences which have moulded modern civilization up to the present; the second an eloquent statement, coming as it were from the heart of Eastern religion and philosophy, of the message the writer thinks it has for the West in its present crisis. The main influences which he submits to analysis are those (1) of Greek Rationalism which laid the foundations of Science, secular Humanism, and the doctrine of the Sovereign State; (2) of Hebrew and Christian Religion centring in the idea of the revealed will of God, and permeating the West with a new ethical passion and a cultural unity which should replace the military unity of the Roman Empire; and (3) of the Renaissance issuing in the simultaneous growth of political freedom, economic prosperity, intellectual advance and social reform, but at the expense of the disintegration of the old faith in God as an overruling Will. "Humanism," we are told, "is the religion of the intellectuals to-day." "We know the shapes of thought, but do not have the substance of conviction." In such an atmosphere it is little wonder that men rally to the State and the Nation, "as savages to fetishes," or that the old divisions between Greek and Barbarian, Jew and Gentile, Damnation and Grace are revived in a new form, and menace the hard-won steps towards the unity of mankind.

But perhaps, it is suggested, this profound *malaise* is only a form of growing pains. Great periods of human history have before now been the result of the quickening influence of foreign cultures. It is such a quickening that Professor Radhakrishnan hopes may yet come from the Eastern conception of religion, as "a transforming experience" rather than as "a notion of God," and as subordinating "belief and conduct, rites and ceremonies, authorities and dogma" to "the art of conscious self-discovery and contact with the Divine."

To attempt to condense the fine interpretation of what the author wishes us to understand by this "transforming experience" in its twofold aspect as a *negative* movement away from the *moha* or delusion of worldly values of the merely animal or the barbaric life, and a *positive* towards *vidya* or true self-knowledge would only spoil it. I prefer to use the few more lines allowed me to express gratitude to our first Indian Professor for the telling picture he has drawn of ourselves in the West, as others see us, and for the equally telling direction to the way of salvation, as we have it, whispered indeed by our own greatest philosophers from the time of Pythagoras and Plato, but proclaimed upon the housetops in the Upanisads of India; and to wish him every success in his work in Oxford and beyond it, of which he has here given us the key-note.

J. H. Muirhead.

Human Nature and Human History. By R. G. Collingwood, Fellow of the Academy. From the Proceedings of the British Academy, Vol. XXII. (London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. 1936. Pp. 33. Price 2s. net.)

"The really new element in the thought of to-day as compared with that of three centuries ago is the rise of history" (7). When will our English

philosophers realize this truth and its immense significance for philosophy? When will they emancipate themselves from the *cadres* of scientific thinking, as formulated by Descartes and his successors, and recognize that, side by side with the knowledge of universal connexions, is the knowledge of individuals in their individuality, with at least as full a title as the former to a place within the synthesis of metaphysics? The *Geisteswissenschaften*, which in the last half-century have aroused so much attention from Continental thinkers, have been handled in this country in stepmotherly fashion, if they have not been passed by wholly without notice. Professor Whitehead, it is true, has set his sails to voyage on the uncharted sea, but English thinkers, though they study his books with admiration, are reluctant to follow him on his adventure. The psychologists still dream, as did Locke and Hume, of a 'science' of the human mind, analogous in method and purpose to the sciences of nature, and, when confronted by failure, "excuse themselves by saying that psychology is still in its infancy" (6). Sociology is a hybrid, history masquerading in the garb of science; while political science, in Maitland's words, "is either history or humbug." What is called for, in these latter days, is a thinker who will broaden the traditional outlook of metaphysics by an examination, independent of the tradition of scientific method, of the claim of history to truth. Professor Collingwood, who, like Croce, is at once a philosopher and a historian, is surely the man to satisfy the need.

The difference between history and the sciences of nature is twofold. In the first place the sciences aim at generalization, history at the discovery of unique and unrepeatable patterns of human actions. The historian is not concerned with prediction of future events on the basis of timeless formulae of conjunction of characters—"he has no gift of prophecy, and knows it" (21). He uses, indeed, the concept of causality, but very differently from the scientist. "When a scientist asks, 'Why did that piece of litmus paper turn pink?' he means, 'On what kinds of occasions do pieces of litmus paper turn pink?' When a historian asks, 'Why did Brutus stab Caesar?' he means, 'What did Brutus think, which made him decide to stab Caesar?' " (14). His task is not, like that of the scientist, "to discover an event by sense-perception and then explain its occurrence by assigning it to its class and determining the relation between that class and others," but to understand the event by discovering the thought expressed in it. "To discover that thought is already to understand it. After the historian has ascertained the facts, there is no further process of inquiring into their causes. When he knows what happened, he already knows why it happened" (*ib.*). Here we see the second distinction between history and science. Science deals with events from the outside, "as a spectacle presented to his intelligent observation," capable of description "in terms of bodies and their movements"; history deals with their "insides," with what "can only be described in terms of thought," i.e. with actions embodying the thoughts of human agents. The business of the historian is to discern this thought by thinking himself into the action (13). Hence it is an error to hold that the recognition of physical processes as subject to time and change implies that "the entire world of nature" can be swept "into the historian's net." Professor Collingwood, while acknowledging his debt to Professor Alexander, declines to follow him to this conclusion. "There is only one hypothesis," he says (17), "on which natural processes could be regarded as ultimately historical in character, namely, that these processes are in reality processes of action determined by a thought which is their own inner side." He goes on, to our mind somewhat cavalierly, to dismiss this alternative on the ground that "such a hypothesis could claim our serious attention only if it led to a better

understanding of the natural world." Is not this just what Professor Whitehead argues in *Process and Reality* that it does lead to, provided always that we substitute for the word "thought," with its implication of conscious mind, the wider term "subjective form"? Every "occasion," according to Professor Whitehead, has "its own inner side." When Professor Collingwood adds that the scientist has no need of any such hypothesis, he seems to fall into an ambiguity. Certainly such a cosmology as Professor Whitehead's is unnecessary for departmental researches; but the question remains for the philosopher. As soon as we look beyond the sciences, the rejected hypothesis can surely claim to demand "serious attention" as offering "a better understanding of the natural world." Nor does its acceptance in any way preclude the drawing of a relative distinction between the history of human actions, expressive of conscious purposes, and the wider history that is co-extensive with the whole process of the universe. But the processes of events and those of thought could no longer be regarded, as Professor Collingwood regards them, as constituting "altogether different" worlds.

History, then, is the true, and the only true, knowledge of mind. For "the only way in which I can know my own mind is by performing some mental act or other and then considering what the act is that I have performed" (19). And, as we have seen, where mind is not active there can be no history: "So far as a man's conduct is determined by what may be called his animal nature, his impulses, and appetites, it is non-historical; the process of those activities is a natural process. Thus, the historian is not interested in the fact that men eat and sleep and make love and thus satisfy their natural appetites; but he is interested in the social customs which they create by their thought as a framework within which these appetites find satisfaction in ways sanctioned by convention and morality" (16). We shall return to this point presently; for the moment, our concern is with Professor Collingwood's interpretation of the theme, "History as the knowledge of mind," in the third section of his essay. For it is clear that behind the doctrines here advocated lies a metaphysic, which raises problems that carry the reader far beyond the scope of the immediate discussion. That the historian must "rethink for himself" all the thoughts that constitute his knowledge (18) will be readily granted; as also that the object of his study is "mind as acting in certain determinate ways in certain determinate situations" (21). But is this equivalent to his "rethinking *the same thought* which created the situation" under investigation? (18). The "eternal object" (e.g. the Roman constitution (18)) is the same, but does not the difference of the "occasion" in which it is "ingredient" (to use Professor Whitehead's terminology) involve a historical difference between the thought that is studied and the thought that studies it? To take Professor Collingwood's illustration (18), we can indeed think to-day the identical theorem that was thought by Pythagoras some 2,500 years ago; but in so far as we do so we are thinking as geometers, not as historians. As historians, what we think of is "Pythagoras thinking the theorem," a particular act of mind which in its uniqueness is other, and not the same, as the act of historical thinking that recalls it. Here is where Professor Collingwood's metaphysical presuppositions come into play. So long as they are not made explicit, the reader is left sorely in doubt as to his meaning. We are told (15) that "the historian not only re-enacts past thought, he re-enacts it in the context for his own knowledge, and therefore, in re-enacting it, criticizes it, forms his own judgment of its value, corrects whatever errors he can discern in it." Are, then, *res gestae* and *historia rerum gestarum* one and the same? "History is nothing but the re-enactment of past thought in the historian's mind" (30). "The historical process is a process

in which man creates for himself this or that kind of human nature by re-creating in his own thought the past to which he is heir" (28). "Re-enact," "creates," "re-creates"—these are the question-raising phrases, that lead us to wonder whether after all, and in what sense, there is a past inherited by the historian, or whether the past exists only as a moment in the dialectic of the historian's present act of self-consciousness, as a *ὑπόθεσις* of his departmental inquiry, to be *aufgehoben* when he rises from history to philosophy. Will Professor Collingwood go all the way with the Italian idealists, and identify philosophy and history in the eternal present of the self-conscious synthesis? And if so, what becomes of the historian's empirical individuality or of the empirical object-matter, the inherited past? What survives is the present, the whole present, and nothing but the present. "Since the historical present includes in itself its own past, the real ground on which the whole rests, namely, the past out of which it has grown, is not outside but is included within it" (31–32). "Certain historians . . . find in certain periods nothing intelligible, and call them Dark Ages; but such phrases tell us nothing about those ages themselves, though they tell us a great deal about the persons who use them, namely, that they are unable to rethink the thoughts that were fundamental to their life" (19). This is true, no doubt, of certain historians who are ill qualified for their occupation; but has Professor Collingwood any criterion for discriminating between those who are qualified and those who are not? Does not his doctrine lead to the conclusion that the darkness of the so-called Dark Ages in merely the darkness that clouds the mind of the modern historian who so calls them?

Professor Collingwood is, of course, prepared with an answer to these objections on lines, probably, analogous to those followed by Gentile in his *Teoria dello Spirito*. Obviously we cannot embark in this brief review on any discussion of first principles, especially when the author has refrained from any clear expression of the metaphysical ground work of his essay. If we quarrel with the ground he has chosen for the engagement, he is at least fighting for a good cause. If we seek to know the truth about the human mind, it is to history, and not to psychology, that we must turn. Is there, then, no scope for Psychology as an autonomous inquiry? We saw that the "animal processes" in human life were natural processes, and therefore presumably matter for the natural sciences. At the close of this essay, Professor Collingwood offers an alternative suggestion. These animal processes, we are now told, hold an intermediate place between that in mind which is the object of history and non-historical nature. On the one hand they are not rational; on the other, they fall within mind, not within body. "To use an old distinction, they are psyche or soul as distinct from spirit. These irrational elements are the subject-matter of psychology. They are the blind forces and activities in us which are part of human life as it consciously experiences itself, but are not parts of the historical process. . . . Their importance to us consists in the fact that they form the proximate environment in which our reason lives. . . . They are the basis of our rational life, though no part of it" (33). This suggestion is most interesting and calls for fuller development. If accepted, it would entail some modification of Professor Collingwood's earlier statements that the only way of knowing mind is that of history, and that the historian alone is concerned with events from the inside. For the irrational processes in question which should be the object of the psychologist's study, fall within mind and constitute the inner activity of the occasions and events informed by them.

W. G. DE BURGH.

A Study in Plato. By W. F. R. HARDIE. (Oxford: Clarendon Press; London: Humphrey Milford. 1936. Pp. xiii + 172. Price 8s. 6d.)

I hope that this very interesting book will be widely read by all students of Plato. For it approaches the consideration of his philosophy from a point of view which, if not absolutely new, has been far too much neglected. This point of view is expressed by Mr. Hardie in the words: "The object of Platonic study must surely be not merely to discover what Plato meant to say, but to discover just how much of what he meant to say is true or at least plausible." And from this angle he examines most of the main problems of the Platonic philosophy, the Theory of Forms, the relations of sensation, opinion, and knowledge, the interpretation of the Divided Line, the meaning of the *Parmenides*, and the theory of God and the soul.

With this general line of approach I am in the fullest sympathy. But I should like to modify Mr. Hardie's formulation of it in two directions. On the one hand, I would suggest that understanding what a philosopher means is not a process which can be kept sharply distinct from estimating the value of his contribution to thought. For we cannot understand what he means at all by just inspecting the propositions in which his final conclusions are set out. We have to see how he came to believe that, and in trying to do this we have eventually to come back to the real facts of human experience from which his problems arose. On the other hand, when we have done this we shall, I think, rarely feel inclined to summarize his results for ourselves in a series of propositions, each of which can be judged as simply true or simply false. At any rate, if we do it will only be at the end of a strenuous and prolonged effort to put ourselves in a position where we can see clearly how he came to believe what he did.

I must confess that, in spite of many admirable philosophical qualities, Mr. Hardie seems to me to fail in this respect. He is a conscientious but unsympathetic critic, and, while there is always something in his criticisms, there nearly always seems to me a good deal more to say in support of Plato than he recognizes. Thus he dismisses summarily the idea that to be fully real a thing must be permanent and unchanging. Yet there must obviously be something more in the idea than he allows. It reappears so constantly in the history of thought, not only as a metaphysical doctrine but as a guiding principle of scientific thought with its various theories of conservation, which a modern scientist has described as "the test of objective existence." Again, the criticisms of the tripartite division of the soul, especially the place assigned to "spirit," seem to me somewhat unimaginative and external. I should be prepared to argue that, if we examine our own experience, we can find within it real distinctions that correspond almost exactly to what Plato has to say about the "parts" of the soul, though we should express it in different terms.

Mr. Hardie would, perhaps, say that in that case Plato was to be blamed for not expressing himself in better terms. And it is no doubt a healthy tendency to be critical of ambiguous or obscure language. Yet it would be obviously unfair to blame Plato for not expressing himself in the precise terminology that we have evolved at the present day after centuries of discussion. Mr. Hardie seems to me at times to come near to doing this. At any rate, he is far from doing justice to the difficulties that would have faced anyone in finding appropriate language for what were really novel ideas. At times, also, he seems almost inclined to blame Plato for not having anticipated all the possible alternative views to his own which have been developed subsequently. Thus he makes it a ground for criticism of the Theory of Forms that Plato has not disposed of the possibility of a conceptualist theory of

universals. Yet how could he have done so when no systematic conceptualist theory had yet been developed? Personally, I am inclined to hold that no coherent conceptualist theory is possible, and that it was an advantage to Plato's thought that it was not distracted by the necessity of chasing this particular will-o'-the-wisp. The rudimentary suggestion of the theory that we find in the *Parmenides* seems to be sufficiently disposed of by the obvious objection that is put to it. And one can hardly blame Plato for not seeing all the possibilities of all the theories that occurred to any of his contemporaries.

There are many other questions both of criticism and interpretation on which I should be inclined to join issue with Mr. Hardie. I cannot, for instance, find his objections to the Burnet-Taylor view of the *Parmenides* at all convincing. And his own interpretation of the second part of that dialogue seems to me to be so speculative and to involve reading so much more into the evidence than is actually there that, even if it admits of no answer, it certainly carries no conviction.

I have probably made it sufficiently clear that on debatable questions I rarely find myself in agreement with Mr. Hardie. But that does not, to my mind, detract from the value of the book. Mr. Hardie's arguments always have to be taken seriously. And those who differ from him will find in him a stimulus and a challenge to reconsider and restate their own point of view, for which they ought to be quite as grateful as if he had succeeded in converting them.

G. C. Field.

An Essay on Economy and Value. By Alec L. Macfie. (London: Macmillan & Co. 1936. Pp. xi + 152. Price 7s. 6d.)

Mr. Macfie performs a considerable service in this endeavour to clear the meaning of two obscure terms and set them in intelligible relations. He begins by accepting the definition given to "economics" by Professor Robbins: "Economics is the science which studies human behaviour as a relationship between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses." Though this is commonly confined to the case of marketable goods, it evidently has a wider application, as, for instance, to the uses of leisure or companionship, and other aspects of behaviour. In the course of his essay Mr. Macfie places economy in its right relation to various types of useful and valuable activities. Fastening first upon the condition of "scarcity" and using the economic laws of diminishing and marginal utility, he shows how they operate in all sorts of organic conduct, whether individual or social. In modern economic science dealing with the satisfaction of desires, it is evident that separate utility cannot be ascribed to each desire. Though Mr. Macfie does not bring out this fallacious separation in considering the concrete productivity of economic processes, it is equally applicable there. The meaning of marginal costs and utilities is applicable both on the supply and the demand side in a continuous process of production and consumption. For the make-up of a factory as a complex whole determines just how many units of each sort of capital and labour shall be employed: the marginal unit is a composite thing. So on the demand side the organic character of a standard of living determines how much shall be spent on this and that article. Marginal equivalence is a result of the right application of such economic calculation. To assign to margins any directly causative or determinative influence is an error which some economists commit because they seek to ensure modes of exact quantitative measurement which are inapplicable to any human problem. In order to make of economics an exact science, you must dehumanize it.

Mr. Macfie relates economy to value in two ways. Taking value to signify experiences that satisfy impulses or desires that are common to humanity "founded in the actual essence of human nature" (p. 36), he finds two distinguishable, though related, values in "economy," one the separate positive feeling of satisfaction from the performance of any action with a minimum of cost or waste, the other the contribution which "economy" makes towards the higher values of life. Exceedingly interesting passages examine the place of "economy" in the fine arts and in literature.

Positive economics, in the Robbins sense, is entitled to disregard the part which economy plays in a progressive society, for positive economics has no law of progress. But normative economics, which alone can contribute to the art of social economic progress, employs economy in an evolutionary sense, making it dependent on and contributory to some purposive end. Mr. Macfie makes a powerful case for the admission of economy into the company of the "oughts" which constitute the highest values. But he cannot, of course, validate by reasoning the detachment of any of these values from the material aspect of the human organism which enters into every sort of satisfaction. The organic structure of the ear and eye are determinant factors in music and painting as sources or containers of value. Mr. Macfie sometimes assumes, but cannot prove, the detachment of the higher values from the make-up of the human organism. This can only be done by taking the idealist position that all experience is purely psychical. Unless that position is taken, some interaction must always be assumed between body and spirit in every experience, however valuable.

I throw out one final doubt. Is "scarcity" essential to "economy"? During a depression the arrangement of such production as takes place may be subject to no scarcity either of plant, materials, or labour. Such "scarcity" as exists is on the consumption or demand side. Or, taking a homely instance, the amount of water I mix with my whisky is not determined by any scarcity. It is determined by my personal sense of proportion. Would it not then be better to define economy as "a right proportion," i.e. a proportion most satisfactory for "organic" needs, material and spiritual, individual and social?

J. A. Hobson.

The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: Its Basis and Genesis. By Leo Strauss. Translated from the German manuscript by E. M. Sinclair. (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press; London: Humphrey Milford. 1936. Pp. xviii + 172. Price 10s.)

This is, in many ways, a remarkable book, and deserves the attention of anyone interested in the history of political philosophy. It comes at a time when what is particularly needed in the study of Hobbes is fresh insight rather than new knowledge, and whatever else it fails to give, it certainly provides 'new light' on the philosophy of Hobbes. Further, it is the work of a scholar who has reconsidered the relevant writings of Hobbes with great thoroughness and intelligence. And again, it is remarkable for the subtlety of its interpretation, and (in spite of the fact that it must be considered a difficult book to read) for the lucidity of its exposition. It contains, perhaps, more repetition than it ought; but it has the great merit of not wasting time by going over all the old ground.

The most important theses defended by Mr. Strauss are, (i) that Hobbes's political philosophy is a revolt from the natural law theory of society, and that Hobbes wrote more truly than he knew when he claimed that "civil

philosophy is no older than my own book, *De Cive*"; (ii) that the distinctive innovation of Hobbes is the replacement of *law* by *right* or *claim* as the principle from which the State is to be deduced; (iii) that Hobbes's political philosophy is founded upon neither the moral principles of natural law, nor (like Spinoza's) upon purely naturalistic principles, but, coming at the "fertile moment when the classical and theological tradition was already shaken, and a tradition of modern science not yet formed and established," it stands midway between them; (iv) that three main periods may be distinguished in Hobbes's writings, (*a*) a first philosophical period, under the influence of the traditional natural law theory, (*b*) a 'humanistic' period, during which he turned his attention to history because the traditional theory seemed to have no way of putting its norms into practice, and (*c*) the period in which he works out his own political philosophy, based upon a new set of norms, a new morality, and influenced by the new 'Euclidian' method; (v) that the real basis of Hobbes's political philosophy is not (as has been supposed) natural science, is not the traditional moral theory, but a new moral theory, derived from Hobbes's observation of human behaviour, in which fear of violent death is the chief virtue and pride or vanity the chief vice. Besides these theses, all of which except perhaps the first two are by way of being novel and original views in the interpretation of Hobbes, Mr. Strauss has an interesting chapter called 'Aristotelianism' in which he establishes Hobbes's great debt to Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, especially in regard to the analysis of the passions, and another (to me rather obscure) chapter called 'The State and Religion,' in which he discusses a rather miscellaneous set of subjects and which I find somewhat inadequate an account of a failure to go deeply enough into Hobbes's theory (if it can be called that) of religious belief.

Now, it must be said at once that Mr. Strauss produces many and powerful arguments in defence of his main theses. Very rarely is he guilty of exaggeration or an attempt to make his evidence prove more than he does; and his whole argument is both ingenious and, in the main, convincing. Perhaps he is sometimes rather over-impressed by some of his new discoveries; but, as a whole, he retains an excellent sense of proportion. There are, however, one or two important points which I think admit of criticism. First, with regard to Hobbes's "deviation from tradition," which is insisted upon in many passages in this book. I think it is exaggerated. It is true that, before he had finished, Hobbes had deviated radically from the natural law tradition; although, for example, his selection of pride or vanity as the primary vice of human nature which makes civil government necessary is thoroughly in keeping with this tradition; and his whole method of argument belongs to the scholastic tradition rather than to any other. But, because he does not belong to the natural law tradition, it does not follow that he belongs to none. He belonged in fact to a tradition which had enjoyed a period of great vitality and was coming into its own again at the end of the sixteenth century—what may be called the Epicurean tradition. And it is surprising to find in this book so little recognition that, for example, this selection of will instead of law as the principle from which the State is deduced, belongs even in Hobbes's time to an already established tradition. It is true that this view has Hobbes as its first thorough expositor, but in principle it by no means begins with Hobbes and belongs to the sixteenth-century revival of Epicureanism. Hobbes did not desert one tradition merely to create an entirely new one. Then again, Mr. Strauss's attempt to establish the independence of Hobbes's theory of nature from his theory of the State is often well conceived —as, for example, when he argues that "the consistent naturalism which

Hobbes displays in his scientific writings cannot be the foundation of his political philosophy" because that philosophy requires and assumes a different conception of nature—but sometimes there seems to be a confusion between questions of genesis and questions of basis; a biographical argument directed to show that the main lines of the politics were laid down before the theory of the natural world was considered in detail, cannot itself prove that the one is in fact independent of the other. And certainly, in the *Leviathan*, the two are made to hang together essentially. Indeed, I am not certain that I understand what Mr. Strauss means by Hobbes's "scientific writings"; Hobbes's theory of the natural world is conceived always as a theory of knowledge, and is always determined by his fundamental concepts of the nature of reason and the character of philosophical explanation.

Perhaps the most original parts of the book are (i) the exposition of the 'periods' of Hobbes's life and work, which is excellently done, being both ingenious and convincing; and (ii) the account of the change which took place in Hobbes's moral ideas, a change which Mr. Strauss suggests led him from a belief in the aristocratic virtue of valour to the bourgeois virtue of prudence, for the principle of honour to the principle of fear of violent death, and which produced Hobbes's political philosophy as we have it.

There are suggestions in this volume that it may be followed by a second which will contain a full exposition of Hobbes's political philosophy itself, and if this is so, the readers of this book will look forward eagerly to the appearance of the other.

MICHAEL OAKESHOTT.

The Philosophy of Physics. By MAX PLANCK. Translated by W. H. Johnston (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1936. Pp. 118. Price 4s. 6d. net.)

This little book consists of a translation of four essays published originally in Germany. In the first essay Planck is concerned with the principles underlying scientific progress and points out their general ethical value. The principle that there must be no inherent contradiction may, he maintains, when translated into the ethical equivalents of honesty and truthfulness, be ranked as the first and most important of virtues. The laws of nature are unchangeable and the same for all men and all nations, and this should apply to the laws of justice also. He concludes by emphasizing the ethical value of continued forward striving towards perfection, but in the Third Reich he dare not add that this requires freedom.

The second essay on "Causality in Nature" is the most interesting of the four. Planck starts with "the simple and general proposition that an event is causally conditioned if it can be foretold with certainty." He then points out that it is never possible to predict a physical event with complete accuracy. However, rather than deny causality as the Indeterminists do, Planck redefines the word 'event' ("By an event, physics means a certain merely intellectual process") so that it occurs in an intellectual construct called the "physical world image." In this world image strict causality can be maintained, and the only change necessary to pass from classical to modern physics is to substitute in the image mass-waves for the mass-point. "The uncertainty in forecasting events in the world of the senses disappears and in its place we have an uncertainty with regard to the connection between the world image and the world of the senses. In other words, we have the inaccuracy arising from a transfer of the symbols of the world image to the sense world, and vice versa. The fact that physicists have been willing to put up with this double inaccuracy is an impressive demonstration of the importance of

maintaining the rule of determinism within the world image" (p. 61). He then goes on to suggest that causality could be given a more important rôle than that of holding together an image, by modifying the *subject* of the prediction and not the object (i.e. event). In this way Planck arrives at the notion of a supreme intellect resembling Laplace's, who, knowing everything, can predict with complete accuracy, and this satisfies his own criterion for causality. He concludes the essay by once again demolishing the illusion of human free will.

Two short essays on "Scientific Ideas" and "Science and Faith" complete this interesting and stimulating little book.

G. Burniston Brown.

Aesthetic Analysis. By D. W. Prall. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company. 1936. Pp. 211. Price 2 dollars.)

The best part of Dr. Prall's book is his analysis of those elementary forms whose combinations and permutations produce the complex formal structure of the arts. His first four chapters are an elucidation of the simple mathematical relations contained in rhythm, proportion, symmetry, etc. He shows how the orders within which these relations prevail are either qualitative—the pitch or intensity of sound, the brightness or shade of colour—spatial—simple shapes borrowed from geometry or nature—or temporal—rhythm and metre in verse, rhythm and tempo in music. The last two chapters deal with the function of art and the nature of critical standards. We at once find ourselves among the worst Crocean aberrations. "The purpose of the so-called fine arts," we read on page 142, "is expression." But "expression" of what? "Feeling or emotion presented as the qualitative character of imaginal content"—at any rate in the case of poetry. Now "feeling" in Dr. Prall's sense is simply the impact of the external world on our organs of sense. "Feeling simply *is* concrete direct experience." This is a bad relapse into the Crocean confusion between aesthetic experience and ordinary perception; the two things cannot possibly be identified. This view harmonizes, however, with the author's conception of aesthetics as "the science of the immediate." Why is it that of all the contemporary European writers on aesthetics only Croce seems to have crossed the Atlantic? One would have thought that the library of such a seat of learning as Harvard might have found a place on its shelves for the works of Volkelt, Dessoir, and Laurila.

Listowel.

Äesthetische Streitfragen. By K. S. Laurila. (Helsingfors: Akademische Buchhandlung. 1934. Pp. 424.)

The mantle of Y. Hirn has clearly fallen upon his fellow-countryman K. S. Laurila, a Finnish writer whose publications—the above collection of essays, first fruits of his philosophical labours during the last twenty-five years, and three brilliant articles on aesthetics in the Scandinavian countries contributed to Dessoir's *Zeitschrift für Ästhetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft* for 1936—have entitled to a place in the front rank of contemporary aestheticians. The student will find no better introduction than this book to the fundamental problems of aesthetics, which are formulated with admirable clarity by a mind saturated in the main tradition of aesthetical speculation; and the critical observations tnat accompany this exposition often shed a new light on first principles.

The first essay is a penetrating psychological study of the feelings—"*Gefühle*"—experienced in the spectator's reaction to art or nature. He finds

it impossible to distinguish them, either in quality, duration, or intensity, or by their mental antecedents, from all the real emotions and ideal sentiments—religious, ethical, logical, social—seated in the mind. He therefore concludes that it is the entire aesthetic frame of mind as a disinterested and emotional contemplation of things that distinguishes it from the attitude of the practical man, the moralist, and the scientist. But the most valuable contribution is a successful, commonsensical attack upon the accepted dogma of pleasure or enjoyment as the unfailing accompaniment of an aesthetic reaction. Experience shows that our feelings in face of the comic, the characteristic, the pathetic, are generally a "mixture" of pain and pleasure, while high tragedy buries a molehill of joy under a mountain of sorrow. Brushing aside those who would confine aesthetics to the study of beauty, or of works of art, he declares that its proper object is the whole aesthetic sphere of life, "die Erklärung des ganzen ästhetischen Lebensgebietes."

In a chapter on the associative process he excludes every kind of "association" as irrelevant to the aesthetic reaction, and only allows "fused" meanings and feelings to figure in aesthetic appreciation. His solution of the old quarrel between the formalists and the adherents of content is that form and content are inseparable, the one corresponding to the direct factor, the other to the indirect factor—using Fechnerian terminology—in aesthetic apperception. LISTOWEL.

Polarity: A German Catholic's Interpretation of Religion. By P. ERICH PRZYWARA, S.J. Translated by A. C. BOUQUET, D.D. (London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford, 1935. Pp. xii + 150. Price 8s. 6d.)

The translator rather vaguely refers to the original of this work as "a contribution to the great *Handbook on Philosophy*." Since the title given to the translation is admittedly "not of the author's choosing," it seems well to note that the original appears as "Religionsphilosophie Katholischer Theologie," the fifth essay of the second volume ("Natur, Geist, Gott") of the *Handbuch der Philosophie*, edited by A. Baeumler and A. Schroeter, in four volumes, published at Munich, 1927–30.

The translation is deliberately close rather than free, but it would have been almost impossible to reproduce the exact thought enclosed in the author's extremely difficult German without carrying over into English some traces of his unusual use of words and somewhat involved style. The compendious nature of the essay calls for expansion and commentary rather than for synoptic review; here we can do no more than to indicate Fr. Przywara's main point and the lines along which he develops it.

The book is divided into three sections: first, a statement of the problem concerning the relation between man and God; second, the solution of this problem by means of the principle of "the analogy of being"; third, an historical summary of the workings of this principle in the various systems of Catholic philosophy.

The problem is a twofold one: (1) the "essence of religion": what is the relationship between God and man, as set forth in various philosophies of religion? (2) the "existence of religion": how is this relationship accomplished; as a relationship which is from God toward man, or one from man toward God?

Like all philosophic problems, this problem occurs within consciousness; hence its solution is worked out along lines proceeding from an analysis of consciousness. In our most fundamental act of awareness, we are conscious of an inward "ego-concept," and of the correlation between this concept and

the "id" of an (ideal or real) object which is independent of the ego-concept itself. Hence arises a basic activity of tension between subject and object, which expresses itself along three main lines: (1) experience of the ego as that which unites into a complete and final unity all the events of awareness; (2) experience of the ego as related to an external unity which it apprehends; (3) experience of the ego as striving towards a unity which it never fully attains, either within itself or outside of itself. These activities together make up the complex basic experience of consciousness. By itself, each is an abstraction; yet emphasis on any one will give rise to a definite philosophy and a definite type of religious activity: (1) immanence, (2) transcendence, (3) transcendentality. (The interaction of these activities results in each of them being more or less combined with the other two. Hence beside the three "pure" types, there are distinguishable six other "hybrid" types which are a combination of the pure type with each of the other two types in turn. Since the "hybrids" are ultimately cases of oscillation between the pure types—mere stages in the history of the interplay of the latter—they are of less importance for the problem, and are not further discussed in detail.)

Each of these types of philosophy take a different view of the relationship between God and creation. The "immanence" type sees God as the "Immanent Unity" within creation, the unifying factor of the opposing elements which fluctuate in the external and internal world of consciousness. The "transcendence" type sees God as the "Infinite Reality" completely separated from and beyond creation, the once-for-all Architect of creation, which now remains shut up in its own unity of tension. The "transcendentality" type sees God as the Ideal toward which creation ever strives upward.

In each case a definite religious attitude results: a definite relation of the soul towards God. For "immanence" the soul sees itself in a relation of intimate union with God. For "transcendence," the soul's attitude is that of the complete "aloofness of reverence." For "transcendentality" it is a combination of absolute unity and complete aloofness.

This purely abstract view of God and of man's relation to Him becomes concrete when it is noted that in the concrete human individual we find another basic tension besides the "subject-object" tension discussed thus far. For the concrete human ego experiences itself not simply as an ego in general, but as (*a*) a mind which is also a body, and (*b*) an individual who is also a member of a community. Each element in the two parts of this double tension, if emphasized in relation to the other elements, will give rise to the following four ways in which the ego may experience itself: (1) "Body-community"—as a ripple on the stream of the cosmic totality of Nature. (2) "Spirit-community"—as the breath of the objective spirit of humanity. (3) "Individual-spirit unity"—experiencing the whole as united in itself in the unity of its innermost spiritual ego. (4) "Individual-body unity"—experiencing the whole as united in itself in the unity of its perfect body.

The book is a constructive work of great merit, but it does not make easy reading.

L. J. Walker.

Consciousness in Neo-Realism. By Binayendranath Ray, M.A., Ph.D. (Dacca). (London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. 1935. Pp. xv + 153. Price 9s.)

"Much thought and labour have . . . been bestowed upon the consideration of other aspects of neo-realism, such as the problems of sense-data, truth and error, values, etc., but the problem of consciousness has not, so far, received any exhaustive treatment" (p. xiv). Hence Dr. Ray's thesis, which canvasses

its chosen field with commendable clarity and thoroughness. The author wisely limits himself to the more prominent Anglo-American developments of realism, and even so finds a variety of doctrine wide enough to render difficult the task of unified treatment. Yet this limitation, inevitable as it is, does involve a difficulty to which I shall refer below.

The author is of the opinion that "the views of English realists as compared with those of their confrères on the other side of the Atlantic are more reasonable and balanced and represent with greater fidelity the observed facts of experience" (p. 96). Nevertheless, these too fail to present an acceptable view of consciousness. As fairly abstracted by Dr. Ray, few will maintain that the "cross-sectionist" doctrine of Holt and Russell can be taken seriously. That of Holt seems to come to little more than fantastic, but dogmatic, asseveration: while Russell's variation, theoretically neat as it is, calls for amputation so severe as to present, in the end, a palp bly (and partially) reassembled corpse in place of a conscious subject. The author finds Alexander more plausible and more solid. But he cannot accept his two conceptions, compresence and selection, as fully characterizing consciousness. "Compresence as a universal relation holds," he observes, "between any two empirical finites." Alexander's motive in interpreting consciousness in this fashion is his desire "to link up the various empirical finites in an unbroken chain of continuity and to exhibit them as marked by a complete absence of any gap or hiatus. This is demanded by his Space-Time hypothesis . . ." (pp. 103–4). Nor, Dr. Ray argues, can consciousness be merely selective. It appears also "in the new rôle of creator."

The author's principal conclusion is that the positive contribution of neo-realism to a doctrine of consciousness is slight where it is not mistaken; while its negative value, as a criticism of dualism and substantialism, is considerable. It is, of course, plain that men such as Holt cannot be looked to for any light on the problem of consciousness, since, in renouncing (with anathemas) introspection and the subjective, they deny *ab initio* that there is a problem to be solved. As to Alexander, however, is it not his private and peculiar ontology, certainly no less than his realistic epistemology, which determines his attitude to consciousness? One is driven to ask the question whether or not it is an accident that these realists turn out (as Dr. Ray analyses them) to be in essence naturalists (or—what comes to much the same thing, neutralists). I should say that it is an accident simply, and that there is no essential connection between realism in epistemology and either neutralism or naturalism, plain or "emergent." If, for instance, Dr. Ray had considered in his book the views of Professor Laird, would he not have disclosed a very different conjunction of doctrines on knowledge and the soul or mind? I take it, indeed, to be a part of Dr. Ray's conclusion, that while realistic epistemology demands the recognition of passivity, or selectivity, as features of consciousness, this does not rule out the reality of other features, namely, of the activity, or the creativity, of the mind. While arguing, however, for these latter features the author does not attempt the more difficult task of specifying the scope and limits of the mind's activity. This is, of course, a very large question, not lightly to be embarked upon.

RALPH E. STEDMAN.

St. Thomas and the Problem of the Soul in the Thirteenth Century. By ANTON CHARLES PEGIS, Ph.D. (Toronto: St. Michael's College. 1934. Pp. 213. Price $2.50.)

The rapid diffusion of the study of Aristotle's works in the thirteenth century gave rise to many problems, of which not the least important and interesting concerned the nature of the human soul and the source and scope of human knowledge. Aristotle's ψυχή (soul) was but the organizing principle of the living human body, and perished with it: his intelligence (νοῦς), on the other hand, was immortal, but existed 'apart,' and the ambiguity of this latter phrase had given rise to many and diverse interpretations. All human knowledge, moreover, in his theory is derived from sense-perception. If Aristotelianism was to be adopted, it must be reinterpreted in accordance with Christian beliefs and its relation to the older and prevailing philosophy of Plato and Augustine must be discussed.

In a well-documented work in which the footnotes occupy almost as much space as the text, Dr. Pegis of Marquette University deals with the controversies which thus arose between the older Augustinian school, of which Bonaventure is the outstanding exponent, and the newer Aristotelian school, in which the outstanding names were those of Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas. The author displays an extensive knowledge and a shrewd appreciation both of medieval documents and of the very considerable literature which of recent years has grown up around them. His work contains an able summary of the main issues at stake and should prove of great value to the student of philosophical thought during this period. It contains a short bibliography and an index to proper names, but no subject index—an omission that one hopes a second edition may remedy.

L. J. WALKER.

Books received also:—

V. FERM. *First Adventures in Philosophy.* New York: C. Scribner's Sons. 1936. Pp. xi + 548. 2 dollars.

Annual Report of the Smithsonian Institution 1935. Washington, D.C. U.S. Government Printing Office. 1936. Pp. xiv + 580. 1 dollar.

R. D. SADANANDA. *Bhagavan Sri Ramana.* Mylapore, Madras. Published by the Author. 1936. Pp. 31. 2 annas.

C. L. NORDON. *International Relations* and *The Elimination of War.* London: Caledonian Press Ltd. 1937. Pp. 23. 6d.

L. A. REID. *Creative Morality.* London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1937. Pp. 270. 10s. 6d.

H. HANNAY. *Roger Fry and Other Essays.* London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1937. Pp. 208. 6s.

G. S. JURY. *Value and Ethical Objectivity. A Study in Ethical Objectivity and the Objectivity of Value.* London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1937. Pp. 258. 7s. 6d.

A. P. USHENKO. *The Philosophy of Relativity.* London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1937 Pp. 208. 8s. 6d.

R. CARNAP. *Logical Syntax of Language.* (International Library of Psychology, Philosophy, and Scientific Method.) London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. 1937. Pp. xvi + 352. 25s.

A. C. BENJAMIN. *The Logical Structure of Science* (Psyche Monographs No. 9). London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. 1937. Pp. 344. 10s. 6d.

W. M. WATT. *Can Christians be Pacifists?* London: Student Christian Movement Press. 1937. Pp. 126. 2s.

E. C. Mossner. *Bishop Butler and the Age of Reason. A Study in the History of Thought.* New York and London: The Macmillan Co. 1935. Pp. xv + 271. 15s.

G. F. Stout. *Alexander Faulkner Shand.* 1858–1936. (From the Proceedings of the British Academy. Vol. XXII.) London: Humphrey Milford. 1937. Pp. 9. 1s.

D. G. James. *Scepticism and Poetry: An Essay on the Poetic Imagination.* London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1937. Pp. 275. 12s. 6d.

U. Mishra. *Conception of Matter according to Nyāya-Vaiçeṣika.* (Foreword by Ganganatha Jha. Introduction by P. G. Kaviraj.) Allahabad: S. U. Mishra, Bank Road, Allahabad. 1936. Pp. xxxvii + 428. Rs. 6.

W. R. Sorley. *A History of English Philosophy.* Cambridge at the University Press. 1937. (Reprint.) Pp. xvi + 380. 8s. 6d.

L. F. Hite. *Ultimate Reality.* (Swedenborg Transactions No. 3.) London: Swedenborg Society, 1937. Pp. 64. 1s.

P. T. Raju. *Thought and Reality. Hegelianism and Advaita.* (Foreword by J. H. Muirhead.) London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1937. Pp. 285. 10s. 6d.

F. Leander. *Humanism and Naturalism. A Comparative Study of Ernest Seillière, Irving Babbitt and Paul Elmer More.* Göteborg: Wettergren & Kerbers Förlag. 1937. Pp. vii + 227. Kr. 8.

P. V. Pathak. *The Heyapaksha of Yoga: or Towards a Constructive Synthesis of Psychological Material in Indian Philosophy.* (Foreword by Sir S. Radhakrishnan.) Lahore: The Punjab Sanskrit Book Depot. 1932. Pp. xii + 295. Rs. 7.8.

M. Chaning-Pearce. *Religion and Reality. An Essay in the Christian Co-ordination of Contraries.* London: Macmillan & Co. 1937. Pp. xv + 190. 7s. 6d.

G. E. Mueller. *What Plato Thinks.* La Salle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Co. 1937. Pp. 128. 1 dollar 60 cents.

W. C. Bosanquet. *Meditatio Medici. A Doctor's Philosophy of Life.* Aldershot: Gale & Polden, Ltd. 1937. Pp. 162. 7s. 6d.

F. M. Cornford. *Plato's Cosmology. The Timaeus of Plato.* (Translation and commentary.) (International Library of Psychology, Philosophy and Scientific Method.) London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. 1937. Pp. xviii + 376. 16s.

J. B. Pratt. *Personal Realism.* New York and London: The Macmillan Co. 1937. Pp. xi + 387. 15s.

R. Osborn (Introduction by J. Strachey). *Freud and Marx. A Dialectical Study.* London: V. Gollancz, Ltd. 1937. Pp. 285. 8s. 6d.

Various. *The Nature of Mind.* (University of California Publications in Philosophy, Vol. XIX.) Berkeley: University of California Press. 1936. Pp. 232.

S. Nikhilananda (translated and annotated). *The Māndūkyopanishad.* With Gāudapada's *Kārikā* and Śankara's Commentary. (Foreword by V. S. Iyer.) Mysore: Sri Ramakrishna Ashrama. 1936. Pp. xliii + 361. Rs. 2.8.

J. Bourjade. *L'Intelligence et la pensée de l'enfant.* Paris: F. Alcan. 1937. Pp. 161. 10 fr.

P. Dumont, S.J. *Liberté humaine et Concours divin.* Bibliothèque des Archives de Philosophie: Paris. Beauchesne. 1936. Pp. vi + 384. 32 fr.

Various. *Etudes Critiques.* Archives de Philosophie, Vol. XII, cahier iii. Paris: Beauchesne. 1936. Pp. 279. 50 fr.

R. Verneau. *Les Sources cartésiennes et kantiennes de l'Idéalisme français.* Bibliothèque des Archives de Philosophie. Paris: Beauchesne. 1936. Pp. 528. 40 fr.

A. Cuvillier. *Introduction à la Sociologie.* (Collection Armand Colin.) Paris: Colin. 1936. Pp. 208. 10.50 fr.

M. Blondel. *L'Action. I. Le problème des causes secondes et le pur agir* Paris: F. Alcan. 1937. Pp. 492. 50 fr.

Actualités scientifique et industrielles:—

J. Pacotte. *Le Physicalisme dans le cadre de l'Empirisme intégral.* Pp. 52. 10fr.

P. Renaud. *Essai sur les définitions expérimentales des opérations chimiques.* Pp. 39. 10 fr.

G. Matisse. *Interprétation philosophique des relations d'incertitude et déterminisme.* Pp. 30. 8 fr.

M. Boll. *La Science des caractères dans ses relations avec la méthode scientifique.* Pp. 39. 8 fr.

Exposés d'histoire et philosophie des sciences: iv et v:—

A. Stern. *La Philosophie des valeurs. Regard sur ses tendances actuelles en Allemagne.* Première partie, pp. 72, 15 fr.; deuxième partie, pp. 61, 14 fr.

Histoire de la pensée scientifique:—

F. Enriques et G. de Santillana. *I. Les Ioniens et la nature des choses.* Pp. 76. 12 fr. *II. Le Problème de la matière. Pythagoriciens et Eléates.* Pp. 62. 10 fr. *III. Les Derniers 'Physiologues' de la Grèce.* Pp. 45. 8 fr. Paris: Hermann & Cie. 1936.

J.-J. Vallory. *Poussières de physique. Glanes dans le champ du sauvage subtil.* Tome II. Paris: Rieder. 1937. Pp. 495. 60 fr.

E. Denissoff. *L'Eglise Russe devant le Thomisme.* Paris: J. Vrin. 1937. Pp. 69. 15 fr.

R. Ruyer. *La Conscience et le corps.* Paris: F. Alcan. 1937. Pp. 141. 10 fr.

Varies. *Thalès.* (Institut d'Histoire des Sciences et des Techniques de l'Université de Paris. Recueil Annuel des Travaux et Bibliographie, 1935.) Paris: F. Alcan. 1936. Pp. 292. 40 fr.

F. Klatt. *Rainer Maria Rilke. Sein Auftrag in heutiger Zeit.* Berlin: L. Schneider. 1936. Pp. 82.

G. Chiavacci. *Saggio sulla natura dell'Uomo.* Firenze: G. C. Sansoni. 1936. Pp. xi + 116. Lire 12.

M. Casotti. *La Pedagogia di Antonio Rosmini e le sue Basi Filosofiche.* Milano: "Vita e Pensiero. 1937. Pp. vii + 190. Lire dodici.

C. Astrada. *Idealismo Fenomenologico y Metafiscia Existencial.* Buenos Aires: Imprenta de la Universidad. 1936. Pp. 132.

T. M. Sparks, O.P. *De Divisione Causae Exemplaris apud S. Thomam.* Dominican House of Studies, River Forest, Illinois, U.S.A. (Published privately.) Pp. 63. 1 dollar.

Opera hactenus inedita Rogeri Baconi. Fasc. XIV. Liber de Sensu et Sensato. Summa de Sophismatibus et Distinctionibus. Nunc primum edidit R. Steele. London: Oxford Clarendon Press, Humphrey Milford. 1937. Pp. xviii + 221. 17s. 6d.

THE NINTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF PHILOSOPHY
(Congrès Descartes)

Organized by the Société Française de Philosophie under the presidency of Monsieur Henri Bergson

Will be held in Paris, August 1st–6th, 1937.

THE Congress will commemorate the third centenary of the publication of Descartes's *Discours de la Méthode*. Communications have been promised from 280 contributors, among whom are philosophers representative of every European country. The work of the Congress, which will consist mainly in the discussion of these papers, is to be divided into five sections, as follows:

1. *The Present Position of Cartesian Studies.*
2. *The Unity of Science.*
   (*a*) *Methodology and the methods of the special sciences.*
   (*b*) *The History of the Problem in Antiquity, in the Middle Ages and in Modern Times.*
3. *Logic and Mathematics: Logic, Logistic and the Philosophy of Mathematics.*
4. *Causality and Determinism in Physics and Biology; Probability and Statistics.*
5. *Reflective Analysis and Transcendence: Mind and Body.*
6. *Value and Reality: Ethical, Social and Aesthetical Norms.*

Of the communications promised, 210 treat of problems falling under Sections 2–6, from the standpoint of their present position and interest, the 70 belonging to Section 1 are alone concerned with Cartesianism, its history, influence, the interpretation and relations of its doctrine.

Invitations are extended to readers of *Philosophy* to participate as either "active members" or "associate members" (fee payable respectively, 80 francs or 40 francs). The former alone take active part in the work of the Congress and receive a copy of its *Actes*.

Applications for either membership or inquiries concerning the privileges accorded—(reduced train fares, admission to the *Exposition Internationale*, etc.)—should be addressed to Monsieur R. Bayer, 26, avenue Théophile-Gautier, Paris, XVI.

The Director of Studies of the British Institute of Philosophy (14, *Gordon Square, London, W.C.*1) *would be obliged if members of the Institute intending to be present at the Congress would inform him, in addition to sending their applications to Monsieur R. Bayer.*

S. V. K.

Deuxième circulaire.

DEUXIÈME CONGRÈS INTERNATIONAL D'ESTHÉTIQUE ET DE SCIENCE DE L'ART PARIS, 1937

MONSIEUR,

L'Association pour l'Étude des Arts et les Recherches relatives à la Science de l'Art a l'honneur de vous rappeler qu'en Juin 1936 elle vous a adressé une circulaire vous faisant connaître qu'elle organise, à l'occasion de l'Exposition Universelle de 1937 à Paris, du Dimanche 8 au Mercredi 11 Août inclus, un Congrès International d'Esthétique et de Science de l'Art auquel elle serait heureuse que vous puissiez participer.

L'Association vous avisait qu'elle avait nommé un Comité d'organisation dont le Bureau est composé comme suit:

Présidents d'Honneur:

M. Henri BERGSON, de l'Académie Française.
M. Paul VALÉRY, de l'Académie Française.
M. Paul CLAUDEL, Ambassadeur de France.

Président:

M. Victor BASCH, Professeur honoraire d'esthétique à la Sorbonne, 8, rue Huysmans, Paris-VI[e].

Vice-Président Trésorier:

M. Charles LALO, Chargé du Cours d'esthétique à la Sorbonne, 7, rue Mirabeau, Paris-XVI[e].

Secrétaire Général:

M. Raymond BAYER, Docteur ès-lettres, Agrégé de Philosophie, 26, avenue Théophile-Gautier, Paris-XVI[e].

Elle vous faisait savoir que le Congrès serait divisé en trois sections:

I. *Esthétique générale et Histoire de l'Esthétique.*
II. *Histoire et Critique de l'Art.*
III. *Science et Technique des Arts.*

Nous sommes en mesure d'ajouter aujourd'hui que la section de *Psychologie Esthétique*, prévue au Congrès de Psychologie de Madrid, a été transférée à notre congrès, d'accord avec le Comité du Congrès International de Psychologie. Nous avons donc organisé une quatrième section:

IV. *Psychologie esthétique*

et nous prions instamment les psychologues qui désirent y faire une communication de se faire inscrire dès maintenant.

Les quatre grands thèmes, sur lesquels portera la discussion des *séances*

plénières, toute liberté de choix étant laissée pour les questions traitées dans les séances de travail, sont:

1°) Esthétique et Science de l'Art.
2°) Quelques méthodes récentes de l'esthétique (méthodes phénoménologique et psychanalytique).
3°) Esthétique, sociologie et culture.
4°) Les grands courants artistiques dans l'Europe du XX^{e} siècle.

DISPOSITIONS PRATIQUES

Plus de 120 communications, émanant de savants réputés de tous les pays, ont déjà été annoncées au Comité. Nous prions vivement ceux d'entre les esthéticiens qui n'ont pas encore rempli cette formalité de faire parvenir, *au plus tôt*, le titre choisi par eux à l'adresse suivante: M. Raymond Bayer, Secrétaire du Comité, 26, avenue Théophile-Gautier, Paris-XVI^{e} (Tél. Aut. 06-28). Un résumé *dactylographié* de 1.000 mots maximum pour chaque communication (environ 3 pages de dactylographie courante) devra être envoyé au Secrétariat au 1er *Mars* 1937 dernier délai. Ce résumé seul sera imprimé et figurera dans le volume des Actes du Congrès. La durée des communications en séance est fixée à 1/4 d'heure. Chaque intervention sur les communications présentées pourra durer au maximum 5 minutes. Les langues admises sont, suivant l'usage des congrès scientifiques, l'allemand, l'anglais, l'espagnol, le français et l'italien.

ORGANISATION MATÉRIELLE

Le Congrès qui aura lieu à Paris, du 8 au 11 Août 1937, suivra immédiatement le Congrès International de Philosophie qui doit se réunir à Paris à cette époque, et bénéficiera, comme lui, des avantages réservés aux Congrès agréés par le Commissariat Général de l'Exposition Internationale de Paris. C'est ainsi que l'entrée gratuite à l'Exposition est accordée à tous les Congressistes pendant toute la durée du Congrès. Le Comité s'occupe activement de l'organisation de réceptions spéciales, soirées de gala, excursions, visites d'ateliers, manifestations d'art. Des réductions importantes sur tous les réseaux français pour le voyage d'aller et le voyage de retour, ainsi que pour tout voyage effectué sur le territoire français par les congressistes pendant leur séjour en France, des réductions variables mais analogues sur les réseaux ferroviaires étrangers: tels sont les avantages d'ores et déjà prévus. Une carte de légitimation dispensera du visa les ressortissants des pays pour lesquels le visa des passeports est nécessaire. Le logement des étrangers, étant particulièrement délicat aux dates choisies pour le Congrès, sera l'objet des soins du Comité: une liste par catégories des principaux hôtels, avec les prix moyens, va être établie incessamment par l'Agence de voyage dont le Comité d'organisation s'est réservé le concours.

Dès maintenant, en effet, le service d'information touristique est assuré par l'*Office des Congrès*, aux *Voyages DUCHEMIN-EXPRINTER*, 26, *avenue de l'Opéra, Paris* (1er). *Tél. Opéra* 56-41, qui est chargé de répondre à toute demande d'ordre matériel.

Nous signalons également que la *Cité Universitaire* mettra volontiers, dans la mesure de ses disponibilités et à des prix modiques, quelques chambres à la disposition d'étudiants ou de professeurs célibataires inscrits au Congrès. Il appartiendrait aux congressistes intéressés par l'offre qui nous est faite, de se mettre au plus tôt et *directement* en rapport avec leur fondation nationale à la Cité Universitaire, 19, boulevard Jourdan, Paris-14^{e}, pour retenir leur logement aux dates du Congrès.

Un comité d'accueil, enfin, se proposera plus spécialement de rendre agréable aux familles de nos hôtes leur séjour dans la capitale.

Le droit d'inscription est fixé pour les membres actifs à soixante francs français; à quarante francs pour les membres associés. Les membres associés bénéficieront de tous les avantages du Congrès, et auront la faculté d'assister à ses séances, mais ils ne pourront prendre une part active à ses travaux et n'en recevront pas les actes en volume. Pour les congressistes qui participent également au Congrès International de Philosophie, la cotisation de membre actif sera ramenée à cinquante francs.

On adressera les versements *au plus tard le* 30 *Juin* 1937:

1°) Soit directement au *Trésorier* (M. Charles Lalo, 7, rue Mirabeau, Paris-XVI^{e}. — Compte Chèque Postal: Paris 272-71).

2°) Soit par chèque à la *Société Générale*, Agence G, 27, boulevard Saint-Michel, Paris-V^{e} (Compte 23.826, Comité du Congrès d'esthétique).

Pour le Comité d'Organisation:
Victor Basch

Président du Comité
Professeur Honoraire à la Sorbonne
8, rue Huysmans, PARIS-VI^{e}.

Paris, 10 *Janvier* 1937.

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INSTITUTE NOTES

DURING the past term Professor W. G. de Burgh has delivered an interesting course of lectures on "Reason and Unreason in the Modern World."

The addresses at the Evening Meetings have been as follows: "Progress and Spiritual Values," by Professor Sir Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan; "The Modern Gospel of Unreason," by Professor W. G. de Burgh; "Should our Rulers be Biologists?" by N. J. T. Needham, Ph.D., Sc.D.

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CONTENTS

PAGE

I. PROGRESS AND SPIRITUAL VALUES: Professor Sir SARVEPALLI RADHAKRISHNAN 259

II. GREAT THINKERS: (XI) BISHOP BERKELEY: Professor T. E. JESSOP 276

III. OXFORD AND PHILOSOPHY: G. R. G. MURE, M.C., M.A. . . 291

IV. THE PLACE OF PHILOSOPHY IN HUMAN CULTURE: Professor W. T. STACE 302

V. TAKING SIDES IN PHILOSOPHY: GILBERT RYLE, M.A. . . 317

VI. PHILOSOPHICAL SURVEY:

PHILOSOPHY IN GERMANY 333

CONTEMPORARY INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 335

VII. NEW BOOKS 342

VIII. INSTITUTE NOTES 381

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